BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//Philosophy events - ECPv6.16.4.1//NONSGML v1.0//EN
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
X-ORIGINAL-URL:/philevents
X-WR-CALDESC:Events for Philosophy events
REFRESH-INTERVAL;VALUE=DURATION:PT1H
X-Robots-Tag:noindex
X-PUBLISHED-TTL:PT1H
BEGIN:VTIMEZONE
TZID:Europe/London
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZOFFSETFROM:+0000
TZOFFSETTO:+0100
TZNAME:BST
DTSTART:20200329T010000
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:+0100
TZOFFSETTO:+0000
TZNAME:GMT
DTSTART:20201025T010000
END:STANDARD
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZOFFSETFROM:+0000
TZOFFSETTO:+0100
TZNAME:BST
DTSTART:20210328T010000
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:+0100
TZOFFSETTO:+0000
TZNAME:GMT
DTSTART:20211031T010000
END:STANDARD
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZOFFSETFROM:+0000
TZOFFSETTO:+0100
TZNAME:BST
DTSTART:20220327T010000
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:+0100
TZOFFSETTO:+0000
TZNAME:GMT
DTSTART:20221030T010000
END:STANDARD
END:VTIMEZONE
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211101T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211101T170000
DTSTAMP:20211101T155343Z
CREATED:20210803T182404Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20211101T155343Z
UID:10001353-1635778800-1635786000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics Seminar Thomas Randriamahazaka (University of 58łÔšĎ)
DESCRIPTION:Title: On Beall and Camrud’s defence of the combinatorial argument for FDE\n\nAbstract: In their 2020 paper “FDE all the way up”\, Beall and Camrud aim to defend a particular combinatorial argument for the paraconsistent and paracomplete logic FDE against a natural objection. The argument\, roughly\, states that\, since logic must consider all possibilities\, it is not enough to have the ‘True’ and the ‘False’ in the correct set of truth-values but there also must be all combinations of these two fundamental truth-values\, namely ‘Both True and False’ and ‘Neither True Nor False’. Including those combinatorial truth-values yields FDE. The objection Beall and Camrud consider consists in the idea that it must be possible to iterate the processus of combining truth-values. The gist of Beall and Camrud’s defence is that iterating the operation of ‘taking combinations of truth-values’ do not change the logic after one gets to FDE.  In this talk\, I argue that their defence fails because the formal definition of the operation of ‘taking combinations of truth-values’ that they use\, namely Priest’s positive plurivalence\, fails to deliver FDE when applied to the two-valued matrix of classical logic. Indeed\, I argue\, one must stay consistent in what notion of ‘taking combinations of truth-values’ one uses throughout the combinatorial argument and the defence against the objection. One can find\, to my knowledge\, two such notions in the literature: Priest’s positive plurivalence and Priest’s general plurivalence. Depending on which one uses\, one find oneself with a combinatorial argument (immune to the natural objection) for Priest’s logic LP or Oller’s logic AL. The conclusion of the talk takes the form of a challenge: to defend the combinatorial argument for FDE against the natural objection\, one must find a notion of ‘taking combinations of truth-values’ which (a) produces the four-valued matrix of FDE when applied to the two-valued matrix of classical logic and (b) always produces FDE as a logic when iterated starting from the four-valued matrix of FDE. The notion used by Beall and Camrud in their paper satisfies (b) but fails to satisfy (a). By contrast\, I put forward in the talk a natural proposal which satisfies (a) but fails to satisfy (b). This leaves me quite skeptical that the challenge can be met and that any such combinatorial argument for FDE can survive the natural objection.
URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-seminar-7/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58łÔšĎ\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211108T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211108T170000
DTSTAMP:20211108T162310Z
CREATED:20210810T191046Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20211108T162310Z
UID:10001360-1636383600-1636390800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics Seminar Frederik Andersen (University of 58łÔšĎ)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Logical Akrasia \n\nAbstract: The aim of this paper is two-fold. First\, it introduces the concept logical akrasia (by analogy to epistemic akrasia). Second\, it discusses how logical akrasia relates to the standards of epistemic rationality\, and in particular\, how logical akrasia might pose a challenge to the tenability of the controversial xed point thesis.
URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-seminar-8/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58łÔšĎ\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211115T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211115T170000
DTSTAMP:20211115T163842Z
CREATED:20210817T195421Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20211115T163842Z
UID:10001367-1636988400-1636995600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics Seminar Thomas Ferguson (City University of New York)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Intensional Subject-Matter in Subsystems of Analytic Implication \nAbstract: Although one tends to think of truth or falsity as the predominant semantic feature with which logic is concerned\, a number of logics exist that give the feature of topic or subject-matter equal weight. Just as we expect compositional truth conditions to extend to the entirety of a formal language\, the promise of such topic-sensitive logics requires that conditions on subject-matter are defined over the full language. Past treatments of the subject-matter of intensional connectives (like intensional conditionals) have been relatively coarse and carry with them a number of counterintuitive features. A natural place to start is by examining Kit Fine’s 1986 semantics for Parry’s logic of analytic implication\, in which the conditionals play either no role—or a degenerate\, token role—in the determination of subject-matter. In this talk\, I will present axiomatizations for subsystems of Parry’s analytic implication in which the subject-matter of the intensional conditional allows a fine degree of control. Given the proximity between Fine’s 1986 semantics and Berto’s semantics for topic-sensitive intentional modals (TSIMs)\, the framework can be immediately exported to TSIMs. I will conclude by discussing how to derive accounts of the subject-matter of other intensional conditionals\, modal operators\, and TSIMs themselves in this context.
URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-seminar-9/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58łÔšĎ\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211122T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211122T170000
DTSTAMP:20211122T170828Z
CREATED:20210824T200930Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20211122T170828Z
UID:10001374-1637593200-1637600400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics Seminar Lorraine Keller (Saint Joseph’s University)
DESCRIPTION:Title: The Access Problem for Act-type Theories of Propositions \nAbstract: Recent work on propositions has seen the rise of act-type theories\, according to which propositions are types of cognitive acts that derive their representational and truth-conditional properties from the token cognitive acts of agents. Act-type theories have been gaining traction as part of a rejection of what is called the ‘Fregean conception’\, a “traditional” conception of propositions according to which they are intrinsically representational\, mind- and language-independent abstracta\, while cognitive attitudes such as belief and doubt derive their representational properties from their relation to propositions. Act-type theorists present two main objections to the Fregean conception: \n\n(i) The Explanation Problem: by construing propositions as non-derivatively representational and deriving the representation of the cognitive attitudes from the representation of propositions\, Fregean theories turn truth-apt mental representation into an unsolvable mystery.\n(ii) The Access Problem: by construing propositions as mind- and language-independent abstracta\, Fregean theories make our cognitive access to them an additional unsolvable mystery.\n\nHowever\, in their attempt to evade the difficulties that plague the Fregean conception\, act-type theorists run into problems of their own—mainly centering around the crucial notion of predication. Peter Hanks has argued that the notion of predication at the heart of Scott Soames’ theory cannot explain representation and is incoherent (Hanks 2015: 36-39). And in a recent paper\, Indrek Reiland endorses Hanks’ criticism of Soames\, but argues that Hanks’ attempt to address objections to his own notion of predication is unsuccessful (Reiland 2019). Reiland offers a modified version of Hanks’ view that allegedly succeeds where Hanks’ proposed solution fails. I argue that the way Reiland modifies his view leads to a particularly acute version of the Access Problem. I then point out that this is a problem for Hanks and Soames as well\, and that\, by examining the way in which their theories face the Access Problem\, we can see that they are also unable to solve the Explanation Problem.
URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-seminar-10/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58łÔšĎ\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211129T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211129T170000
DTSTAMP:20211129T173913Z
CREATED:20210831T210947Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20211129T173913Z
UID:10001408-1638198000-1638205200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics Seminar Francesca Poggiolesi (Univeristy of Paris)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Explanatory (or Grounding) Proofs: Philosophical Framework\, Core Ideas\, Results \nAbstract: When it comes to the question of what proofs serve for\, since the antiquity two possible answers have been identified: on the one hand\, a proof can serve to show that something is true\, on the other hand\, a proof can also serve to explain why something is true. The first type of proofs are called “proofs-that”\, whilst the latter “proofs-why” or “explanatory proofs”. A great part of the logic of the XX century has been dedicated to the formalization and the development of proofs-that\, leaving untouched the analysis of proofs-why.  In this talk we will try to fill this gap and explore the realm of explanatory proofs. We will offer a formalization of explanatory proofs and we will attempt to show what type of results can be obtained with such a formalization.
URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-seminar-12/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58łÔšĎ\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR