BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//Philosophy events - ECPv6.16.3//NONSGML v1.0//EN
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
X-ORIGINAL-URL:/philevents
X-WR-CALDESC:Events for Philosophy events
REFRESH-INTERVAL;VALUE=DURATION:PT1H
X-Robots-Tag:noindex
X-PUBLISHED-TTL:PT1H
BEGIN:VTIMEZONE
TZID:Europe/London
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZOFFSETFROM:+0000
TZOFFSETTO:+0100
TZNAME:BST
DTSTART:20250330T010000
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:+0100
TZOFFSETTO:+0000
TZNAME:GMT
DTSTART:20251026T010000
END:STANDARD
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZOFFSETFROM:+0000
TZOFFSETTO:+0100
TZNAME:BST
DTSTART:20260329T010000
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:+0100
TZOFFSETTO:+0000
TZNAME:GMT
DTSTART:20261025T010000
END:STANDARD
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZOFFSETFROM:+0000
TZOFFSETTO:+0100
TZNAME:BST
DTSTART:20270328T010000
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:+0100
TZOFFSETTO:+0000
TZNAME:GMT
DTSTART:20271031T010000
END:STANDARD
END:VTIMEZONE
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260506T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260506T170000
DTSTAMP:20260611T135316
CREATED:20260220T075348Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260430T173815Z
UID:10002729-1778079600-1778086800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics & Logic Seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-logic-seminar-16/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260506T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260506T170000
DTSTAMP:20260611T135316
CREATED:20260501T173814Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260506T182311Z
UID:10002888-1778079600-1778086800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics & Logic Seminar: NO MEETING THIS WEEK
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-logic-seminar-patrick-greenough-flexible-essence-and-flexible-identity/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104\, University of 58�Թ�\, 58�Թ�\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260513T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260513T170000
DTSTAMP:20260611T135316
CREATED:20260220T075400Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260503T175321Z
UID:10002736-1778684400-1778691600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics & Logic Seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-logic-seminar-17/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260513T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260513T170000
DTSTAMP:20260611T135316
CREATED:20260504T175326Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260513T190825Z
UID:10002889-1778684400-1778691600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics & Logic Seminar: Greg Restall\, “The Logic of Paradox as a Substructural Logic”
DESCRIPTION:Graham Priest’s simple three-valued logic LP has many curious properties. It has the same valid formulas as classical logic\, but differs from classical logic when it comes to valid sequents. The valid sequents do not uniquely characterise the logic: it is possible to have more than one different LP-“negation”\, each of which satisfies all the LP-requirements\, without being equivalent. (The situation is not unlike modal operators in your favoured modal logic. A modal logic like S5 does not uniquely determine the meaning of the modal operators. The same goes for LP when characterised in terms of its consequence relation.)\n\n\n\nOne consequence of this fact is that extant proof-first characterisations of LP are unwieldy. In some systems\, connectives are given rules featuring negation and rules without; in others\, formulas occur positively or negatively signed\, and in others\, sequents have three positions in which formulas can occur instead of two. This makes relating LP to familiar logics on a proof-first basis difficult. \nThe simple three-valued logic ST (strict-tolerant logic) also has many curious properties. It has the same valid formulas and valid sequents as classical logic\, but differs from classical logic at the level of meta-inferential validity (rules obtaining between sequents). In ST\, the Cut rule is not generally valid: from A ⇒ B and B ⇒ C\, it need not follow that A ⇒ C. Understanding the distinctive behaviour of ST on an inferential level involves considering not only valid formulas and valid inferences but also valid meta-inferences. However\, keeping track of this ever-growing tower of consequence relations is also difficult. \nIn this talk\, I aim to address both of these issues in one go. I will exploit the relationship between LP and ST\, and some prior work on mildly bilateral treatments of natural deduction to provide a novel natural deduction proof system for both LP and ST that has the following features: \n\nEach connective rule is a standard natural deduction rule\, familiar from Gentzen.\nEach connective is uniquely characterised by rules governing it.\nThe difference between LP and ST on the one hand\, and classical logic on the other\, is the addition of a purely structural rule.\nThe relationship between the valid formulas\, the valid sequents\, and the valid meta-sequents in each of the logics in question (LP\, ST and classical logic) is uniquely and systematically determined by the rules governing the construction of proofs in the underlying calculus.\n\nThe aim of this exercise is not is to not only get a better understanding the breadth of the range of options for inferential presentations of logic LP and ST\, but to also deepen our understanding of the relationship between natural deduction and the sequent calculus (and meta-inferential relations above the level of the sequent)\, and the distinctive role of structural rules from each of these perspectives.
URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-logic-seminar-greg-restall-the-logic-of-paradox-as-a-substructural-logic/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260520T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260520T170000
DTSTAMP:20260611T135316
CREATED:20260220T075413Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260513T190826Z
UID:10002743-1779289200-1779296400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics & Logic Seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-logic-seminar-18/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260520T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260520T170000
DTSTAMP:20260611T135316
CREATED:20260514T190820Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260520T195325Z
UID:10002893-1779289200-1779296400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics & Logic Seminar: Luna Guan: “Simplicity without Identity”
DESCRIPTION:The doctrine of divine simplicity serves two roles in Christian theology—it upholds the creator-creation distinction by saying that only the divine ontology is absolutely simple whereas every other created being is a composite\, and it supports divine aseity by identifying the divine attributes with God. Traditional and contemporary versions of divine simplicity have filled these roles by assuming constituent ontology. Relational ontologies face two problems: God and creation are both metaphysically simple as the relational framework itself denies metaphysical parts; and a relational understanding of property as commonality is a violation of divine aseity. This paper presents an identity-less and non-trivial model of divine simplicity based in a relational ontology. By adopting prototype theory for qualitative spaces\, the two roles of divine simplicity are satisfied\, and the infamous theistic identity claims are avoided. Theories of properties based on conceptual spaces\, using qualitative notions of similarity\, and prototypes are common in philosophy of cognitive science. In this model\, divine attributes are properties understood as regions of qualitative spaces. Additionally\, understanding divine aseity in terms of metaphysical grounding\, I argue that prototypes and the proximity relations together ground the properties. Thus\, God and some facts about proximity are each a partial ground for the property goodness. By definition\, God’s goodness is at zero proximity to the prototype. As a result\, God is the full ground of God’s properties. This means that they all metaphysically depend on God alone\, which affirms divine aseity. This model shows that identity is not the core of the strong account of divine simplicity\, rather a consequence of attempting to articulate the doctrine within a particular ontological framework. The aim is to consider what divine simplicity would look like with a paradigm shift away from the constituent ontologies of Aquinas and the Thomists.
URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-logic-seminar-luna-guan-simplicity-without-identity/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260527T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260527T170000
DTSTAMP:20260611T135316
CREATED:20260226T080900Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260515T190845Z
UID:10002753-1779894000-1779901200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics & Logic Seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-logic-seminar-19/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260528T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260528T170000
DTSTAMP:20260611T135316
CREATED:20260516T190823Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260528T202316Z
UID:10002894-1779980400-1779987600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics & Logic Seminar: Christopher Masterman: “Are abstraction principles all that explanatory?””
DESCRIPTION:An increasingly popular view is that abstracta are thin—their existence alone makes little or no demand on the world. The most sophisticated defence of this view to date is the version of abstractionism found in Linnebo’s recent book Thin Objects (2018). On this view\, good abstraction principles should be understood as involving claims about asymmetric metaphysical dependencies between abstracta (e.g.\, directions\, letter types\, sets) and more familiar objects (e.g.\, lines\, letter tokens\, pluralities). In many ways\, such a view is a highly promising development of more traditional versions of abstractionism. However\, in this paper\, I argue that it\, and any view sufficiently like it\, should ultimately be rejected\, since it cannot adequately respond to a neglected explanatory challenge—what I call the characterisation challenge. This is the demand that any theory of abstracta should accommodate explanations for why abstracta are the way they are. In short\, I argue that the nature of abstracta problematically outstrips the explanatory resources available to this kind of ‘metaphysically serious’ abstractionism.
URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-logic-seminar-christopher-masterman-why-are-abstracta-the-way-they-are/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR