BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//Philosophy events - ECPv6.16.4//NONSGML v1.0//EN CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH X-ORIGINAL-URL:/philevents X-WR-CALDESC:Events for Philosophy events REFRESH-INTERVAL;VALUE=DURATION:PT1H X-Robots-Tag:noindex X-PUBLISHED-TTL:PT1H BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:Europe/London BEGIN:DAYLIGHT TZOFFSETFROM:+0000 TZOFFSETTO:+0100 TZNAME:BST DTSTART:20200329T010000 END:DAYLIGHT BEGIN:STANDARD TZOFFSETFROM:+0100 TZOFFSETTO:+0000 TZNAME:GMT DTSTART:20201025T010000 END:STANDARD BEGIN:DAYLIGHT TZOFFSETFROM:+0000 TZOFFSETTO:+0100 TZNAME:BST DTSTART:20210328T010000 END:DAYLIGHT BEGIN:STANDARD TZOFFSETFROM:+0100 TZOFFSETTO:+0000 TZNAME:GMT DTSTART:20211031T010000 END:STANDARD BEGIN:DAYLIGHT TZOFFSETFROM:+0000 TZOFFSETTO:+0100 TZNAME:BST DTSTART:20220327T010000 END:DAYLIGHT BEGIN:STANDARD TZOFFSETFROM:+0100 TZOFFSETTO:+0000 TZNAME:GMT DTSTART:20221030T010000 END:STANDARD END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211101T093000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211101T110000 DTSTAMP:20260619T082228 CREATED:20210803T182403Z LAST-MODIFIED:20211101T155343Z UID:10001352-1635759000-1635764400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Medieval Logic Seminar: Walter Segrave\, Insolubles DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/medieval-logic-seminar-16/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58łÔčÏ\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Medieval Logic Research Group END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211101T150000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211101T170000 DTSTAMP:20260619T082228 CREATED:20210803T182404Z LAST-MODIFIED:20211101T155343Z UID:10001353-1635778800-1635786000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Metaphysics Seminar Thomas Randriamahazaka (University of 58łÔčÏ) DESCRIPTION:Title: On Beall and Camrud’s defence of the combinatorial argument for FDE\n\nAbstract: In their 2020 paper “FDE all the way up”\, Beall and Camrud aim to defend a particular combinatorial argument for the paraconsistent and paracomplete logic FDE against a natural objection. The argument\, roughly\, states that\, since logic must consider all possibilities\, it is not enough to have the ‘True’ and the ‘False’ in the correct set of truth-values but there also must be all combinations of these two fundamental truth-values\, namely ‘Both True and False’ and ‘Neither True Nor False’. Including those combinatorial truth-values yields FDE. The objection Beall and Camrud consider consists in the idea that it must be possible to iterate the processus of combining truth-values. The gist of Beall and Camrud’s defence is that iterating the operation of ‘taking combinations of truth-values’ do not change the logic after one gets to FDE.  In this talk\, I argue that their defence fails because the formal definition of the operation of ‘taking combinations of truth-values’ that they use\, namely Priest’s positive plurivalence\, fails to deliver FDE when applied to the two-valued matrix of classical logic. Indeed\, I argue\, one must stay consistent in what notion of ‘taking combinations of truth-values’ one uses throughout the combinatorial argument and the defence against the objection. One can find\, to my knowledge\, two such notions in the literature: Priest’s positive plurivalence and Priest’s general plurivalence. Depending on which one uses\, one find oneself with a combinatorial argument (immune to the natural objection) for Priest’s logic LP or Oller’s logic AL. The conclusion of the talk takes the form of a challenge: to defend the combinatorial argument for FDE against the natural objection\, one must find a notion of ‘taking combinations of truth-values’ which (a) produces the four-valued matrix of FDE when applied to the two-valued matrix of classical logic and (b) always produces FDE as a logic when iterated starting from the four-valued matrix of FDE. The notion used by Beall and Camrud in their paper satisfies (b) but fails to satisfy (a). By contrast\, I put forward in the talk a natural proposal which satisfies (a) but fails to satisfy (b). This leaves me quite skeptical that the challenge can be met and that any such combinatorial argument for FDE can survive the natural objection. URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-seminar-7/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58łÔčÏ\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211102T120000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211102T140000 DTSTAMP:20260619T082228 CREATED:20210804T182411Z LAST-MODIFIED:20211102T160812Z UID:10001354-1635854400-1635861600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Language & Mind Seminar: Daniel Garibay Garcia (58łÔčÏ) DESCRIPTION:Deborah Tollefsen’s “Can Groups Assert that P?” URL:/philevents/event/language-and-mind-s1-9/ CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211102T150000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211102T170000 DTSTAMP:20260619T082228 CREATED:20210804T182412Z LAST-MODIFIED:20211102T160812Z UID:10001355-1635865200-1635872400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Conceptual Engineering Seminar – Kevin Scharp (University of 58łÔčÏ) – DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/conceptual-engineering-seminar-18/ CATEGORIES:Conceptual Engineering Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211103T150000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211103T160000 DTSTAMP:20260619T082228 CREATED:20210831T171158Z LAST-MODIFIED:20211103T162307Z UID:10001397-1635951600-1635955200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group DESCRIPTION:Moral Philosophy Reading Group\nDescription: This group reads and discusses an article per week\, chosen by a different member each time. \nDay/time: Wednesdays 3pm to 4pm on Teams. \nOrganizer: Theron Pummer (tgp4). URL:/philevents/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-68/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211103T160000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211103T180000 DTSTAMP:20260619T082228 CREATED:20210805T183036Z LAST-MODIFIED:20211103T160811Z UID:10001356-1635955200-1635962400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory Seminar: Lara Jost DESCRIPTION:For this session\, Lara Jost will lead a discussion of the second chapter of Myisha Cherry’s new book ‘The Case for Rage: Why Anger is Essential to Anti-Racist Struggle’. \nTitle: Fitting Fury and Frightful Rage\, Myisha Cherry\nAbstract: Chapter 2 argues that Lordean rage is an appropriate response to racial injustice and is more likely to correctly represent racial injustice than the other variations of rage. The chapter claims that this apt and correct Lordean rage is morally and politically valuable because it not only registers racial injustice but it appreciates justice. Lordean rage says that racial justice is worth having. It also not only marks disvalue\, but it is a way to respond to the value that racial minorities in the United States have. The chapter also explores ways to escape strategic traps set by others to make the outraged doubt their anger and give it up. URL:/philevents/event/philosophy-and-social-theory-seminar-7/ CATEGORIES:Philosophy & Social Theory ArchĂ© Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211104T100000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211104T120000 DTSTAMP:20260619T082228 CREATED:20210806T184151Z LAST-MODIFIED:20211104T160811Z UID:10001357-1636020000-1636027200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Super Special Seminar DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/super-special-seminar-14/ CATEGORIES:Super Special Seminar series END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211104T130000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211104T143000 DTSTAMP:20260619T082228 CREATED:20210806T184152Z LAST-MODIFIED:20211104T160812Z UID:10001358-1636030800-1636036200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar: Corine Besson (Sussex) “Carroll’s Regress\, Guidance and Explicit Representation” DESCRIPTION:Abstract: What is the nature of one’s justification to use a logical principle such as Modus Ponens in reasoning? It is widely agreed amongst epistemologists of logic that such justification cannot be internalist. One key reason offered for this view is that internalist accounts of justification are susceptible to Carroll-style regresses. In this talk\, I examine this claim and argue that internalist accounts of justification are not open to such regresses. I further argue that the sorts of externalist accounts of the justification of logical principles typically put forward as alternatives are inadequate. URL:/philevents/event/epistemology-seminar-18/ CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211104T160000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211104T173000 DTSTAMP:20260619T082228 CREATED:20210830T171138Z LAST-MODIFIED:20211104T162308Z UID:10001387-1636041600-1636047000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk – Thomas Hurka (University of Toronto) DESCRIPTION:Title: “Against ‘Good For\,’ Against ‘Well-Being’”\n\nAbstract: This paper challenges the widely held view that ‘good for’\, ‘well- being’\, and related terms express a distinctive evaluative concept of central importance for ethics and separate from ‘simply good’ as used by G.E. Moore and others. More specifically\, it argues that there’s no philosophically useful good-for or well-being concept that’s neither merely descriptive in the sense of naturalistic nor reducible to ‘simply good’. The paper distinguishes two interpretations of the common claim that the value ‘good for’ expresses is distinctively ‘subject-relative’. Neither interpretation\, the paper argues\, yields a significantly distinct evaluative concept. The ethically fundamental such concept is just ‘simply good’. URL:/philevents/event/ceppa-talk-thomas-hurka-university-of-toronto/ CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk ORGANIZER;CN="Enrico Galvagni":MAILTO:eg240@st-andrews.ac.uk END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211108T093000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211108T110000 DTSTAMP:20260619T082228 CREATED:20210810T191034Z LAST-MODIFIED:20211108T162309Z UID:10001359-1636363800-1636369200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Medieval Logic Seminar: Walter Segrave\, Insolubles DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/medieval-logic-seminar-17/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58łÔčÏ\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Medieval Logic Research Group END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211108T150000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211108T170000 DTSTAMP:20260619T082228 CREATED:20210810T191046Z LAST-MODIFIED:20211108T162310Z UID:10001360-1636383600-1636390800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Metaphysics Seminar Frederik Andersen (University of 58łÔčÏ) DESCRIPTION:Title: Logical Akrasia \n\nAbstract: The aim of this paper is two-fold. First\, it introduces the concept logical akrasia (by analogy to epistemic akrasia). Second\, it discusses how logical akrasia relates to the standards of epistemic rationality\, and in particular\, how logical akrasia might pose a challenge to the tenability of the controversial ïŹxed point thesis. URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-seminar-8/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58łÔčÏ\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211109T120000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211109T140000 DTSTAMP:20260619T082228 CREATED:20210811T190946Z LAST-MODIFIED:20211109T162309Z UID:10001361-1636459200-1636466400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Language & Mind Seminar: Stefano Pugnaghi DESCRIPTION:Breckenridge & Magidor: ‘Arbitrary Reference’ URL:/philevents/event/language-and-mind-s1-10/ CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211109T150000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211109T170000 DTSTAMP:20260619T082228 CREATED:20210811T190946Z LAST-MODIFIED:20211109T162309Z UID:10001362-1636470000-1636477200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Conceptual Engineering Seminar – Elisabetta Lalumera (University of Bologna) DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/conceptual-engineering-seminar-19/ CATEGORIES:Conceptual Engineering Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211110T150000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211110T160000 DTSTAMP:20260619T082229 CREATED:20210831T171159Z LAST-MODIFIED:20211110T165312Z UID:10001398-1636556400-1636560000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group DESCRIPTION:Moral Philosophy Reading Group\nDescription: This group reads and discusses an article per week\, chosen by a different member each time. \nDay/time: Wednesdays 3pm to 4pm on Teams. \nOrganizer: Theron Pummer (tgp4). URL:/philevents/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-69/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211110T160000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211110T180000 DTSTAMP:20260619T082229 CREATED:20210812T190914Z LAST-MODIFIED:20211110T162309Z UID:10001363-1636560000-1636567200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory Seminar: Colin Troesken DESCRIPTION:Colin Troesken will lead a discussion of Anne Eaton’s paper ‘A Lady on the Street but a Freak in the Bed’: On the Distinction Between Erotic Art and Pornography (abstract below). \nPlease be aware that the paper includes examples of the sorts of erotic art under discussion. As usual\, the discussion leader will provide a short summary of the paper and we encourage those who have not had time to read the paper in full to still participate in the discussion. \n\n\nTitle: ‘A Lady on the Street but a Freak in the Bed’: On the Distinction Between Erotic Art and Pornography \n\n\nAbstract: How\, if at all\, are we to distinguish between the works that we call ‘art’ and those that we call ‘pornography’? This question gets a grip because from classical Greek vases and the frescoes of Pompeii to Renaissance mythological painting and sculpture to Modernist prints\, the European artistic tradition is chock-full of art that looks a lot like pornography. In this paper I propose a way of thinking about the distinction that is grounded in art historical considerations regarding the function of erotic images in 16 th -century Italy. This exploration suggests that the root of the erotic art/pornography distinction was—at least in this context—class: in particular\, the need for a special category of unsanctioned illicit images arose at the very time when print culture was beginning to threaten elite privilege. What made an erotic representation exceed the boundaries of acceptability\, I suggest\, was not its extreme libidinosity but\, rather\, its widespread availability and\, thereby\, its threat to one of the mechanisms of sustaining class privilege. URL:/philevents/event/philosophy-and-social-theory-seminar-8/ CATEGORIES:Philosophy & Social Theory ArchĂ© Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211111T100000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211111T120000 DTSTAMP:20260619T082229 CREATED:20210813T192433Z LAST-MODIFIED:20211111T162307Z UID:10001364-1636624800-1636632000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Super Special Seminar DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/super-special-seminar-15/ CATEGORIES:Super Special Seminar series END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211111T130000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211111T143000 DTSTAMP:20260619T082229 CREATED:20210813T192434Z LAST-MODIFIED:20211111T162307Z UID:10001365-1636635600-1636641000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar: Alessandra Tanesini (Cardiff) “The alleged epistemic significance of silence\, silencing\, and the conversational norm of no silent rejections (NSR)” DESCRIPTION:Abstract: In this talk I examine\, and rebut\, Goldberg’s (2020) arguments in favour of a conversational norm that would defeasibly entitle linguistic agents to presume that silence indicates assent (NSR). Using evidence from conversational analysis I show that Goldberg is wrong to claim that our linguistic communities de facto conform to this norm in conversation. Instead\, I argue that norms similar to NSR are temporarily enacted by means of exercitive speech acts. If this is right\, and contra Goldberg\, silencing is the function served by these norms rather than a product of NSR’s misapplication. Finally\, I argue that because of the bounded nature of human rationality\, we would not wish a system of human communication aiming at the epistemic goals of persuasion and the sharing of information to have NSR as one of its norms. URL:/philevents/event/epistemology-seminar-19/ CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211111T160000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211111T173000 DTSTAMP:20260619T082229 CREATED:20210830T171139Z LAST-MODIFIED:20211111T165313Z UID:10001388-1636646400-1636651800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk – Jennifer Lackey (Northwestern University) DESCRIPTION:Title: “Epistemic Reparations and the Right to be Known” \nAbstract: In this paper\, I provide an account of the epistemic significance of the phenomenon of “being known” and the relationship it has to reparations that are distinctively epistemic. Drawing on a framework provided by the United Nations of the “right to know\,” I argue that victims of gross violations and injustices not only have the right to know what happened\, but also the right to be known—to be a giver of knowledge to others about their own experiences. I show how such victims can suffer epistemic wrongs by being rendered invisible\, vilified or demonized\, or systematically distorted\, and that these ways of not being known demand epistemic reparations. While there are traditional reparations that are epistemic in nature\, such as memorialization and education\, I argue that there is a prior and arguably more important epistemic reparation—knowing victims of gross violations and injustices in the sense of bearing witness. I conclude by sketching an epistemological picture to underwrite this notion of epistemic reparations\, one that significantly expands the traditional picture by including epistemic duties that are imperfect in nature and concern actions in addition to beliefs. URL:/philevents/event/ceppa-talk-jennifer-lackey-northwestern-university/ CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk ORGANIZER;CN="Jessica Brown":MAILTO:jab30@st-andrews.ac.uk END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211111T160000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211111T173000 DTSTAMP:20260619T082229 CREATED:20211108T162311Z LAST-MODIFIED:20211111T162307Z UID:10001436-1636646400-1636651800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar (joint with CEPPA): Jennifer Lackey (Northwestern) “Epistemic Reparations and the Right to be Known” DESCRIPTION:Abstract: In this paper\, I provide an account of the epistemic significance of the phenomenon of “being known” and the relationship it has to reparations that are distinctively epistemic. Drawing on a framework provided by the United Nations of the “right to know\,” I argue that victims of gross violations and injustices not only have the right to know what happened\, but also the right to be known—to be a giver of knowledge to others about their own experiences. I show how such victims can suffer epistemic wrongs by being rendered invisible\, vilified or demonized\, or systematically distorted\, and that these ways of not being known demand epistemic reparations. While there are traditional reparations that are epistemic in nature\, such as memorialization and education\, I argue that there is a prior and arguably more important epistemic reparation—knowing victims of gross violations and injustices in the sense of bearing witness. I conclude by sketching an epistemological picture to underwrite this notion of epistemic reparations\, one that significantly expands the traditional picture by including epistemic duties that are imperfect in nature and concern actions in addition to beliefs. URL:/philevents/event/epistemology-seminar-joint-with-ceppa-jennifer-lackey-northwestern-epistemic-reparations-and-the-right-to-be-known/ CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211115T093000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211115T110000 DTSTAMP:20260619T082229 CREATED:20210817T195420Z LAST-MODIFIED:20211115T163841Z UID:10001366-1636968600-1636974000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Medieval Logic Seminar: Walter Segrave\, Insolubles DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/medieval-logic-seminar-18/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58łÔčÏ\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Medieval Logic Research Group END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211115T150000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211115T170000 DTSTAMP:20260619T082229 CREATED:20210817T195421Z LAST-MODIFIED:20211115T163842Z UID:10001367-1636988400-1636995600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Metaphysics Seminar Thomas Ferguson (City University of New York) DESCRIPTION:Title: Intensional Subject-Matter in Subsystems of Analytic Implication \nAbstract: Although one tends to think of truth or falsity as the predominant semantic feature with which logic is concerned\, a number of logics exist that give the feature of topic or subject-matter equal weight. Just as we expect compositional truth conditions to extend to the entirety of a formal language\, the promise of such topic-sensitive logics requires that conditions on subject-matter are defined over the full language. Past treatments of the subject-matter of intensional connectives (like intensional conditionals) have been relatively coarse and carry with them a number of counterintuitive features. A natural place to start is by examining Kit Fine’s 1986 semantics for Parry’s logic of analytic implication\, in which the conditionals play either no role—or a degenerate\, token role—in the determination of subject-matter. In this talk\, I will present axiomatizations for subsystems of Parry’s analytic implication in which the subject-matter of the intensional conditional allows a fine degree of control. Given the proximity between Fine’s 1986 semantics and Berto’s semantics for topic-sensitive intentional modals (TSIMs)\, the framework can be immediately exported to TSIMs. I will conclude by discussing how to derive accounts of the subject-matter of other intensional conditionals\, modal operators\, and TSIMs themselves in this context. URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-seminar-9/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58łÔčÏ\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211116T120000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211116T140000 DTSTAMP:20260619T082229 CREATED:20210818T195435Z LAST-MODIFIED:20211116T163820Z UID:10001368-1637064000-1637071200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Language & Mind Seminar: David Bain (Glasgow) DESCRIPTION:Pain\, Painfulness\, and Evaluation\n\nIn this talk\, I survey the increasingly rich\, contemporary debate about the nature of pain and its unpleasantness.  Along the way\, I highlight some of the advantages of my evaluativist view\, and\, against the messenger-shooting objection\, I argue that evaluativism can accommodate the non-instrumental badness of unpleasant pain. URL:/philevents/event/language-and-mind-s1-11/ CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211116T150000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211116T170000 DTSTAMP:20260619T082229 CREATED:20210818T195435Z LAST-MODIFIED:20211116T163820Z UID:10001369-1637074800-1637082000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Conceptual Engineering Seminar – James Hampton (University of London) DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/conceptual-engineering-seminar-20/ CATEGORIES:Conceptual Engineering Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211117T150000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211117T160000 DTSTAMP:20260619T082229 CREATED:20210831T171200Z LAST-MODIFIED:20211117T165500Z UID:10001399-1637161200-1637164800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group DESCRIPTION:Moral Philosophy Reading Group\nDescription: This group reads and discusses an article per week\, chosen by a different member each time. \nDay/time: Wednesdays 3pm to 4pm on Teams. \nOrganizer: Theron Pummer (tgp4). URL:/philevents/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-70/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211117T160000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211117T180000 DTSTAMP:20260619T082229 CREATED:20210819T195430Z LAST-MODIFIED:20211110T162310Z UID:10001370-1637164800-1637172000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory Seminar DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/philosophy-and-social-theory-seminar-9/ CATEGORIES:Philosophy & Social Theory ArchĂ© Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211118T100000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211118T120000 DTSTAMP:20260619T082229 CREATED:20210820T200927Z LAST-MODIFIED:20211118T163815Z UID:10001371-1637229600-1637236800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Super Special Seminar DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/super-special-seminar-16/ CATEGORIES:Super Special Seminar series END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211118T160000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211118T173000 DTSTAMP:20260619T082229 CREATED:20210820T200928Z LAST-MODIFIED:20211118T163815Z UID:10001372-1637251200-1637256600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar (joint with CEPPA and FPST): Linda MartĂ­n Alcoff (CUNY) “Extractivist epistemologies” DESCRIPTION:Abstract: This paper (which is very much a work in progress) will develop the concept of extractivist epistemology as a way to think through the effect of colonialism on knowing practices. Extractivist epistemologies work analogously to extractivist capitalism: seeking an epistemic resource of some sort—such as a piece of pharmacological knowledge held by an indigenous community or rural healer concerning the medicinal potential of a given plant\, or an artifact from an indigenous funeral site. The extractivist approach to knowledge treats this epistemic resource as a piece of knowledge that can be separated from the social context and identities of its origin without epistemic loss. In so doing\, extractivist practices change the items that are abstracted. I will show how this is this is an epistemic problem and not simply an ethical problem. URL:/philevents/event/epistemology-seminar-20/ CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211118T160000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211118T173000 DTSTAMP:20260619T082229 CREATED:20210830T171150Z LAST-MODIFIED:20211118T165416Z UID:10001389-1637251200-1637256600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk – Linda MartĂ­n Alcoff (City University of New York) DESCRIPTION:Event co-Hosted with ECT and FPST. \nTitle: Extractivist epistemologies \nAbstract: This paper (which is very much a work in progress) will develop the concept of extractivist epistemology as a way to think through the effect of colonialism on knowing practices. Extractivist epistemologies work analogously to extractivist capitalism: seeking an epistemic resource of some sort—such as a piece of pharmacological knowledge held by an indigenous community or rural healer concerning the medicinal potential of a given plant\, or an artifact from an indigenous funeral site. The extractivist approach to knowledge treats this epistemic resource as a piece of knowledge that can be separated from the social context and identities of its origin without epistemic loss. In so doing\, extractivist practices change the items that are abstracted. I will show how this is this is an epistemic problem and not simply an ethical problem.\n  URL:/philevents/event/ceppa-talk-linda-martin-alcoff-city-university-of-new-york/ CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk ORGANIZER;CN="Nick Kuespert":MAILTO:nk94@st-andrews.ac.uk END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211122T093000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211122T110000 DTSTAMP:20260619T082229 CREATED:20210824T200930Z LAST-MODIFIED:20211122T170828Z UID:10001373-1637573400-1637578800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Medieval Logic Seminar: Walter Segrave\, Insolubles DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/medieval-logic-seminar-19/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58łÔčÏ\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Medieval Logic Research Group END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211122T150000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211122T170000 DTSTAMP:20260619T082229 CREATED:20210824T200930Z LAST-MODIFIED:20211122T170828Z UID:10001374-1637593200-1637600400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Metaphysics Seminar Lorraine Keller (Saint Joseph’s University) DESCRIPTION:Title: The Access Problem for Act-type Theories of Propositions \nAbstract: Recent work on propositions has seen the rise of act-type theories\, according to which propositions are types of cognitive acts that derive their representational and truth-conditional properties from the token cognitive acts of agents. Act-type theories have been gaining traction as part of a rejection of what is called the ‘Fregean conception’\, a “traditional” conception of propositions according to which they are intrinsically representational\, mind- and language-independent abstracta\, while cognitive attitudes such as belief and doubt derive their representational properties from their relation to propositions. Act-type theorists present two main objections to the Fregean conception: \n\n(i) The Explanation Problem: by construing propositions as non-derivatively representational and deriving the representation of the cognitive attitudes from the representation of propositions\, Fregean theories turn truth-apt mental representation into an unsolvable mystery.\n(ii) The Access Problem: by construing propositions as mind- and language-independent abstracta\, Fregean theories make our cognitive access to them an additional unsolvable mystery.\n\nHowever\, in their attempt to evade the difficulties that plague the Fregean conception\, act-type theorists run into problems of their own—mainly centering around the crucial notion of predication. Peter Hanks has argued that the notion of predication at the heart of Scott Soames’ theory cannot explain representation and is incoherent (Hanks 2015: 36-39). And in a recent paper\, Indrek Reiland endorses Hanks’ criticism of Soames\, but argues that Hanks’ attempt to address objections to his own notion of predication is unsuccessful (Reiland 2019). Reiland offers a modified version of Hanks’ view that allegedly succeeds where Hanks’ proposed solution fails. I argue that the way Reiland modifies his view leads to a particularly acute version of the Access Problem. I then point out that this is a problem for Hanks and Soames as well\, and that\, by examining the way in which their theories face the Access Problem\, we can see that they are also unable to solve the Explanation Problem. URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-seminar-10/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58łÔčÏ\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR