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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240501T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240501T170000
DTSTAMP:20260615T035956
CREATED:20240401T011457Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240501T043926Z
UID:10002001-1714575600-1714582800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics and Logic Seminar: Roy Sorensen (UT Austin and University of 58³Ô¹Ï)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Seeing Holes-without seeing what they are holes in \nAbstract: Peering down into a tall box\, you see a ring. The ring is removed. To your surprise this uncovers a second duplicate ring. Did you see the hole of the bottom ring before you saw the bottom ring? Each answer is backed by good reasons. I resolve the antinomy by arguing yes: you saw the bottom hole without seeing what it was a hole in! Therefore\, a hole cannot be a part of what it is a hole in – its host. For a hole can be seen without seeing its host. Nor can a hole be an intrinsic property of its host\, such as its shape. Nor can it be a way of seeing its host. Seeing a hole is not a matter of seeing the matter in which it is a hole. The metaphysical dependence of a hole on its host does not make it perceptually dependent. Seeing a hole merely requires matter to serve as a visual aid. This loosened association between hosts and holes confirms other theories of holes such as the theory that holes are spacetime regions. \nThere will be a little magic show to illustrate the nature of holes and how they are seen.
URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-roy-sorensen-ut-austin-and-university-of-st-andrews/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 and via MS Teams
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240508T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240508T170000
DTSTAMP:20260615T035956
CREATED:20240408T015515Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240508T051528Z
UID:10002011-1715180400-1715187600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics and Logic Seminar: Zoé McConaughey (University of Lille)
DESCRIPTION:Title: History of logic as a tool for exploring the plurality of logical frameworks \nAbstract: \nI will outline another type of logical pluralism than the one now famously proposed by Beall and Restall (2006). I will argue that in addition to paying attention to particular logics\, such as classical\, intuitionnistic\, relevance logics\, etc.\, it is important to study the different frameworks in which these particular logics are expressed\, such a model-theoretic\, proof-theoretic\, or game-theoretic frameworks. This provides a different kind of logical pluralism\, namely a pluralism for logical frameworks. It is a dimension to take into account when studying logics from different cultures\, which should be of particular interest to feminist or decolonial approaches to logic\, but also when studying logics from different times\, and I will focus on this point\, taking Aristotle’s logic as a case study.\nBy comparing different modern formalizations of Aristotle’s assertoric syllogistic\, I will highlight the fact that the choice of logical framework injects within a particular logic (syllogistic in this case) the basic principles constitutive of this framework. In this fashion\, an uncritical formalization of an ancient logic risks injecting in the ancient texts the modern logician’s preconceptions regarding what logic is\, inherited from their preferred logical framework. I will present the dialogical reconstruction of syllogistic I worked out in my PhD dissertation (2021) in order to show that different logical paradigms are embedded in logical frameworks\, and can completely change the meaning of logic\, even when the logical result stay the same.
URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-zoe-mcconaughey-university-of-lille/
LOCATION:Online Meeting via Teams
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240515T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240515T170000
DTSTAMP:20260615T035956
CREATED:20240415T022501Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240515T052345Z
UID:10002023-1715785200-1715792400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics and Logic Seminar: Sabina Domínguez Parrado (University of 58³Ô¹Ï and University of Amsterdam)
DESCRIPTION:Title: A New Problem for Logical Contextualism \nAbstract: Logical contextualism is the view that ‘valid’ is a context-sensitive expression. One key reason to endorse logical contextualism is that\, unlike traditional forms of logical pluralism\, it can avoid the so-called collapse problem. Logical contextualism relies on the crucial assumption that each conversational context determines a uniquely appropriate logical consequence relation. In this talk\, I argue for two points. First\, I put pressure on this crucial assumption by focusing on the design of several card-selection tasks. Second\, I show that\, once this assumption is rejected\, logical contextualism does not solve the collapse problem. In light of these two points\, my conclusion will be that logical contextualism\, as currently developed\, is a less promising view than thus far appreciated.
URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-sabina-dominguez-parrado-university-of-st-andrews-and-university-of-amsterdam/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 and via MS Teams
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240522T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240522T170000
DTSTAMP:20260615T035956
CREATED:20240422T035030Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240522T055309Z
UID:10002037-1716390000-1716397200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics and Logic Seminar: Matteo Nizzardo (University of 58³Ô¹Ï and University of Stirling)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Reference Without Identity \nAbstract: Singular reference to non-individuals is often thought to be impossible. At present\, however\, this claim rests solely on intuitions. In this paper\, I present four arguments in favour of the impossibility of singular reference to non-individuals.
URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-matteo-nizzardo-university-of-st-andrews-and-university-of-stirling/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 and via MS Teams
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240529T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240529T170000
DTSTAMP:20260615T035956
CREATED:20240429T042433Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240529T062312Z
UID:10002050-1716994800-1717002000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics and Logic Seminar: Hannes Leitgeb (MCMP)
DESCRIPTION:Title: When Rules Define Logical Operators: Rules as Second-Order Definitions \nAbstract: Logical inferentialists hold that the meaning of logical operators is given by their rules of inference. Arthur Prior cast doubt on this by introducing rules for his so-called tonk operator that seemed to allow for the derivation of any sentence whatsoever from any sentence whatsoever. The obvious inferentialist reply was to require constraints on the defining rules\, such as conservativeness (Belnap) or harmony (Dummett). In my talk\, I will propose a different criterion for when rules define logical operators that (i) is philosophically principled in taking the idea of rules as definitions perfectly seriously\, (ii) explains how the semantic meaning of the operators can be determined from their rules\, (iii) is local in a similar sense as harmony is\, (iv) validates the intuitionistic natural deduction rules and the intuitionistic/classical sequent calculus rules as defining the classical logical operators while ruling out Prior’s rules for tonk\, (v) makes clear why already the intuitionistic natural deduction rules define the classical meaning of logical operators so long as metavariables are interpreted as expressing arbitrary classical propositions\, (vi) validates the classical natural deduction rules as analytic\, and (vii) does not guarantee conservativeness in Belnap’s sense but in a closely related one that still entails consistency. The basic idea will be: rules define a classical logical operator just in case they translate into an explicit definition in pure classical second-order logic.
URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-hannes-leitgeb-mcmp/
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
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