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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20251203T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20251203T170000
DTSTAMP:20260612T023331
CREATED:20250904T161002Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250907T164005Z
UID:10002584-1764774000-1764781200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics and Logic Seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-65/
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20251203T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20251203T170000
DTSTAMP:20260612T023331
CREATED:20250908T164114Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20251203T043844Z
UID:10002595-1764774000-1764781200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics and Logic Seminar: Giulia Schirripa\, “How Could There Be Intedeterminacy in the Social World?”
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: Contemporary metaphysics is a multi-faceted enterprise\, enriched by a plurality of approaches that often lead to methodological conflicts. A central conundrum concerns the boundaries of realist metaphysics when the social world is the focus of theorising. The traditional definition of realism precludes social reality from having the relevant kind of objective joints that social metaphysicians aim to track. Although the debate has so far targeted the `objectivity’ component of standard realism\, centring around notions like fundamentality or mind-independence\, I maintain that the determinacy of metaphysical claims—the other core component—also represents an important\, yet highly overlooked\, locus of contention. The specific aim of this paper is to explore how worldly social indeterminacy could represent a compelling phenomenon motivating a revision of the determinacy component of traditional metaphysics. To this end\, I distinguish between two kinds of constructional indeterminacy\, `product’ and `process’ indeterminacy\, and explain their respective meta-metaphysical demands. Albeit both viable options\, I argue that process indeterminacy is more compelling because less committal and revisionary. Interactive kinds\, whose existence is widely accepted\, are shown to be paradigmatic instances of this type of constructional indeterminacy.
URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-giulia-schirripa-tba/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 and via MS Teams
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20251210T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20251210T170000
DTSTAMP:20260612T023331
CREATED:20250911T165516Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20251210T052309Z
UID:10002613-1765378800-1765386000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics and Logic Seminar: Patrick Todd\, “The Open Future: ‘will’\, negation\, credence\, and an extended error-theory”
DESCRIPTION:In Todd 2021 (The Open Future: Why Future Contingents are All False) I defended a kind of pragmatic “error-theory” regarding ordinary judgments about the interaction of ‘will’ and negation.  On the view I defended\, ‘will’ involves an essentially modal component\, in the form of a universal quantifier over the “available” histories.  But this view faces an objection: we do not tend to hear a distinction between ‘not: will’ and ‘will not’.  Response: that is because we typically assume (falsely\, I suggest) that there is always only ever one available history\, in which case the scope of the negation makes no difference.  In this talk\, I aim to review and clarify the essential components of this pragmatic account — and I attempt to sketch an improved story about how a similar strategy might help my “all false” open future view respond to a persistent objection involving credence.  Here I try to build on some anti-“Molinist” remarks of Anscombe and van Inwagen regarding counterfactuals.
URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-patrick-todd-tba/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 and via MS Teams
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20251217T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20251217T170000
DTSTAMP:20260612T023331
CREATED:20250918T175515Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20251217T055312Z
UID:10002627-1765983600-1765990800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics and Logic Seminar: Sabina Dominguez Parrado\, “What are logical pluralists pluralist about?”
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: This talk clarifies and reassesses the scope of logical pluralism. I first argue that philosophers of logic often overlook an important distinction between the word ‘valid’\, the concept validity\, and the property validity. As a result\, it is often unclear what the subject matter of logical theories is\, and what exactly logical pluralists are pluralist about. With this distinction in mind\, I argue that the pluralist proposal advanced by Beall and Restall is best understood as the conjunction of individually plausible but jointly incompatible claims about the concept validity and the word ‘valid’. I then show that other extant forms of pluralism located at the linguistic and conceptual levels initially appear to avoid this tension but ultimately incur important difficulties. I conclude by considering the prospects for a coherent and substantial form of pluralism at the linguistic and conceptual levels.
URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-sabina-dominguez-parrado-tba/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 and via MS Teams
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
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