BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//Philosophy events - ECPv6.16.4.1//NONSGML v1.0//EN CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH X-ORIGINAL-URL:/philevents X-WR-CALDESC:Events for Philosophy events REFRESH-INTERVAL;VALUE=DURATION:PT1H X-Robots-Tag:noindex X-PUBLISHED-TTL:PT1H BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:Europe/London BEGIN:DAYLIGHT TZOFFSETFROM:+0000 TZOFFSETTO:+0100 TZNAME:BST DTSTART:20200329T010000 END:DAYLIGHT BEGIN:STANDARD TZOFFSETFROM:+0100 TZOFFSETTO:+0000 TZNAME:GMT DTSTART:20201025T010000 END:STANDARD BEGIN:DAYLIGHT TZOFFSETFROM:+0000 TZOFFSETTO:+0100 TZNAME:BST DTSTART:20210328T010000 END:DAYLIGHT BEGIN:STANDARD TZOFFSETFROM:+0100 TZOFFSETTO:+0000 TZNAME:GMT DTSTART:20211031T010000 END:STANDARD BEGIN:DAYLIGHT TZOFFSETFROM:+0000 TZOFFSETTO:+0100 TZNAME:BST DTSTART:20220327T010000 END:DAYLIGHT BEGIN:STANDARD TZOFFSETFROM:+0100 TZOFFSETTO:+0000 TZNAME:GMT DTSTART:20221030T010000 END:STANDARD END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210503T150000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210503T170000 DTSTAMP:20200819T113130Z CREATED:20200819T113130Z LAST-MODIFIED:20200819T113130Z UID:10001135-1620054000-1620061200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Metaphysics and Logic Seminar tba DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-tba-19/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210504T120000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210504T140000 DTSTAMP:20210504T101228Z CREATED:20210504T101228Z LAST-MODIFIED:20210504T101228Z UID:10001265-1620129600-1620136800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Language and Mind Seminar DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/language-and-mind-seminar-29/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210504T150000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210504T170000 DTSTAMP:20210504T101229Z CREATED:20200819T113130Z LAST-MODIFIED:20210504T101229Z UID:10001136-1620140400-1620147600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Conceptual Engineering Seminar | Mona Simion (Glasgow): “Engineering Evidence†DESCRIPTION:ABSTRACT. — Evidence matters in philosophy: the concept of evidence is central to both epistemology and the philosophy of science. Outside philosophy\, the concept of evidence is highly employed as well: lawyers\, judges\, historians and scientists\, investigative journalists and reporters\, as well as ordinary folk in the course of everyday life talk and think about evidence a lot. When one compares philosophical accounts of evidence with the way the concept is often employed in non-philosophical contexts\, however\, a puzzle soon emerges. Historically\, in philosophy\, having evidence has been spelled out in terms of being in one state of mind or another. The problem that often arises from this is that we have difficulties diagnosing resistance to evidence: people are often faced with strong evidence for p but refuse to take it up. In everyday talk and thought\, however\, having evidence has little to do with being in a particular state of mind. Rather\, one is said to have evidence for p when one has objects and facts available to them that render p likely. You will not convince any judge that you had no evidence for p just because you were not paying attention to or refusing to accept the facts supporting p lying in plain view. On the other hand\, the non-philosophical account of having evidence seems a bit too agent-insensitive: after all\, we are cognitively limited beings\, there is only so much information we can be expected to pick up from our environments. This paper is an exercise in unification: it proposes to engineer a novel concept of evidence had as available facts that raise the probability of knowledge. This view\, it is argued\, escapes this puzzle\, and has the capacity to play the roles it needs to play both within and outside philosophy. \nZOOM INFO \n\nMeeting ID: 892 5895 0975\nPassword: ACEW21\nInvite link: here URL:/philevents/event/conceptual-engineering-seminar-tba-19/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210505T110000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210505T123000 DTSTAMP:20200819T154432Z CREATED:20200819T112814Z LAST-MODIFIED:20200819T154432Z UID:10001064-1620212400-1620217800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-24/ ORGANIZER;CN="Ben Sachs":MAILTO:bas7@st-andrews.ac.uk END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210505T160000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210505T173000 DTSTAMP:20210505T101913Z CREATED:20210504T101421Z LAST-MODIFIED:20210505T101913Z UID:10001297-1620230400-1620235800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Joe Slater Talk DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/joe-slater-talk/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210505T160000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210505T180000 DTSTAMP:20210505T101917Z CREATED:20210504T101229Z LAST-MODIFIED:20210505T101917Z UID:10001266-1620230400-1620237600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Philosophy & Social Theory Arché Seminar DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/philosophy-social-theory-arche-seminar/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Philosophy & Social Theory Arché Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210506T100000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210506T120000 DTSTAMP:20210506T102042Z CREATED:20200819T113131Z LAST-MODIFIED:20210506T102042Z UID:10001137-1620295200-1620302400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Super Special Seminar tba DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/super-special-seminar-tba-23/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Super Special Seminar series END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210506T130000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210506T143000 DTSTAMP:20210506T102042Z CREATED:20200819T113131Z LAST-MODIFIED:20210506T102042Z UID:10001138-1620306000-1620311400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar: Lara Jost “Knowledge: Emotions\, Perception and Rational Agents†DESCRIPTION:Abstract: In contemporary analytic epistemology\, emotions are usually not considered to be a good justification for an agent’s belief\, in the same way perception\, memory\, reasoning or testimony are\, due to emotions facing issues when it comes to being reliable and sensitive to defeaters. In this talk\, I argue that this problem can be overcome if one reframes what is expected of emotions under rational guidance. Building on Jones (2003)\, I will propose that we need to consider emotions as participating to knowledge acquisition under a conception of epistemic agents as reason trackers rather than reason responders. This will enable me to build a model where the reliability and sensitivity of emotions can be explained through delayed calibration rather than immediate control. In order to strengthen this proposal\, I will highlight how perception is following the same pattern\, while benefiting from a better epistemic reputation than emotions. Finally\, I will discuss how the calibration of emotions is a dual process\, where calibration is influenced by both internal and social monitoring\, which explains why our emotions can offer good justification for belief. URL:/philevents/event/epistemology-seminar-tba-18/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210506T160000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210506T173000 DTSTAMP:20210506T102043Z CREATED:20200819T154433Z LAST-MODIFIED:20210506T102043Z UID:10001191-1620316800-1620322200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk – Jesse Tomalty (University of Bergen) DESCRIPTION:Title: Discrimination at the Border\n\nAbstract: In selecting among prospective immigrants\, it is widely accepted that states are morally permitted to differentiate on the basis of skill. By contrast\, differentiating among prospective immigrants on the basis of (perceived) traits such as race\, ethnicity\, or religion is widely held to amount to wrongful discrimination. I argue that these views are in tension. This is because the strongest account of why race\, ethnicity\, and religion are not morally acceptable criteria for selecting immigrants also rules out selection based on skill. What all of these criteria have in common is that their application fails to respect the moral equality of prospective immigrants. Given that states are obligated to respect the moral equality of all persons\, I argue that this implies that the set of morally acceptable criteria for selecting immigrants is narrower than many currently accept. URL:/philevents/event/ceppa-talk-jesse-tomalty-university-of-bergen/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210507T101500 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210507T114500 DTSTAMP:20200819T113131Z CREATED:20200819T113131Z LAST-MODIFIED:20200819T113131Z UID:10001139-1620382500-1620387900@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Medieval Logic Seminar tba DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/medieval-logic-seminar-tba-30/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210510T093000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210510T110000 DTSTAMP:20210510T104929Z CREATED:20210504T101230Z LAST-MODIFIED:20210510T104929Z UID:10001267-1620639000-1620644400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Medieval Logic Seminar: Dumbleton\, Summa Logicae DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/medieval-logic-seminar-dumbleton-summa-logicae/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210510T150000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210510T170000 DTSTAMP:20210510T104929Z CREATED:20200819T113135Z LAST-MODIFIED:20210510T104929Z UID:10001140-1620658800-1620666000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Metaphysics and Logic Seminar Helen Beebee (University of Manchester) DESCRIPTION:Title: The Genesis of Lewis’s Counterfactual Analysis of Causation\n\n\nAbstract: Lewis presented a prototype counterfactual analysis of causation back in 1958 — aged just 16 or 17 — in the very first undergraduate philosophy essay he ever wrote. I place this paper in its historical context\, relating it to the state of the debate at that time both about counterfactuals and\, in philosophy and law\, about causation. I also trace his view as it developed in two further versions of the paper written during the following two years\, and say something about the further development of his view between then and the publication of his seminal ‘Causation’ in 1973. URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-tba-20/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210511T120000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210511T140000 DTSTAMP:20210511T105324Z CREATED:20210504T101231Z LAST-MODIFIED:20210511T105324Z UID:10001268-1620734400-1620741600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Language and Mind Seminar DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/language-and-mind-seminar-30/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210511T150000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210511T170000 DTSTAMP:20210511T105324Z CREATED:20200819T113136Z LAST-MODIFIED:20210511T105324Z UID:10001141-1620745200-1620752400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Conceptual Engineering Seminar | Cristina Bicchieri (UPenn): “Measuring Norms†DESCRIPTION:ABSTRACT. — TBA \nZOOM INFO \n\nMeeting ID: 892 5895 0975\nPassword: ACEW21\nInvite link: here URL:/philevents/event/conceptual-engineering-seminar-tba-20/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210512T110000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210512T123000 DTSTAMP:20200819T154433Z CREATED:20200819T112814Z LAST-MODIFIED:20200819T154433Z UID:10001065-1620817200-1620822600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-25/ ORGANIZER;CN="Ben Sachs":MAILTO:bas7@st-andrews.ac.uk END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210512T150000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210512T163000 DTSTAMP:20210512T103602Z CREATED:20210504T101421Z LAST-MODIFIED:20210512T103602Z UID:10001298-1620831600-1620837000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk – Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Lok Chan (Duke University) DESCRIPTION:Title: ‘Should Responsibility Affect Who Gets a Kidney?’ \nAbstract: About 98\,000 people in the US are waiting for a kidney transplant\, but only around 20\,000 kidneys become available each year. As a result\, doctors sometimes have to decide who gets a kidney. Many people (though few medical providers) hold that\, when two patients need the only available kidney\, and one but not the other is responsible for their own kidney disease\, then the patient who is not responsible should get the kidney\, other things being equal. We report two experiments that reveal what people hold patients responsible for and how responsibility affects how people allocate fault and kidneys. We also discuss some theoretical and practical implications of these empirical studies. URL:/philevents/event/ceppa-talk-walter-sinnott-armstrong-duke-university/ ORGANIZER;CN="Ben Sachs":MAILTO:bas7@st-andrews.ac.uk END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210512T160000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210512T180000 DTSTAMP:20210512T110614Z CREATED:20210504T101232Z LAST-MODIFIED:20210512T110614Z UID:10001269-1620835200-1620842400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Philosophy & Social Theory Arché Seminar DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/philosophy-social-theory-arche-seminar-2/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Philosophy & Social Theory Arché Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20210513 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20210516 DTSTAMP:20210513T112005Z CREATED:20210504T101245Z LAST-MODIFIED:20210513T112005Z UID:10001270-1620864000-1621123199@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Breaking Down the Barriers: Applied Conceptual Engineering (ACE) DESCRIPTION:  \nDESCRIPTION\nConceptual engineering focuses on how best to assess and improve our conceptual apparatuses. In less than half a decade\, it has become a central topic of contemporary analytic philosophy. Current work in conceptual engineering goes in two main directions. Case study research\, on the one hand\, which focuses on specific concepts and then advocates for specific improvement. Metaphilosophical research\, on the other hand\, which focuses on conceptual engineering qua philosophical method and deals\, for instance\, with issues related to its theoretical foundations. The ACE Conference takes the next step: It bridges the gap between these two trends of research in conceptual engineering and concentrates on how conceptual engineering actually works. Thereby\, it aims to contribute to turning conceptual engineering into a form of applied philosophy that has a direct bearing on areas of practical concern. \n  \nSPEAKERS\nINVITED SPEAKERS\n\nHerman Cappelen (Hong Kong University)\nDownload ACE20 Poster\n\nNancy Cartwright (Durham University)\nCatarina Dutilh Novaes (VU Amsterdam/University of 58³Ô¹Ï)\nManuel Gustavo Isaac (Swiss NSF/University of 58³Ô¹Ï)\nÉdouard Machery (University of Pittsburgh)\nMichela Massimi (University of Edinburgh)\nKevin Scharp (University of 58³Ô¹Ï)\nNicholas Shea (University of London)\n\n  \nONLINE ACCESS\n\nZoom Meeting ID: 875 2607 3825\nZoom Password: ACE21 (Invite link)\nACE YouTube Channel: www.youtube.com/channel/UC2KmatAi964jqA6gTSm7wbQ\n\n  \nFORMAT\nThe ACE conference will run over two days\, divided into four sessions. Each session will include two one-hour talks\, an open space\, and a final round table. \n\nSession 1: Thursday 13th May | 09.00 – 12.00 (BST/GMT+1) [Chair: TBA]\nSession 2: Thursday 13th May | 14.00 – 17.00 (BST/GMT+1) [Chair: TBA]\nSession 3: Friday 14th May | 09.00 – 12.00 (BST/GMT+1) [Chair: TBA]\nSession 3: Friday 14th May | 14.00 – 17.00 (BST/GMT+1) [Chair: TBA]\n\n  \nPROVISIONAL SCHEDULE\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nUK Time\n13 MAY\n14 MAY\n\n\n  \nAM\n09.00 – 09.15\nOpening\nOpen space\n\n\n09.15 – 10.15\nNancy Cartwright\nMichela Massimi\n\n\n10.15 – 10.30\nBreak\nBreak\n\n\n10.30 – 11.30\nHerman Cappelen\nManuel Gustavo Isaac\n\n\n11.30 – 12.00\nRound table 1\nRound table 3\n\n\n\n\n\n  \nPM\n14.00 – 15.00\nÉdouard Machery\nNicholas Shea\n\n\n15.00 –15.15\nBreak\nBreak\n\n\n15.15 – 16.15\nKevin Scharp\nCatarina Dutilh Novaes\n\n\n16.15 – 16.45\nRound table 2\nRound table 4\n\n\n16.45 – 17.00\nOpen space\nClosing\n\n\n\n  \nABSTRACTS\n#01 | Nancy Cartwright (Durham University): “Engineering Objectivity – For Responsible Science Use†— This talk is about engineering the concept of scientific objectivity to fit it to serve the demand for responsible use of science’s practices\, products and endeavours. It is based on work from the forthcoming Tangle of Science\, with Jeremy Hardie\, Eleonora Montuschi\, Mat Soleiman and Ann Thresher. Rather than engineering the concept to make it more precise\, we urge leaving it as a loose ‘Ballung’ notion\, similar to ‘duty of care’\, where context sets what is demanded in any given case. In particular we argue for the importance of a concept that we label ‘objectivity to be found’: the duty to be objective involves the duty to find what is required in the case. This duty intertwines epistemic and moral considerations because it demands finding the right tools for the right purposes. \n#02 | Herman Cappelen (Hong Kong University): “Conceptual Engineering as Lexical and Conceptual Abandonment: “Democracy†as a Case Study†— Some of our terminology shouldn’t be improved\, but instead abandoned. Abandonment Theory is the study of the conditions under which lexical and conceptual abandonment is appropriate. The first part of this talk is an introduction to abandonment theory and its relationship to amelioration\, replacement and elimination. The second part applies abandonment theory to a core concept in political philosophy: ‘democracy’. I argue that ‘democracy’ is an ideal candidate for abandonment. \n#03 | Édouard Machery (University of Pittsburgh): “Should We Really Engineer Confused\, Unclear\, or Otherwise Deficient Concepts? The Case of Scientific Concepts†— Following Carnap\, conceptual engineers have long thought that confused\, unclear\, or vague concepts\, particularly scientific concepts\, are deficient\, and should be explicated (Carnap)\, prescriptively analyzed (Machery)\, or engineered (Cappelen). This talk will review several challenges to this view\, arguing in particular that confusion\, lack of clarity\, and vagueness are not necessarily deficiencies in science. \n#04 | Kevin Scharp (University of 58³Ô¹Ï): “Conceptual Engineering and the Omnicide Problem†\n#05 | Michela Massimi (University of Edinburgh): “Conceptually Re-Engineering ‘Phenomena’†— In this paper I will re-engineer one of the oldest concepts in philosophy of science: the concept of ‘phenomena’. For long time this concept has been a battleground for empiricist\, metaphysical realist and constructivist views about science. I will lay out the reasons why the concept of ‘phenomena’ requires to be re-engineered so as to address some outstanding problems facing the empiricist tradition and the metaphysical realist one too. The solution is not a de novo conceptual engineering but instead a ‘re-engineering’ that goes back to a Kantian insight and tries to make good of it for 21st century debates about realism and perspectivism in philosophy of science. \n#06 | Manuel Gustavo Isaac (Swiss NSF/University of 58³Ô¹Ï): “Applied Conceptual Engineering†— Applied conceptual engineering primarily concerns the application of conceptual engineering to real-world cases. It ranges from across academic disciplines to society at large. This talk aims to take the first step toward making conceptual engineering an effective tool to achieve real-world changes with measurable impact via the development of a multistakeholder participatory model for knowledge co-creation. \n#07 | Nicholas Shea (University of London): “How People Appraise Their Conceptsâ€. — One way of addressing various social injustices is by changing the way we conceive of the relevant social categories. However\, to stop people using a familiar concept may take more than exhortation. We will need to find ways to act on the psychological factors that make people select some concepts\, and leave others aside\, when they engage in communication and reasoning. At the moment we have little idea what those factors are. They may be implicit as well as explicit. The findings reported here are a first step in the direction of gaining that insight. Our studies found that people have a unified sense of how well they understand a concept (a Sense of Understanding). They also appraise concepts along a number of other dimensions. These forms of appraisal are shown to affect which concepts are relied on for category-based induction. They also predict the hierarchical structure (superordinate-basic-subordinate) of taxonomic concepts. That gives us an indication of how aspects of the structure of a concept may affect whether or not it is selected for various uses\, including for communication with others. It thus points the way towards potential places to intervene if we want people to stop using certain commonplace but problematic concepts. \n#08 | Catarina Dutilh Novaes (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam): “The Role of History and Genealogy for Conceptual Engineering.†— What is the relevance of historical\, and in particular genealogical\, investigations for projects of conceptual engineering? This question has received some attention in the literature (in particular in (Plunkett 2016))\, but it deserves further attention. In this presentation\, I address this question by focusing on Carnapian explication\, in particular the preliminary step of clarification of the explicandum\, which remains an under-developed component of Carnap’s own presentation of explication. I argue that a genealogical perspective\, in particular inspired by Foucault\, is eminently suitable for the clarification of an explicandum: it provides the conditions for a successful conceptual intervention because it may provide a diagnosis of what is defective in the explicandum. I illustrate this approach by means of two examples: the concept of marriage and the concept of logical form. \n  \nFUNDING\nTHOUGHT Trust Conference Grant \n  \nORGANISER\nDr. Manuel Gustavo Isaac // SNSF-PM2018 Fellow @ ARCHÉ Philosophical Research Centre \nDr. Kevin Scharp // Reader in Philosophy\, Director of ARCHÉ @ University of 58³Ô¹Ï URL:/philevents/event/breaking-down-the-barriers-applied-conceptual-engineering-ace/ LOCATION:A virtual Conference – by Zoom CATEGORIES:Conference ORGANIZER;CN="Manuel Gustavo Isaac":MAILTO:mgi1@st-andrews.ac.uk END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210513T100000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210513T120000 DTSTAMP:20200819T113136Z CREATED:20200819T113136Z LAST-MODIFIED:20200819T113136Z UID:10001142-1620900000-1620907200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Super Special Seminar tba DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/super-special-seminar-tba-24/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Super Special Seminar series END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210513T160000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210513T173000 DTSTAMP:20210513T112006Z CREATED:20200819T113136Z LAST-MODIFIED:20210513T112006Z UID:10001143-1620921600-1620927000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar (joint with CEPPA and FPST): Emmalon Davis (UMich) “Challenging the Pursuit of Novelty†DESCRIPTION:Abstract: Novelty—understood as the value of saying something new—appears to be a good-making feature of a philosophical contribution. Beyond this\, however\, novelty functions as a marker of philosophical success: contributions that say something new are considered successful\, while contributions that do not say something new are considered unsuccessful. When novelty serves as a marker and metric of success\, the pursuit of novelty becomes an aspirational ideal. This paper challenges the presumption and expectation that a successful philosophical contribution will be a novel one.\n\nTo do so\, I distinguish two constituent components—novelty as ingenuity/originality and novelty as discovery/priority—which\, taken together\, comprise the aspirational ideal of novelty. I outline a series of traps or pitfalls associated with the practical pursuit of each component part and show that efforts to avoid traps associated with one render philosophers vulnerable to traps associated with the other. I argue that an aspirational ideal of novelty should be rejected\, as the pursuit of each component part is in tension with the other. Throughout my analysis\, I demonstrate that the greatest risks accompanying the pursuit of novelty are unevenly distributed and that an aspirational ideal of novelty disadvantages certain practitioners disproportionately. I conclude that an aspirational ideal of novelty is less desirable and less feasible than it appears. URL:/philevents/event/epistemology-seminar-tba-19/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210513T160000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210513T173000 DTSTAMP:20210512T103602Z CREATED:20210504T101422Z LAST-MODIFIED:20210512T103602Z UID:10001299-1620921600-1620927000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk – Emmalon Davis (Michigan) DESCRIPTION:Title: ‘Challenging the Pursuit of Novelty’ \nAbstract: Novelty—understood as the value of saying something new—appears to be a good-making feature of a philosophical contribution. Beyond this\, however\, novelty functions as a marker of philosophical success: contributions that say something new are considered successful\, while contributions that do not say something new are considered unsuccessful. When novelty serves as a marker and metric of success\, the pursuit of novelty becomes an aspirational ideal. This paper challenges the presumption and expectation that a successful philosophical contribution will be a novel one. \nTo do so\, I distinguish two constituent components—novelty as ingenuity/originality and novelty as discovery/priority—which\, taken together\, comprise the aspirational ideal of novelty. I outline a series of traps or pitfalls associated with the practical pursuit of each component part and show that efforts to avoid traps associated with one render philosophers vulnerable to traps associated with the other. I argue that an aspirational ideal of novelty should be rejected\, as the pursuit of each component part is in tension with the other. Throughout my analysis\, I demonstrate that the greatest risks accompanying the pursuit of novelty are unevenly distributed and that an aspirational ideal of novelty disadvantages certain practitioners disproportionately. I conclude that an aspirational ideal of novelty is less desirable and less feasible than it appears. \n*** \nThis event is co-hosted with the Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory Seminar. \n  URL:/philevents/event/ceppa-talk-emmalon-davis-the-new-school/ CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk ORGANIZER;CN="Emilia Wilson":MAILTO:ew58@st-andrews.ac.uk END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210514T101500 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210514T114500 DTSTAMP:20200819T113136Z CREATED:20200819T113136Z LAST-MODIFIED:20200819T113136Z UID:10001144-1620987300-1620992700@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Medieval Logic Seminar tba DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/medieval-logic-seminar-tba-31/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210517T093000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210517T110000 DTSTAMP:20210517T114923Z CREATED:20210504T101245Z LAST-MODIFIED:20210517T114923Z UID:10001271-1621243800-1621249200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Medieval Logic Seminar: Dumbleton\, Summa Logicae DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/medieval-logic-seminar-dumbleton-summa-logicae-2/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210517T150000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210517T170000 DTSTAMP:20210517T114923Z CREATED:20200819T113137Z LAST-MODIFIED:20210517T114923Z UID:10001145-1621263600-1621270800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Metaphysics and Logic Seminar Fatema Amijee (University of British Columbia) DESCRIPTION:TITLE: Fundamentality Without Favouritism \nABSTRACT: According to a widely endorsed conception of fundamentality\, the fundamental is characterized in terms of a certain privileged relation or set of relations. On this conception\, something is fundamental just in case it is unexplained relative to a unique privileged relation or a privileged set of relations. Let us say that such a conception of fundamentality shows favouritism\, for it privileges some relations over others in in its characterization. First\, I will argue that fundamentality characterized in terms of a single privileged relation or set of relations cannot do all the work we need fundamentality to do. In particular I will show that we also need an ecumenical conception of fundamentality\, according to which fundamentality is relativized to some metaphysical dependence relation or other.  On this conception\, there is no one privileged relation or set of relations that determines what qualifies as fundamental. Instead\, something qualifies as fundamental relative to any given metaphysical dependence relation just in case it is unexplained relative to that relation. Second\, I will argue that the conception of fundamentality characterized in terms of a privileged relation or set of relations itself relies on the ecumenical conception of fundamentality for its coherence\, and that the ecumenical conception is thus conceptually basic URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-tba-21/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210518T120000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210518T140000 DTSTAMP:20210518T120720Z CREATED:20210504T101246Z LAST-MODIFIED:20210518T120720Z UID:10001272-1621339200-1621346400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Language and Mind Seminar DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/language-and-mind-seminar-31/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210518T150000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210518T170000 DTSTAMP:20210518T120721Z CREATED:20200819T113138Z LAST-MODIFIED:20210518T120721Z UID:10001146-1621350000-1621357200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Conceptual Engineering Seminar | Ãsta (SFSU): “What Are Sex and Gender and What Do We Want Them to Be?†DESCRIPTION:ABSTRACT. — We are living in times where there is considerable debate over what sex and gender are and who gets to be of what sex and what gender. These are questions that impact people’s lives greatly\, some more than others. They are metaphysical questions but they also concern what principles we should be guided by when allocating resources\, services\, and protections to people with potentially different needs. There are also methodological questions in the vicinity. I present a conception of sex and gender and their relation and suggest a certain approach to navigating some of the political and material differences. I call that approach “ontic descentâ€. \nZOOM INFO \n\nMeeting ID: 892 5895 0975\nPassword: ACEW21\nInvite link: here URL:/philevents/event/conceptual-engineering-seminar-tba-21/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210519T110000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210519T123000 DTSTAMP:20200819T154433Z CREATED:20200819T112815Z LAST-MODIFIED:20200819T154433Z UID:10001066-1621422000-1621427400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-26/ ORGANIZER;CN="Ben Sachs":MAILTO:bas7@st-andrews.ac.uk END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210519T160000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210519T180000 DTSTAMP:20210519T120558Z CREATED:20210504T101247Z LAST-MODIFIED:20210519T120558Z UID:10001273-1621440000-1621447200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Philosophy & Social Theory Arché Seminar DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/philosophy-social-theory-arche-seminar-3/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Philosophy & Social Theory Arché Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210520T100000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210520T120000 DTSTAMP:20210520T121903Z CREATED:20200819T113138Z LAST-MODIFIED:20210520T121903Z UID:10001147-1621504800-1621512000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Super Special Seminar tba DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/super-special-seminar-tba-25/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Super Special Seminar series END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210520T160000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210520T173000 DTSTAMP:20210520T121903Z CREATED:20200819T113138Z LAST-MODIFIED:20210520T121903Z UID:10001148-1621526400-1621531800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar (joint with CEPPA and FPST): Rima Basu (CMC) “Normative Expectations†DESCRIPTION:Abstract: In supplementing the familiar ways that our interpersonal relationships are morally fraught\, recent work in epistemology on doxastic wronging has highlighted how these relationships can be epistemically fraught as well. However\, in focusing predominantly on beliefs— mental states that arguably constitute a small fraction of our mental lives—these theories have their own theoretical blindspots. In this paper\, I expand the scope of analysis to expectations. Typically\, we notice the failures of expectations when we’re the targets of them: when we let our loved ones down. Key indicators of the presence of normative expectations are feelings of disappointment and betrayal. Contexts in which these feelings manifest most vividly involve parents and their hopes and dreams for our lives. Focusing on these contexts\, I argue that normative expectations play three distinctive roles: a pre- dictive role\, a prescriptive role\, and a proleptic role. Each role\, I conjecture\, comes with its own avenue for moral\, epistemic\, and conceptual failure. Ultimately\, in precisifying the heterogeneous class of attitudes that constitute normative expectations\, I reveal just how expansive the ‘doxastic’ in doxastic wronging ought be. URL:/philevents/event/epistemology-seminar-tba-20/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR