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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20251105T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20251105T170000
DTSTAMP:20260612T023551
CREATED:20250902T154005Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250907T163929Z
UID:10002552-1762354800-1762362000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics and Logic Seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-61/
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20251105T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20251105T170000
DTSTAMP:20260612T023551
CREATED:20250908T164036Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20251105T013808Z
UID:10002591-1762354800-1762362000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics and Logic Seminar: Jason Carter\, “Plato on What is Not:  Negation and Non-Being in the Theaetetus and Sophist”
DESCRIPTION:Quine\, in ‘On What There Is’\, discusses a problem that he calls the ‘Platonic riddle of nonbeing’. The riddle is this: ‘Nonbeing must in some sense be; otherwise what is it that there is not?’ (Quine 1948\, 21). Take Pegasus\, the flying stallion of Bellerophon\, and the statement\, ‘Pegasus does not exist’. On the one hand\, if the word ‘Pegasus’ does not have a referent\, it seems that there is nothing there to negate; on the other\, if it does have a referent\, it seems that we are forced to affirm and deny Pegasus’ existence\, which is incoherent. Quine suggests that Plato grasped the second horn of this dilemma\, nicknaming it ‘Plato’s beard’. According to this solution\, empty names refer to subsistent entities\, that is\, entities that have some form of being\, but do not exist. But was Quine right that Plato had a beard? In this paper\, I set out the Platonic riddle of non-being in the way that Plato did in the Theaetetus and the Sophist – not as a riddle about negative existential statements in particular\, but as a riddle about how negation is possible in the first place. I argue that Plato’s own solution to the riddle turns on rejecting the view that predicating non-being of something is an assertion of its non-existence\, or its being nothing\, in favour of the view that to negate is to assert a relative difference between an existing subject and its negated predicate. I argue that\, given some of Plato’s assumptions about the non-transparency of reference\, his difference interpretation of negation can solve the Platonic riddle of nonbeing\, but not in the tangled way that Quine alleged.
URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-franz-berto-tba/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 and via MS Teams
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20251112T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20251112T150000
DTSTAMP:20260612T023551
CREATED:20250908T164037Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20251112T023821Z
UID:10002592-1762952400-1762959600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics and Logic Seminar: Franz Berto\, Bestimmte Negation (Or: What Is Hegel’s Dialectic?)
DESCRIPTION:I think Hegel’s dialectic is\, in Brandomian fashion\, a very inferentialist theory of concepts. There’s conspicuous textual evidence that the majority of theoretical claims in the Phenomenology\, the Science of Logic\, the Encyclopaedia\, are about conceptual connections. Conceptual contents are individuated by the connections with the concepts they entail and which entail them. Since theoretical as well as ordinary language expressions can be governed by incoherent inferential links\, dialectic has to reshape them (one may see it as 19th century conceptual engineering). In particular\, concepts are shaped by relations of modal incompatibility or exclusion. So Hegel claims in the Science of Logic that the essence of dialectic lies in a certain idea of negation: the ‘quite simple insight’ of ‘the logical principle that the negative is just as much positive’\, is all we need to understand dialectic. I propose that what he calls bestimmte Negation\, determinate or ‘positive’ negation\, is such modal exclusion\, out of which blosse Negation\, mere negation\, i.e.\, the contradictory-forming operator\, is abstracted as the minimal incompatible.
URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-viviane-fairbank-tba-2/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 and via MS Teams
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20251112T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20251112T170000
DTSTAMP:20260612T023551
CREATED:20250902T154018Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250907T163929Z
UID:10002560-1762959600-1762966800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics and Logic Seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-62/
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20251119T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20251119T170000
DTSTAMP:20260612T023551
CREATED:20250902T154019Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250907T163942Z
UID:10002568-1763564400-1763571600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics and Logic Seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-63/
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20251119T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20251119T180000
DTSTAMP:20260612T023551
CREATED:20250908T164049Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20251119T030920Z
UID:10002593-1763568000-1763575200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics and Logic Seminar: Soroush Rafiee Rad\, “Probabilities with Gaps and Gluts”
DESCRIPTION:Belnap-Dunn logic (BD)\, sometimes also known as First Degree Entailment\, is a four-valued propositional logic that complements the classical truth values of True and False with two non-classical truth values Neither and Both. The latter two are to account for the possibility of the available information being incomplete or providing contradictory evidence. We present a probabilistic extension of BD that permits agents to have probabilistic beliefs about the truth and falsity of a proposition. We briefly look into the axiomatization for the framework defined and also identify policies for conditionalization and aggregation.
URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-soroush-rafiee-rad-tba/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 and via MS Teams
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20251126T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20251126T170000
DTSTAMP:20260612T023551
CREATED:20250902T154033Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250907T163954Z
UID:10002576-1764169200-1764176400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics and Logic Seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-64/
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20251126T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20251126T180000
DTSTAMP:20260612T023551
CREATED:20250908T164101Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20251126T034100Z
UID:10002594-1764172800-1764180000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics and Logic Seminar: Justin D’Ambrosio\, “The Meaning of ‘Means'”
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: Semantic theories are supposed to be theories of meaning\, so ascriptions of meaning should play a role in guiding and constraining our semantic theories. To play this role\, however\, we need to know the meaning of “means” itself. In this paper I develop a semantics for the verb “means\,” as it is used to specify the meanings of natural language expressions. According to the view I propose—which I call the type-polymorphism view—the type of “means” is flexible\, and shifts to accept whatever type of expression occurs in its complement. I formalize this view in a system that extends standard type theory to accommodate polymorphism: System F. I go on to argue that proponents of higher-order approaches to natural language semantics—who state their semantic theories in a higher-order metalanguage—can and should see themselves as stating their semantic theories using the verb “means.” But this approach is not available to proponents of first-order\, model-theoretic approaches to semantic theorizing. As a consequence\, I argue\, only higher-order approaches are genuinely offering theories of meaning.
URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-justin-dambrosio-tba/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 and via MS Teams
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
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