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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210601T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210601T140000
DTSTAMP:20260620T084144
CREATED:20210504T101302Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210601T124914Z
UID:10001278-1622548800-1622556000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Language and Mind Seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/language-and-mind-seminar-33/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210601T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210601T170000
DTSTAMP:20260620T084144
CREATED:20200819T113142Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210601T124914Z
UID:10001156-1622559600-1622566800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Conceptual Engineering Seminar | Genoveva Martí (Barcelona): “How Flexible (or Tolerant) Is Too Flexible (or Tolerant)?�
DESCRIPTION:Joint work w/ Lorena Ramírez-Ludeña (Pompeu Fabra University\, Barcelona) \nABSTRACT. — We will discuss two different phenomena of language usage that we have characterized in past work as flexibility and tolerance. We will examine their relation\, or lack thereof\, to conceptual engineering and we will apply the distinctions discussed to the specific case of the legal and everyday use of the term ‘violence’. \nZOOM INFO \n\nMeeting ID: 892 5895 0975\nPassword: ACEW21\nInvite link: here
URL:/philevents/event/conceptual-engineering-seminar-tba-23/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210602T110000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210602T123000
DTSTAMP:20260620T084144
CREATED:20200819T112815Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20200819T154437Z
UID:10001068-1622631600-1622637000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-28/
ORGANIZER;CN="Ben Sachs":MAILTO:bas7@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210602T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210602T180000
DTSTAMP:20260620T084144
CREATED:20210504T101315Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210602T125248Z
UID:10001279-1622649600-1622656800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Philosophy & Social Theory Arché Seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/philosophy-social-theory-arche-seminar-5/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Philosophy & Social Theory Arché Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210603T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210603T120000
DTSTAMP:20260620T084144
CREATED:20200819T113142Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210603T125912Z
UID:10001157-1622714400-1622721600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Super Special Seminar tba
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/super-special-seminar-tba-27/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Super Special Seminar series
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210603T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210603T143000
DTSTAMP:20260620T084144
CREATED:20200819T113143Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210603T125912Z
UID:10001158-1622725200-1622730600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar: Daniel Whiting (Southampton) “Higher-Order Evidence\, First-Order Beliefs�
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: When a person has evidence about their capacity to assess the evidence for or against a proposition\, for example\, when they have evidence that their assessment is subject to bias\, they have higher-order evidence. A popular view in epistemology is that higher-order evidence can make a difference to whether it is rational for a person to believe a proposition. In particular\, many think that there are cases in which it would be rational to believe a proposition in the absence of higher-order evidence but not rational to believe that same proposition in the presence of higher-order evidence. In this paper\, I will ask\, how? How might higher-order evidence have this effect? I will outline three answers to this question and show that they fail. In closing\, I will query the motivation for thinking that higher-order evidence makes a rational difference.
URL:/philevents/event/epistemology-seminar-tba-22/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210604T101500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210604T114500
DTSTAMP:20260620T084144
CREATED:20200819T113143Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20200819T113143Z
UID:10001159-1622801700-1622807100@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Medieval Logic Seminar tba
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/medieval-logic-seminar-tba-34/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210607T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210607T170000
DTSTAMP:20260620T084144
CREATED:20200819T113144Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210607T131900Z
UID:10001160-1623078000-1623085200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics and Logic Seminar Thomas Randriamahazaka (University of St. Andrews)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Truthmaker semantics for containment and nonsense\n\nAbstract: Conceptivism is the doctrine according to which a proposition cannot entail another proposition if the latter contains a concept which is not already contained in the former: entailment does not introduce any additional conceptual content. This doctrine motivates so-called containment logics\, namely logics where a formula B cannot be deduced from a formula A if B contains a propositional variable which is not already contained in A. Interestingly\, most containment logics can be described as the result of filtering another logic by this syntactic condition. For instance\, A follows from B in Parry’s logic PAI if and only if A classically follows from B and all the propositional variables of B occur in A. Routley uses this fact to discredit containment logics as syntactic artefacts lacking any semantic depth. In this talk\, I investigate the semantic properties of containment logics to rebut Routley’s critique. I look at two recent strategies to semantically characterise containment logics without syntactic filters: Berto (2019)’s two-component semantics\, where entailment contains a condition of topical inclusion\, and logics of nonsense (e.g.\, Ferguson (2015))\, which include a truth-value representing meaninglessness. Both are somewhat unsatisfactory and call for a more general approach. I argue that the framework of truthmaker semantics (e.g.\, Fine (2017)) can be used to that end. I develop sound and complete truthmaker semantics for logics of nonsense and adapt them to model containment logics. The truthmaker understanding of containment logics provides a purely semantic foundation for them\, thus refuting Routley’s claim that they are syntactic artefacts.
URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-tba-24/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210608T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210608T120000
DTSTAMP:20260620T084144
CREATED:20200819T113144Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210608T131905Z
UID:10001161-1623146400-1623153600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Conceptual Engineering Seminar* | Frank Jackson (ANU): “Conceptual Engineering in Context�
DESCRIPTION:*Session jointly hosted with ARCHÉ’s “Mind & Language� Research Group \nABSTRACT. — We should all be supporters of conceptual engineering. I take that to be relatively uncontroversial. But why – exactly? That’s where the controversy starts. I give the answer I like\, drawing on a view in metaphysics which explains why we need conceptual analyses (of a more or less traditional nature). Perhaps surprisingly\, when we are clear about why we need conceptual analyses\, we can see why we should be supporters of conceptual engineering. \nZOOM INFO \n\nMeeting ID: 892 5895 0975\nPassword: ACEW21\nInvite link: here
URL:/philevents/event/conceptual-engineering-seminar-tba-24/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210608T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210608T140000
DTSTAMP:20260620T084144
CREATED:20210504T101317Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210608T131906Z
UID:10001281-1623153600-1623160800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Language and Mind Seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/language-and-mind-seminar-34/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210609T093000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210609T110000
DTSTAMP:20260620T084144
CREATED:20210504T101316Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210609T131900Z
UID:10001280-1623231000-1623236400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Medieval Logic Seminar: Dumbleton\, Summa Logicae
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/medieval-logic-seminar-dumbleton-summa-logicae-5/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210609T110000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210609T123000
DTSTAMP:20260620T084144
CREATED:20200819T112819Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20200819T154437Z
UID:10001069-1623236400-1623241800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-29/
ORGANIZER;CN="Ben Sachs":MAILTO:bas7@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210609T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210609T180000
DTSTAMP:20260620T084144
CREATED:20210504T101318Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210609T131901Z
UID:10001282-1623254400-1623261600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Philosophy & Social Theory Arché Seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/philosophy-social-theory-arche-seminar-6/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Philosophy & Social Theory Arché Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20210610
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20210612
DTSTAMP:20260620T084144
CREATED:20210504T101319Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210610T131900Z
UID:10001283-1623283200-1623455999@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Workshop on Identity and Individuation of Particulars and Universals
DESCRIPTION:The University of 58³Ô¹Ï’ Arché Philosophical Research Centre for Logic\, Language\, Metaphysics\, and Epistemology will host a one-day online workshop on Identity and Individuation\, which will take place on June 10th 2021\, 12:30PM-7PM (British Summer Time). \nThe aim of this workshop is to bring together and promote research in the metaphysics of identity and individuation\, and to draw connections with ongoing work in metaphysics\, including but not limited to: the logical form and function of criteria of identity\, identity and indiscernibility\, identity and essence\, identity and modality\, the individuation of particulars and properties\, intrinsic and extrinsic properties\, and qualitative and non-qualitative properties\, as well as assessments of the relative merits of the different criteria of identity for both particulars and properties on offer today. \n  \nProgramme\n(N.B. Details to access the workshop can be found at the bottom of this webpage) \n12:30-12:55 Registration and Coffee \n12:55-13:00 Introduction \n13:00-14:00 Tim Button (University College London) \n14:00-14:15 Break \n14:15-15:15 Sophie Allen (Keele University) \n15:15-15:30 Break \n15:30-16:30 Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (University of Oxford) \n16:30-16:45 Break \n16:45-17:45 Vera Hoffman-Kolss (University of Bern) \n17:45-18:00 Break \n18:00-19:00 Sam Cowling (Denison University) \n  \nTim Button (University College London) \nTitle: Getting precise on indiscernibility \nAbstract: “Are there indiscernible but distinct objects?â€� That question is imprecise\, in at least two regards: \nFirst: there are many notions of indiscernibility. For example: we say (roughly) that two objects are two-symmetricaliff you can swap the objects without affecting the overall structure. (More precisely: a and b are two-symmetrical iff there is an automorphism mapping a to b and b to a.) We say that two objects are Leibniz-indiscernible iff they stand in exactly the same relations to all entities. These are distinct notions. When asking questions about indiscernibility\, we need to know which notion we have in mind. \nSecond: every notion of indiscernibility makes reference to a background language\, with regard to which discernment occurs. When asking questions about indiscernibility\, we need to choose a particular language. Which language we choose might depend on our purposes. For example\, if we are interested in our ability to refer (determinately) to one entity rather than another\, we should presumably choose a language we can acquire and manifest. By contrast\, if we are interested in whether there are “metaphysicallyâ€� indiscernible entities\, we will have to assume there is a metaphysically privileged language. \nTo see why this matters\, I will run through the question “Are there indiscernible but distinct mathematical objects?â€� It transpires there is a “cheapâ€� to a version of the identity of indiscernibles (with the most demanding notion of indiscernibility); and it is not obviously too cheap. \n  \nSophie Allen (Keele University) \nTitle: Sortalism\, Token Identity\, and the Conception of a Particular \nAbstract: The conflict between sortalism and token identity between the mental and the physical is not unexpected: the former requires that the individuation of events or objects be based somehow on their type\, their essence or the properties which they have\, while the latter maintains that particulars can be identified across disparate domains regardless of type. In this paper\, I consider the prospects for resolving this dispute\, or for rejecting sortalism and characterising particulars in a way which is compatible with token identity. \n  \nGonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (University of Oxford) \nTitle: An Argument for the Identity of Indiscernibles \nAbstract: I shall argue that there is no trivial version of the Identity of Indiscernibles. I shall also identify the weakest version of the Identity of Indiscernibles (a fortiori the weakest non-trivial version of it) and give an argument for it based on considerations of grounding. \n  \nVera Hoffman-Kolss (University of Bern) \nTitle: Interventionism and the Individuation of Properties \nAbstract: Under what conditions is a property P identical with a property Q? Interventionist theories of causation and causal models provide a prima facie plausible answer to this question: P and Q are identical iff they (or the variables representing them) assume exactly the same position in all possible causal models. This criterion is problematic\, however\, if properties are individuated hyperintensionally\, that is\, if there are properties P and Q that are distinct\, but instantiated by the same individuals in all possible worlds. In this paper\, I argue that causal modeling frameworks can overcome this difficulty if the dependence relations occurring in them are characterized in terms of counterpossible conditionals. \n  \nSam Cowling (Denison University) \nTitle: Haecceitism by the Numbers \nAbstract: Haecceitism holds that things could be just as they are in all qualitative respects—e.g.\, with respect to properties like shape and mass—but differ non-qualitatively—e.g.\, with respect to which individuals exist or which qualitative roles they occupy. Although debate over the truth of haecceitism is commonplace\, investigation into the nature or variety of haecceitistic differences we ought to accept is far more limited. This essay explores the challenges that haecceitists face when specifying which haecceitistic differences are genuine. After considering competing proposals that deliver gruesome or natural species of haecceitism\, we turn to some empirical studies of haecceitistic intuitions. We conclude by considering what differ species of haecceitism might mean for the effectiveness of conceivability arguments for haecceitism. \nDetails to access the workshop:  \nWhere: Zoom \nMeeting ID: 895 194 2082 \nMeeting Password: PHD2020 (Invite link) \nIf you have any questions\, please contact one of the organizers: Matteo Nizzardo (email- mn85@st-andrews.ac.uk) or Jace Snodgrass (email- js413@st-andrews.ac.uk).
URL:/philevents/event/1st-workshop-on-identity-and-individuation/
LOCATION:A virtual workshop by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Workshops
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/png:/philevents/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/Poster_Identity-V9e5b4.tmp_.png
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210610T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210610T120000
DTSTAMP:20260620T084144
CREATED:20200819T113145Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210610T131900Z
UID:10001162-1623319200-1623326400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Super Special Seminar tba
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/super-special-seminar-tba-28/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Super Special Seminar series
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210610T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210610T143000
DTSTAMP:20260620T084144
CREATED:20200819T113145Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210610T131901Z
UID:10001163-1623330000-1623335400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar: Catarina Dutilh Novaes “Argumentation and a three-tiered model of epistemic exchange�
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: Argumentation is often contrasted with testimony in that in cases of testimony\, an epistemic agent (presumably) primarily evaluates the trustworthiness of the source of information (the informant)\, whereas in argumentation there is (presumably) primarily engagement with the content communicated. I have argued however (Dutilh Novaes 2020) that trust and trustworthiness in fact play an important role in argumentation too. From this analysis emerged a three-tiered model of epistemic exchange\, inspired by the framework of social exchange theory (an influential framework in sociology and social psychology). According to this model\, there are three stages for an instance of epistemic exchange to take place: 1- a relation of attention is established between the parties; 2- a relation of sufficient trust is established between the parties; 3- the parties can finally engage in fruitful epistemic exchange. This model generalizes beyond argumentation\, and sheds new light on a number of phenomena that have attracted the interest of social epistemologists such as epistemic bubbles and epistemic injustice\, among others. In this talk\, I present the model in detail and discuss some of its applications.
URL:/philevents/event/epistemology-seminar-tba-23/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210610T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210610T170000
DTSTAMP:20260620T084144
CREATED:20210528T111910Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210602T095819Z
UID:10001303-1623340800-1623344400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Knox Seminar with Tim Scanlon (Harvard)
DESCRIPTION:This will be a one-hour discussion of Scanlon’s Knox Lecture\, which can be viewed here: \nhttps://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/events/2021-knox-lecture-tim-scanlon-harvard-university/
URL:/philevents/event/knox-seminar-with-tim-scanlon-harvard/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210611T101500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210611T114500
DTSTAMP:20260620T084144
CREATED:20200819T113145Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20200819T113145Z
UID:10001164-1623406500-1623411900@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Medieval Logic Seminar tba
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/medieval-logic-seminar-tba-35/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210614T093000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210614T110000
DTSTAMP:20260620T084144
CREATED:20210504T101337Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210614T133418Z
UID:10001284-1623663000-1623668400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Medieval Logic Seminar: Dumbleton\, Summa Logicae
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/medieval-logic-seminar-dumbleton-summa-logicae-6/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210614T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210614T170000
DTSTAMP:20260620T084144
CREATED:20200819T113146Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210614T133418Z
UID:10001165-1623682800-1623690000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics and Logic Seminar Hitoshi Omori (Ruhr-Universität Bochum)
DESCRIPTION:Title: On American and Australian plans for negation \nAbstract: Francesco Berto\, later joined by Greg Restall\, defends a modal account of negation\, or the Australian plan for negation. The aim of this talk is to carefully examine and compare Australian and American plans for negation. To this end\, I will consider four cases\, and draw some implications for both plans. The four cases include (i) FDE-family\, also with Shrieking and Shrugging idea deployed by Jc Beall\, (ii) intuitionistic logic\, (iii) treatment of Aristotle’s thesis\, and (iv) the system CLoN made use of by Diderik Batens.
URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-tba-25/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210615T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210615T140000
DTSTAMP:20260620T084144
CREATED:20210504T101338Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210615T134922Z
UID:10001285-1623758400-1623765600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Language and Mind Seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/language-and-mind-seminar-35/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210615T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210615T170000
DTSTAMP:20260620T084144
CREATED:20200819T113147Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210615T134923Z
UID:10001166-1623769200-1623776400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Conceptual Engineering Seminar | Elizabeth Barnes (Virginia): “What Is Health?�
DESCRIPTION:ABSTRACT. — Philosophers have taken a wide range of approaches to defining health. I offer a pessimistic take on such definitional projects. I will argue\, not only that extant accounts are flawed\, but that no theory which seeks to give a single\, unified conceptual definition of health can succeed. \nZOOM INFO \n\nMeeting ID: 892 5895 0975\nPassword: ACEW21\nInvite link: here
URL:/philevents/event/conceptual-engineering-seminar-tba-25/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20210616
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20210617
DTSTAMP:20260620T084144
CREATED:20210504T101424Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210602T095820Z
UID:10001301-1623801600-1623887999@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:JS Mill Cup
DESCRIPTION:https://millcup.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/ \n  \n 
URL:/philevents/event/js-mill-cup/
ORGANIZER;CN="Ben Sachs":MAILTO:bas7@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210616T110000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210616T123000
DTSTAMP:20260620T084144
CREATED:20200819T112819Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20200819T154437Z
UID:10001070-1623841200-1623846600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-30/
ORGANIZER;CN="Ben Sachs":MAILTO:bas7@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210616T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210616T180000
DTSTAMP:20260620T084144
CREATED:20210504T101338Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210616T134908Z
UID:10001286-1623859200-1623866400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Philosophy & Social Theory Arché Seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/philosophy-social-theory-arche-seminar-7/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Philosophy & Social Theory Arché Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20210617
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20210619
DTSTAMP:20260620T084144
CREATED:20210504T101339Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210617T135307Z
UID:10001287-1623888000-1624060799@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Workshop on Hyperintensional Metaphysics
DESCRIPTION:The University of 58³Ô¹Ï Arché Philosophical Research Centre for Logic\, Language\, Metaphysics and Epistemology will be hosting a Workshop on Hyperintensional Metaphysics\, which will take place on the 17th of June 2021. \nThe aim of this Workshop is to bring together and promote research in the area of Hyperintensional Metaphysics\, and to draw connections with ongoing work in Metaphysics\, including (but not limited to): causation\, essence\, grounding\, explanation\, the individuation of propositions and properties\, intrinsic and extrinsic properties\, conditionality\, impossible worlds\, and truthmaking. Further\, other areas up for discussion also include: questions regarding the metaphysical status of hyperintensional phenomena\, objections against hyperintensional analyses\, or kinds of analyses\, as well as assessments of the relative merits of the different accounts of hyperintensional metaphysics on offer today. \nConference Venue: Online on Zoom (N.B. There is a 100 participant capacity.) \nProgramme (All times are British Summer Time) \n12:30-12:55 Registration and Coffee \n12:55-13:00 Introduction \n13:00-14:00 Timothy Williamson (University of Oxford) \n14:00-14:15 Break \n14:15-15:15 Maya Eddon (University of Massachusetts\, Amherst) \n15:15-15:30 Break \n15:30-16:30 Sara Bernstein (University of Notre Dame) \n16:30-16:45 Break \n16:45-17:45 Daniel Nolan (University of Notre Dame) \n17:45-18:00 Break \n18:00-19:00 Kit Fine (New York University) \n  \nTimothy Williamson (University of Oxford) \nTitle: Is Hyperintensionalism Good Science? \nAbstract: Theories in metaphysics can be compared abductively\, in a way similar to the abductive comparison of theories in natural science. By that standard\, how do hyperintensionalist theories when compared to their natural rivals\, intensionalist theories? (Here intensionalism about states of affairs\, properties\, relations\, etc. holds that they are identical if necessarily equivalent\, while hyperintensionalism is the denial of intensionalism.) \nSimplicity is one salient abductive virtue. In most cases\, hyperintensionalist theories are manifestly more complicated than their intensionalist rivals\, so the issue is whether the former can compensate on other dimensions for this initial disadvantage. Hyperintensionalism is sometimes held to have an advantage over intensionalism in being a less constraining framework than intensionalism\, but from an abductive perspective that is a mistake: extra degrees of freedom weaken a theory (i.e. make it less informative) and so in themselves are an abductive vice. Furthermore\, the intensionalist approach has been far more systematically and fully developed than hyperintensionalist accounts\, has proved its worth in applications outside philosophy (e.g. in computer science\, theoretical economics\, and linguistics)\, and is closely related to frameworks in very general use in science (e.g. probability spaces). Another disadvantage of hyperintensionalism is that its unrestricted versions are inconsistent (Russell-Myhill paradoxes)\, while its restricted versions involve further losses of simplicity and elegance; there is no analogous threat to intensionalism. \nIf hyperintensionalist theories are to survive abductive comparison with their intensionalist rivals\, they will have to do so by fitting the data better (for which the extra complications and loss of informativeness would be the price to be paid). However\, the data to which they appeal are shaky. The relevant judgments seem to project features of discourse onto the extra-linguistic world\, e.g. relevance\, aboutness\, contextual shifts\, perspicuousness of explanations\, and can be explained away by intensionalists without ad hoc auxiliary assumptions. By abductive standards\, intensionalism is way ahead of hyperintensionalism. \n  \nMaya Eddon (University of Massachusetts\, Amherst) \nTitle: On Not Having Mass \nAbstract: What does it mean for an object to lack some quantitative feature\, like mass?  Does such an object instantiate the property having no mass\, or does it instantiate the property having 0 units mass\, or is there even any distinction between the two?  I will show that no matter what we say we must deal with some counterintuitive results.  I lay out several views and their consequences\, and argue in favor of one of these views. \n  \nSara Bernstein (University of Notre Dame) \nTitle: Countersocial Counterfactuals \nAbstract: We often reason about what our lives would have been like if we had belonged to different social groups\, as in “If I had been born into a Victorian English family\, I wouldn’t have gotten married\,â€� or “If I hadn’t been a woman\, I would have had an easier time in that meeting.â€� This talk aims to make sense of such countersocial counterfactuals\, conditionals whose antecedents run contrary to social facts. I distinguish between several sorts of countersocials\, and suggest that some countersocials are non-vacuous counterpossibles. After arguing for the explanatory power of such countersocials\, I suggest that countersocial counterfactuals play an important role in social explanations. I discuss the benefits of adopting a hyperintensional framework (i.e.\, a framework for distinguishing between necessarily equivalent claims) for the evaluation of countersocials. I conclude by suggesting that a plausible similarity metric for countersocial counterfactuals must take into account the nature of unitary and intersectional social groups. \n  \nDaniel Nolan (University of Notre Dame) \nTitle: The Hyperintensional Mind \nAbstract: The case for hyperintensionally individuated mental contents is now hard to resist. That is\, it is clear that agents do not automatically believe all the necessary equivalents of the things they believe; and they do not always desire necessary equivalents to the same degree. Debate continues about the ontology of the contents of belief and desire. Issues include whether to characterise contents as propositions or properties; whether to think of the propositions or properties as structured or unstructured; and if contents are not individuated by necessary equivalence\, how fine-grained should we take them to be. \nWe would like an account of what it is about an agent that determines she has one set of mental contents rather than another. One influential picture of how content is determined\, associated with the kinds of functionalism defended by David Lewis\, Frank Jackson\, Robert Stalnaker and others\, outlines an account of the contents of an agent’s attitudes in terms of how the agent\, others like her\, and her internal states are disposed to behave across a range of possible circumstances. This kind of story can be developed to handle a rich range of impossible contents as well\, provided we equip ourselves with hyperintensional metaphysical resources. In particular\, if we endorse non-trivial counterpossible conditionals and non-trivial dispositions to respond in impossible circumstances\, we can characterise the “modalâ€� profiles of agents\, states\, and populations in the way needed to deliver a foundational story about agents with fine grained attitudes. The resulting understanding of mental content is a useful guide to the metaphysics of those contents themselves. It suggests a picture of contents as sets of worlds rather than as structured contents\, and offers some guidance on the question of the fine-grainedness of belief and desire. \n  \nKit Fine (New York University) \nTitle: Why go Hyperintensional? \nAbstract: I will give some purely logical reasons why it might be helpful to adopt a hyperintensional approach to logics – such as those for the counterfactual and deontic operators – that are commonly taken to be intensionial. \n  \nOrganizers: \nJace Snodgrass \nMatteo Nizzardo
URL:/philevents/event/workshop-on-hyperintentional-metaphysics/
LOCATION:A virtual workshop by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Workshops
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/png:/philevents/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/WHM-yOJlDZ.tmp_.png
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210617T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210617T120000
DTSTAMP:20260620T084144
CREATED:20200819T113147Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210617T135307Z
UID:10001167-1623924000-1623931200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Super Special Seminar tba
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/super-special-seminar-tba-29/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Super Special Seminar series
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210617T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210617T143000
DTSTAMP:20260620T084144
CREATED:20200819T113147Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210617T135308Z
UID:10001168-1623934800-1623940200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar: Corine Besson (Sussex) “Carroll’s Regress\, Guidance and Explicit Representation�
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: What is the nature of one’s justification to use a logical principle such as Modus Ponens in reasoning? It is widely agreed amongst epistemologists of logic that such justification cannot be internalist. One key reason offered for this view is that internalist accounts of justification are susceptible to Carroll-style regresses. In this talk\, I examine this claim and argue that internalist accounts of justification are not open to such regresses. I further argue that the sorts of externalist accounts of the justification of logical principles typically put forward as alternatives are inadequate.
URL:/philevents/event/epistemology-seminar-tba-24/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20210618
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20210621
DTSTAMP:20260620T084144
CREATED:20210508T103806Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210618T135330Z
UID:10001302-1623974400-1624233599@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:How Could Truth be Plural?
DESCRIPTION:It has been nearly thirty years since Crispin Wright’s Truth and Objectivity was published\, and in these thirty years alethic pluralism has established itself as a strong contender in the current debate on truth. Yet\, while various intricate versions of alethic pluralism have been developed over the years\, many philosophers are still hesitant to buy into the very idea that truth is plural.\nOur conference\, “How Could Truth Possibly Be Plural?�\, offers the alethic pluralist the opportunity to face their critics and defend their views. \nSchedule (all times are in UTC+1)\nDay 1 (18th of June):\n14:45 – 15:00 Crispin Wright (NYU/Stirling)  Introduction\n15:00 – 16:15 Mark Jago (Nottingham)  On Ways of Being True\n16:30 – 17:45 Cheryl Misak (Toronto)  Ramsey’s Unified Pragmatist Concept of Truth\n18:00 – 19:15 María José Frápolli (Granada)  Semantic Pluralism and the Complex Meaning of Truth\n19.30 – 20:45 Chase Wrenn (Alabama) — Blindspots and Brightspots in Alethic Pluralism \nDay 2 (19th of June):\n15:00 – 16:15 William Gamester (Leeds) A Place and Purpose for Pluralism\n16:30 – 17:45 Douglas Edwards (Utica) & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen (Yonsei) Moderate Pluralism: Doubly Grounded?\n18:00 – 19:30 Douglas Edwards\, Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen\, Crispin Wright  Panel Discussion \nRegistration\nIf you would like to attend the conference\, please register by emailing Tom Kaspers (tk70@st-andrews.ac.uk) or Niccolò Aimone Pisano (nap6@st-andrews.ac.uk). The conference is free and open to all. \nAbstracts\nJago — On Ways of Being True \nThere are many ways for truths to be true. How should we understand that idea? One is that there are different kinds of truth: the ways are different properties of truth. Another understanding is that a truth can be made true in different ways\, by different kinds of entities. The former understanding supports alethic pluralism. But the latter can be understood as a kind of monism: truth is the existential property of having some truthmaker or other. On this view\, the differences reside in how a truth is made true\, but not in its being true. I’ll discuss how these two understandings differ\, and what the potential advantages of each might be. \nMisak — Ramsey’s Unified Pragmatist Concept of Truth \nF.P. Ramsey is sometimes taken to be a proponent of the redundancy theory of truth. Sometimes he is taken to be on the same page as the Vienna Circle or Wittgenstein’s Tractatus\, where the truth predicate only applies to something like simple elementary perceptual propositions. I will argue that both these interpretations are wrong. Ramsey offered a promising account of truth on pragmatist lines\, where truth is the aim of belief\, and each domain of belief or inquiry must answer\, for its own subject matter\, the question What is true? His project was to offer a unified account of how various kinds of beliefs might aim at truth\, including logic\, ethics\, and perhaps even aesthetics. \nFrápolli — Semantic Pluralism and the Complex Meaning of Truth \nTruth ascriptions are sophisticated linguistic tools of endorsement and generalisation over propositions. Their complex meaning can only be unravelled in a pluralistic semantic framework that makes room for a distinction between an aspect of meaning that is stable\, i.e. linguistic meaning\, and an aspect that is contextually modulated\, i.e. the content that they help to assert. The focus on the use of truth ascriptions accommodates the intuition that different terms (different sentences) can act as truth predicates (truth ascriptions). This does not imply\, nevertheless\, that there are different truth conceptsthat apply to different kinds of contents. Ramsey is my main inspiration. Frege\, Kaplan\, Strawson\, C. F. J. Williams and Brandom have also had an essential impact on my proposal\, which combines philosophical aspects\, taken from pragmatics\, and technical aspects\, taken from the linguistic analysis of proforms. \nWrenn — Blindspots and Brightspots in Alethic Pluralism \nAlethic pluralists often stake their position on the claim that truth-attributions involve marking claims with a special normative status. We can understand that status as fitness to believe or fitness to assert. I argue that truth-attributions can’t necessarily involve attributing any such status. The problem comes from true-belief (or true-assertion) blindspots (Sorensen; Bykvist & Hattiangadi) and brightspots. The former are claims such as ‘It’s raining and no one believes it’\, which can be true but not truly believed. The latter are claims such as ‘2 is prime and no one believes it’\, which can be false but not falsely believed. The basic shape of the problem is this: If something is fit to believe\, then\, were you to believe it\, your belief would be alethically fitting (or correct or good or whatever). No state of believing a blindspot is alethically fitting\, even though blindspots can be true. So\, being true does not entail fitness to believe. For similar reasons\, falsehood doesn’t entail unfitness to believe. Consequently\, it can’t be part of the content of TRUE that what is true is fit to believe. After laying out the problem\, I explore some of the likeliest pluralist responses to it. \nGamester — A Place and Purpose for Pluralism \nThis talk takes up a suggestion made independently by Wright (“Comrades Against Quietism�\, 1998) and Lynch (“Expressivism and Plural Truth�\, 2013): that truth pluralism and metaethical expressivism are natural allies. I explore one way in which expressivists stand to benefit by endorsing a substantive\, but non-representational\, theory of truth for ethical judgements: with regards to the notorious Frege-Geach Problem. I argue that such a theory can play a critical role in earning the right to a truth-conditional semantics for ethical discourse\, by explaining that in virtue of which ethical sentences have truth-conditions (namely\, in virtue of expressing judgements that can be true or false). The expressivist can hereby silo her distinctive commitments to the metasemantics of ethical discourse and the nature of ethical judgement\, while endorsing an utterly orthodox\, truth-conditional semantic theory. While this does not\, by itself\, suffice to solve the Frege-Geach Problem – we still need a compositional story about what mental states are expressed by logically complex sentences – it constitutes a major step forwards. Moreover\, I suggest how we can complete the solution by appealing to a kind of logical expressivism – an independently motivated and well-developed theory that is already employed by some truth pluralists (Ferrari\, Moruzzi\, and Pedersen\, “Austere Truth Pluralism�\, 2021). \nEdwards & Pedersen — Moderate Pluralism: Doubly Grounded? \nModerate truth pluralists (such as Lynch 2009\, Edwards 2018) hold that truth itself is distinct from properties such as correspondence and superassertibility that nevertheless play a significant role in explaining the truth of sentences in different domains. A significant challenge for moderate pluralists is to explain the relationship between truth itself and these domain-specific properties. In this talk we explore the idea (due to Pedersen 2020\, MS) that grounding can be used to account for this relation. We do this in two ways. We first show how the truth of particular sentences can be explained through grounding\, before going on to explore whether grounding can also be used to account for the general relation between truth and the domain-specific properties. \n  \n 
URL:/philevents/event/how-could-truth-be-plural/
LOCATION:A virtual Conference – by Zoom
CATEGORIES:Conference
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/png:/philevents/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/Poster-Alethic-Pluralism-Conference_001-e1620399580532-1wKYWz.tmp_.png
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210618T101500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210618T114500
DTSTAMP:20260620T084144
CREATED:20200819T113148Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20200819T113148Z
UID:10001169-1624011300-1624016700@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Medieval Logic Seminar tba
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/medieval-logic-seminar-tba-36/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ô¹Ï\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR