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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260415T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260415T170000
DTSTAMP:20260611T151256
CREATED:20260220T075320Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260226T080809Z
UID:10002708-1776265200-1776272400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics & Logic Seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-logic-seminar-13/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260415T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260415T170000
DTSTAMP:20260611T151256
CREATED:20260227T082321Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260415T020837Z
UID:10002755-1776265200-1776272400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics & Logic Seminar: Inferentialism Reading Group: Viviane Fairbank Leads a Discussion on Murzi and Steinberger’s “Inferentialism”
DESCRIPTION:The Inferentialism Reading group is running over the first three seminars of this semester of M&L. \nOn April 15th\, Viviane Fairbank will be leading a discussion on Julien Murzi & Florian Steinberger’s “Inferentialism“. \nOn April 22nd\, Harry Vincent will be leading a discussion Ladislav Koreň’s “Propositional Contents and the Logical Space“. \nOn April 29th\, Greg Restall will be leading a discussion Hans-Johann Glock’s “Why Rules Ought to Matter“. \nThese sessions will be run as ‘pre-read’ discussions\, and participants will be expected to have read the paper ahead of the seminar. \nInferentialism \nBy Murzi\, J. and Steinberger\, F. (2017). Inferentialism. In A Companion to the Philosophy of Language (eds B. Hale\, C. Wright and A. Miller). https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118972090.ch9 \nThis chapter introduces inferential role semantics (IRS) and some of the challenges it faces. It also introduces inferentialism and places it into the wider context of contemporary philosophy of language. The chapter focuses on what is standardly considered both the most important test case for and the most natural application of IRS: logical inferentialism\, the view that the meanings of the logical expressions are fully determined by the basic rules for their correct use\, and that to understand a logical expression is to use it in accordance with the appropriate rules. It discusses some of the benefits of logical inferentialism\, chiefly with regard to the epistemology of logic\, and considers a number of objections. The chapter critically examines Robert Brandom’s inferentialism about linguistic and conceptual content in general. Finally\, it considers a number of general objections to IRS and possible responses on the inferentialist’s behalf.
URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-logic-seminar-20/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260422T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260422T170000
DTSTAMP:20260611T151256
CREATED:20260220T075334Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260330T225327Z
UID:10002715-1776870000-1776877200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics & Logic Seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-logic-seminar-14/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260422T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260422T180000
DTSTAMP:20260611T151256
CREATED:20260331T230823Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260422T025310Z
UID:10002813-1776873600-1776880800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics & Logic Seminar: Inferentialism Reading Group: Harry Vincent Leads a Discussion on Ladislav Koreň’s “Propositional Contents and the Logical Space”.
DESCRIPTION:The Inferentialism Reading group is running over the first three seminars of this semester of M&L. \nOn April 22nd\, Harry Vincent will be leading a discussion Ladislav Koreň’s “Propositional Contents and the Logical Space“. \nOn April 29th\, Greg Restall will be leading a discussion Hans-Johann Glock’s “Why Rules Ought to Matter“. \nThese sessions will be run as ‘pre-read’ discussions\, and participants will be expected to have read the paper ahead of the seminar. \nPropositional Contents and the Logical Space \nBy Koreň\, L. (2018). Propositional Contents and the Logical Space. In From Rules to Meanings (eds O. Beran\, V. Kolman\, and L. Koreň). https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315103587-10 \nRobert Brandom’s formulation of the inferentialist doctrine advances a number of bold claims. One of them is that logical vocabulary has a distinctive expressive role to play in linguistic practice. It serves to make explicit\, in the content of claims\, material-inferential proprieties implicitly governing use of nonlogical expressions within discursive practices of making\, challenging\, and justifying claims. This chapter elaborates a challenge to this account of logic and its relation to prelogical discourse. It starts by situating it in a wider context of Brandom’s inferentialism. The chapter turns to Jaroslav Peregrin’s development of the inferentialist approach\, which contains a line of reasoning that flirts with an alternative conception of logic. Expressive role of logical vocabulary presupposes the intelligibility of a discursive practice having the pragmatic structure of practices of giving and asking for reasons whose participants are capable of expressing and endorsing inferentially articulated contents in claims made by means of nonlogical sentences. \n 
URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-logic-seminar-25/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260429T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260429T170000
DTSTAMP:20260611T151256
CREATED:20260220T075334Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260405T235352Z
UID:10002722-1777474800-1777482000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics & Logic Seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-logic-seminar-15/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260429T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260429T170000
DTSTAMP:20260611T151256
CREATED:20260406T235334Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260429T173816Z
UID:10002848-1777474800-1777482000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics & Logic Seminar: Inferentialism Reading Group: Greg Restall Leads a Discussion on Hans-Johann Glock’s “Why Rules Ought to Matter”
DESCRIPTION:The Inferentialism Reading group is running over the first three seminars of this semester of M&L. \nOn April 29th\, Greg Restall will be leading a discussion Hans-Johann Glock’s “Why Rules Ought to Matter“. \nThese sessions will be run as ‘pre-read’ discussions\, and participants will be expected to have read the paper ahead of the seminar. \nWhy Rules Ought to Matter \nBy Glock\, H. -J. (2018). Propositional Contents and the Logical Space. In From Rules to Meanings (eds O. Beran\, V. Kolman\, and L. Koreň). https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315103587-10 \nThe inferentialism of Brandom and Peregrin explains the notion of linguistic meaning by reference to rules governing communication. This chapter pursues the same idea\, but draws directly on Wittgenstein rather than contemporary inferentialism. It defends the idea that the meaning of an expression is constituted by the rules for its correct use. The chapter assuages the qualm that linguistic meaning is ultimately a notion that would be better off without and addresses arguments against the idea that meaning has an essential normative dimension. It distinguishes those linguistic rules that are constitutive of meaning from others and spells out the idea of correct use in a way that is not unilluminatingly circular. Wittgenstein’s strategy for clarifying meaning also appeals to how competent speakers understand an expression. The desideratum of identifying the semantically relevant features of use and the desideratum of pinpointing the normative dimension of meaning seem to stand in a potentially fatal tension. \n 
URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-logic-seminar-inferentialism-reading-group-greg-restall-leads-a-discussion-on-hans-johann-glocks-why-rules-ought-to-matter/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
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