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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240501T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240501T170000
DTSTAMP:20260614T051202
CREATED:20240401T011457Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240501T043926Z
UID:10002001-1714575600-1714582800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics and Logic Seminar: Roy Sorensen (UT Austin and University of 58łÔčÏ)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Seeing Holes-without seeing what they are holes in \nAbstract: Peering down into a tall box\, you see a ring. The ring is removed. To your surprise this uncovers a second duplicate ring. Did you see the hole of the bottom ring before you saw the bottom ring? Each answer is backed by good reasons. I resolve the antinomy by arguing yes: you saw the bottom hole without seeing what it was a hole in! Therefore\, a hole cannot be a part of what it is a hole in – its host. For a hole can be seen without seeing its host. Nor can a hole be an intrinsic property of its host\, such as its shape. Nor can it be a way of seeing its host. Seeing a hole is not a matter of seeing the matter in which it is a hole. The metaphysical dependence of a hole on its host does not make it perceptually dependent. Seeing a hole merely requires matter to serve as a visual aid. This loosened association between hosts and holes confirms other theories of holes such as the theory that holes are spacetime regions. \nThere will be a little magic show to illustrate the nature of holes and how they are seen.
URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-roy-sorensen-ut-austin-and-university-of-st-andrews/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 and via MS Teams
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240502T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240502T120000
DTSTAMP:20260614T051202
CREATED:20240402T012446Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240502T045502Z
UID:10002002-1714644000-1714651200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Plenary Seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/plenary-seminar-5/
CATEGORIES:Plenary session
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240502T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240502T143000
DTSTAMP:20260614T051202
CREATED:20240402T012446Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240502T045502Z
UID:10002003-1714654800-1714660200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar: Carlotta Pavese (Cornell University)
DESCRIPTION:Speaker: Carlotta Pavese (Cornell University) \nAre there essentially intentional actions? \nA long tradition in action theory holds that there are such things as essentially intentional actions—actions that are intentional whenever performed (Anscombe\, Davidson\, Bennett\, Turri\, etc). In my talk\, I argue that the existence of essentially intentional action is a philosophical myth and that this has interesting repercussions in action theory and in epistemology. In the first part of my talk\, I defend the claim that the doctrine of essentially intentional actions is incompatible with a desirable practical knowledge condition on intentional actions\, which I argue we have independent reasons to embrace. In the second part of my talk I argue that the doctrine of essentially intentional actions is incompatible with a plausible solution to a puzzle—the puzzle of novice learning—-that arises for certain kinds of theories of action and I contend that is an additional reason to reject the doctrine. Finally\, I explore some interesting conclusions that follow from rejecting the doctrine of essentially intentional actions.
URL:/philevents/event/epistemology-seminar-tba-29/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240502T143000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240502T153000
DTSTAMP:20260614T051202
CREATED:20240402T140839Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240414T142419Z
UID:10002006-1714660200-1714663800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:Location: Edgecliffe G03 and Teams \nContact: ceppadirector@st-andrews.ac.uk
URL:/philevents/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-141/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240502T143000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240502T153000
DTSTAMP:20260614T051202
CREATED:20240415T142326Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240426T154850Z
UID:10002025-1714660200-1714663800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:  \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03 and Teams \nContact: ceppadirector@st-andrews.ac.uk
URL:/philevents/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-144/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240502T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240502T170000
DTSTAMP:20260614T051202
CREATED:20240402T012446Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240502T045502Z
UID:10002004-1714662000-1714669200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Unity: No Seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/unity-no-seminar-2/
CATEGORIES:Unity Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240502T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240502T173000
DTSTAMP:20260614T051202
CREATED:20240402T140839Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240502T161437Z
UID:10002007-1714665600-1714671000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in person) – Bridget Bradley (58łÔčÏ)
DESCRIPTION:This talk is part of our series on Climate Ethics. \nTitle: Ethical births\, ethical deaths: Climate anxiety in Britain through the life course \nAbstract: This paper is based on anthropological research conducted with climate activists on the topic of climate anxiety in Britain. Drawing on themes of kinship and its relationship to mental health and activism\, the paper considers the ethical questions surrounding birth and death as significant moments in the life course. Through ethnographic and autoethnographic reflections\, this work reveals how climate anxiety re-frames expectations surrounding what counts as appropriate ways to enter and leave the world\, situated within the context of the cultural politics of contemporary Britain in a time of ecological crisis.\n \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03 \n 
URL:/philevents/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-bridget-bradley-st-andrews/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240506T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240506T110000
DTSTAMP:20260614T051202
CREATED:20231109T140736Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231109T140736Z
UID:10001791-1714986000-1714993200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Medieval Logic Seminar:
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/medieval-logic-seminar-46/
CATEGORIES:Medieval Logic Research Group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240507T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240507T140000
DTSTAMP:20260614T051202
CREATED:20240407T015626Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240426T040943Z
UID:10002008-1715083200-1715090400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Language and Mind seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/language-and-mind-seminar-60/
CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240507T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240507T140000
DTSTAMP:20260614T051202
CREATED:20240427T041428Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240507T050809Z
UID:10002047-1715083200-1715090400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Language and Mind seminar: Roy Sorensen (University of 58łÔčÏ and UT Austin)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Kant risk a lie!\n\nAbstract: Immanuel Kant says\, “lying is the chief sin against others\, alongside robbery\, murder and stuproviolatio”. Kant never risks robbery\, murder\, or rape. But Kant does risk telling intentionally deceptive falsehoods. Instead of being a man a few words\, Kant is a man of three million words. Equally revealing is the scale of Augustine’s corpus: He wrote five million words before he died in 403 at age 75. Augustine was surpassed by Thomas Aquinas: eight million words before reporting a divine revelation to stop writing\, a few months before his death in 1274 at age 48. Each of these three proponents of `Never lie’ take some steps to lower the risk of lying. But their precautions are at the same scale as those who have an average aversion to lying. Accordingly\, all of those famed for their absolute opposition to lying drastically overstate the degree to which they oppose lying.
URL:/philevents/event/language-and-mind-seminar-roy-sorensen-university-of-st-andrews-and-ut-austin/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 and via MS Teams
CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240507T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240507T170000
DTSTAMP:20260614T051202
CREATED:20240407T015626Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240408T015515Z
UID:10002009-1715094000-1715101200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:FPST Seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/fpst-seminar-11/
CATEGORIES:Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240507T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240507T170000
DTSTAMP:20260614T051202
CREATED:20240409T015541Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240507T050809Z
UID:10002015-1715094000-1715101200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:FPST Seminar – Kate Manne (Cornell University) [online only]
DESCRIPTION:Title: The Authority of Hunger \nAbstract: In this talk\, I canvass moral considerations that suggest that hunger is morally authoritative. What’s more\, trying to circumvent our hunger via current surgical and pharmaceutical technologies is risky\, unpleasant\, and often ineffective. I conclude by considering the case for avoiding even “silver bullet” appetite suppressants\, for the sake of avoiding bodily self-alienation\, enjoying the pleasure and sense of community that comes from satisfying our hunger (often in the company of loved ones)\, and also for the sake of resisting the oppressive norms of fatphobia.
URL:/philevents/event/fpst-seminar-kate-manne-cornell-university-online-only/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240508T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240508T170000
DTSTAMP:20260614T051202
CREATED:20240408T015515Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240508T051528Z
UID:10002011-1715180400-1715187600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics and Logic Seminar: Zoé McConaughey (University of Lille)
DESCRIPTION:Title: History of logic as a tool for exploring the plurality of logical frameworks \nAbstract: \nI will outline another type of logical pluralism than the one now famously proposed by Beall and Restall (2006). I will argue that in addition to paying attention to particular logics\, such as classical\, intuitionnistic\, relevance logics\, etc.\, it is important to study the different frameworks in which these particular logics are expressed\, such a model-theoretic\, proof-theoretic\, or game-theoretic frameworks. This provides a different kind of logical pluralism\, namely a pluralism for logical frameworks. It is a dimension to take into account when studying logics from different cultures\, which should be of particular interest to feminist or decolonial approaches to logic\, but also when studying logics from different times\, and I will focus on this point\, taking Aristotle’s logic as a case study.\nBy comparing different modern formalizations of Aristotle’s assertoric syllogistic\, I will highlight the fact that the choice of logical framework injects within a particular logic (syllogistic in this case) the basic principles constitutive of this framework. In this fashion\, an uncritical formalization of an ancient logic risks injecting in the ancient texts the modern logician’s preconceptions regarding what logic is\, inherited from their preferred logical framework. I will present the dialogical reconstruction of syllogistic I worked out in my PhD dissertation (2021) in order to show that different logical paradigms are embedded in logical frameworks\, and can completely change the meaning of logic\, even when the logical result stay the same.
URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-zoe-mcconaughey-university-of-lille/
LOCATION:Online Meeting via Teams
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20240509
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20240511
DTSTAMP:20260614T051202
CREATED:20240320T222531Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240509T091524Z
UID:10001969-1715212800-1715385599@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Scottish Seminar in Early Modern Philosophy XII
DESCRIPTION:9 MAY\n\n\n11.00-11.15\nWelcome\n\n\n11.15-12.00\nHelena Taylor (Exeter)\, Natural philosophy in the Early Modern French Salon: at the Crossroads of Science and Literature\nChair: Mogens LĂŠrke (CNRS\, Oxford/Lyon)\n\n\n12.00-12.45\nEmily Kent (Edinburgh)\, Practice Makes Pedagogy: Maignan’s Cursus philosophicus (1653) and the Institutionalization of Experimental Philosophy\n\n\n12.45-14.00\nLunch\n\n\n14.00-15.00\nKey Note. Antonio Salgardo Borge (Nottingham)\, Spinoza’s (only) doctrine of parallelism\nChair: Alexander Douglas (St. Andrews)\n\n\n15.00-15.15\nBreak\n\n\n15.15-16.00\nLouis Rouquayrol (CNRS\, Lyon)\, Descartes and Mersenne versus Comenius on Common Notions\nChair: Veronica Calado (ParanĂĄ)\n\n\n16.00-16.45\nAlex Douglas (58łÔčÏ)\, Spinozism in Aceh: divine superdeterminacy in Spinoza and Malaysian Sufism\n\n\n16.45-17.00\nBreak\n\n\n17.00-17.45\nGeertje Bol (Ghent)\, Mary Astell on Ambition\, Rank\, and Talent\nChair: Mara van der Lugt (St. Andrews)\n\n\n10 MAY\n\n\n9.00-9.15\nWelcome\n\n\n9.15-10.00\nTim Stuart-Buttle (York)\, Gratitude in the History of Modern Political Thought: The Case of Hobbes\nChair : Antonio Salgado Borge (Nottingham)\n\n\n10.00-10.45\nMarie Wuth (Hamburg)\, A Tale of Two States Spinoza on the Civil and the Natural\n\n\n10.45-11.00\nBreak\n\n\n11.00-12.00\nKey Note: Michael Gill (Edinburgh)\, Responses to the denial of virtue in Butler and his contemporaries\nChair: James Harris (St. Andrews)\n\n\n12.00-13.00\nLunch\n\n\n13.15-14.00\nMaaike Korpershoek (Groningen) and Aaron Wells (Paderborn)\, From the Theory of Fire to Dynamical Balancing: Boerhaave\, Du ChĂątelet\, and Kant.\nChair: TamĂĄs Demeter (Corvinus\, Budapest)\n\n\n14.00-14.45\nDaniel Klugman (Princeton)\, Cracked Foundations: Pascal’s Critique of Descartes’ Theory\n\n\n14.45-15.00\nBreak\n\n\n15.00-15.45\nDario Perinetti (UQAM)\, Desire and Satisfaction: Understanding Hume’s Sceptical Problems and Solutions\nChair: Flavio Augusto de Oliveira Santos (ParanĂĄ)\n\n\n\n  \nOrganisation: James Harris (St. Andrews); Alexander Douglas (St. Andrews); Mara van der Lugt (St. Andrews)\, Mogens LĂŠrke (CNRS) \nFunding: University of St. Andrews / Scots Philosophical Association (SPA) / Maison Française d’Oxford / NOTCOM (ERC AdG  101052433)
URL:/philevents/event/scottish-seminar-in-early-modern-philosophy-xii/
LOCATION:Senate Room\, St Mary’s College\, South St\, 58łÔčÏ\, Fife\, KY16 9JU\, United Kingdom
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:/philevents/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/rocks.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240509T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240509T120000
DTSTAMP:20260614T051202
CREATED:20240409T015541Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240509T052516Z
UID:10002016-1715248800-1715256000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Plenary Seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/plenary-seminar-6/
CATEGORIES:Plenary session
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240509T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240509T143000
DTSTAMP:20260614T051202
CREATED:20240409T015541Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240509T052516Z
UID:10002017-1715259600-1715265000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar: Jade Fletcher (58łÔčÏ)
DESCRIPTION:Speaker: Jade Fletcher (58łÔčÏ) \nPractices\, Normativity\, and Ideological Construction: Conceptualizing Epistemic (In)Justice \nThe aim of this exploratory paper is to put into dialogue two different threads in contemporary social philosophy. Charles Mills made a helpful interjection into the epistemic injustice literature when he suggested that the concept of ideology is valuable for analytic epistemologists. Sally Haslanger has developed a metaphysics which captures how ethically pernicious ideologies can construct unjust social realities. In this paper I want to explore how this metaphysics of the social world might complicate our understanding of the nature of epistemic injustice\, and consequently our conception of the demands of epistemic justice. This is to accept Mills’ invitation to take more seriously the explanatory potency of ideology when theorising epistemic injustice\, but\, following Haslanger\, I understand ideologies to be metaphysically productive. I argue that this metaphysical reframing brings to light a potentially misguided theoretical orientation that pervades the epistemic injustice literature.
URL:/philevents/event/epistemology-seminar-jade-fletcher-st-andrews/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240509T143000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240509T153000
DTSTAMP:20260614T051202
CREATED:20240409T140757Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240414T142419Z
UID:10002019-1715265000-1715268600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:Location: Edgecliffe G03 and Teams \nContact: ceppadirector@st-andrews.ac.uk
URL:/philevents/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-142/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240509T143000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240509T153000
DTSTAMP:20260614T051202
CREATED:20240415T142327Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240505T163934Z
UID:10002026-1715265000-1715268600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:  \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03 and Teams \nContact: ceppadirector@st-andrews.ac.uk
URL:/philevents/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-145/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240509T143000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240509T153000
DTSTAMP:20260614T051202
CREATED:20240506T163859Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240508T163832Z
UID:10002061-1715265000-1715268600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:This week Victor Tardos will be leading an in-person discussion of Sameer Bajaj and Patrick Tomlin’s article ‘Consenting Under Coercion: The Partial Validity Account.’ (Link here: https://academic.oup.com/pq/advance-article/doi/10.1093/pq/pqad092/7287044) \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03 and Teams \nContact: ceppadirector@st-andrews.ac.uk
URL:/philevents/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-150/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240509T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240509T170000
DTSTAMP:20260614T051202
CREATED:20240409T015606Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240509T052516Z
UID:10002018-1715266800-1715274000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Unity Pre-Reading: GĂ€rdenfors Ch. 4
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/unity-pre-reading-gardenfors-ch-4/
LOCATION:ArchĂ© Seminar Room\, 17-19 College Street\, 58łÔčÏ\, KY169AL
CATEGORIES:Unity Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240509T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240509T173000
DTSTAMP:20260614T051202
CREATED:20240416T142456Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240509T164232Z
UID:10002033-1715270400-1715275800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CANCELLED CEPPA Talk (in person) –  Victor Tadros (University of Warwick)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Consent\, Intent\, and Communication \nWhat is consent? I will assume that it is a normative power – a power to alter rights and duties directly. If this is right\, how is consent exercised? I will argue that consent is exercised through the execution of intentions to alter practical reasoning. Successful communication is not needed for valid consent. Even an attempt to communicate is not needed (though it is the central way of consenting). What is needed is an intention that the consentee understands that their practical reasoning is altered – their understanding that they are permitted to do what the consenter consents to. More precisely\, I defend: \nPermissive Intentions: X consents to Y aing where they execute their intention permit Y to a by intending that Y understands that X has permitted Y to a. \nThis View contrasts with familiar alternative views in four ways. \nFirst\, consent is concerned with altering the consentee’s practical reasoning\, and not just with altering the normative status of the consentee’s conduct. So\, a person cannot give consent where they believe that altering the consentee’s practical reasoning is impossible\, even where they wish the normative status of the target’s conduct to be altered. This contrasts with pure mentalist views that consent can be given just by having a mental state or performing a mental action without attempting to alter the consentee’s practical reasoning. Second\, consent can be given without external behaviour that is sufficient to give the consentee grounds to conclude that the consenter has permissive intentions. Consenters can try but fail to give others evidence of their intentions. This contrasts with one kind of externalist view that external evidence or signs of permissive intentions are necessary for consent. Third\, consent is given only if the consenter intends to permit the consentee’s conduct. This contrasts with another kind of externalist view that external evidence or signs of permissive intentions are sufficient for consent. Fourth\, consenters necessarily intend to permit consentees’ conduct. It is insufficient for consent that a person intends the recipient of their communication to believe that they intend to permit them to act. A person can pretend to consent by communicating that they intend to permit an act without actually intending to permit it. And sometimes this might result in the consenter forfeiting a right against the consentee acting. But consent is absent. This contrasts with the view that intending to communicate that one has permissive intentions is sufficient for consent whether or not the consenter has these intentions. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03
URL:/philevents/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-neil-sinhababu-national-university-of-singapore/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240513T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240513T110000
DTSTAMP:20260614T051202
CREATED:20231109T140736Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231109T140736Z
UID:10001792-1715590800-1715598000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Medieval Logic Seminar:
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/medieval-logic-seminar-47/
CATEGORIES:Medieval Logic Research Group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240514T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240514T140000
DTSTAMP:20260614T051202
CREATED:20240414T021845Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240430T043832Z
UID:10002021-1715688000-1715695200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Language and Mind seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/language-and-mind-seminar-61/
CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240514T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240514T140000
DTSTAMP:20260614T051202
CREATED:20240501T043941Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240514T052348Z
UID:10002057-1715688000-1715695200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Language and Mind seminar: Matteo Nizzardo (University of 58łÔčÏ)
DESCRIPTION:TITLE: Probabilistic Arbitrary Reference\n\nABSTRACT: Arbitrary Reference is the idea that we can refer to individual entities with some degree of arbitrariness. Although there are different accounts of Arbitrary Reference\, nearly all of them can be challenged on the basis that they entail the existence of free-floating semantic facts\, namely: semantic facts which are not grounded in any non-semantic fact. In this talk I propose a solution. First I argue that the friends of Arbitrary Reference can answer the challenge by appealing to the notion of indeterministic grounding. Then I propose a new account of Arbitrary Reference as a probabilistic phenomenon\, and argue that this new account should be preferred over the classical versions of Arbitrary Reference for its ability to build a bridge between cases of canonical and arbitrary reference and the new insights it offers on the phenomenon of semantic vagueness.
URL:/philevents/event/language-and-mind-seminar-matteo-nizzardo-university-of-st-andrews/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 and via MS Teams
CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240514T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240514T170000
DTSTAMP:20260614T051202
CREATED:20240414T021845Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240506T050832Z
UID:10002022-1715698800-1715706000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:FPST Seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/fpst-seminar-12/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240514T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240514T170000
DTSTAMP:20260614T051202
CREATED:20240507T050810Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240514T052348Z
UID:10002063-1715698800-1715706000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:FPST Seminar (in person) – Miguel de la Cal Moreno (reading group)
DESCRIPTION:This week we will be doing a reading group on Lorna Finlayson’s ‘There Is No Alternative: Constructiveness and Political Criticism’\, chapter one of her book ‘The Political is Political’. Get in touch for a copy of the reading.
URL:/philevents/event/fpst-seminar-in-person-miguel-de-la-cal-moreno-reading-group/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20240515
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20240516
DTSTAMP:20260614T051202
CREATED:20240415T142327Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240515T165613Z
UID:10002027-1715731200-1715817599@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Book Workshop (in person) – Daniel Muñoz (UNC Chapel Hill)
DESCRIPTION:Workshop on Daniel Muñoz’s forthcoming book What We Owe to Ourselves\n\nDate: 15 May 2024\nLocation: Edgecliffe 104\nRegistration required: email Theron Pummer (tgp4@st-andrews.ac.uk)\n \nProvisional Schedule \n945am: Coffee/tea\, welcome\n10am: Jordan MacKenzie (Virginia Tech)\n1115am: Thomas Schmidt (Humboldt University)\n1225pm: Lunch\n130pm: Quinn White (Harvard University)\n240pm: Coffee/tea\n300pm: Kerah Gordon-Solmon (Queen’s University)\n415pm: Joseph Bowen (University of Leeds)\n5:25pm: Walk around town or go to pub\n630pm: Dinner\n \nAbout the Workshop\nThis is a pre-read event. The book manuscript will be circulated to all participants by 15 April. There are 20 spaces available at the catered workshop\, and 10 spaces available at the dinner. Please let me (tgp4) know if you have any access requirements I should be aware of which will help you attend this event.\n \nAbout the Book\nWhat We Owe to Ourselves is under contract with OUP. The book aims to unify\, in a fresh and systematic way\, the two main concepts in deontological morality. “Restrictions” forbid us from harming others for the greater good; “prerogatives” permit us not to harm ourselves. Muñoz argues that both concepts share a source in obligations. Restrictions consist in unwaived obligations to others\, and prerogatives are waivable obligations we have to ourselves. Just as you owe it to me not to harm me for someone else’s greater good\, you owe it to yourself not to harm yourself.\n \nThe key to this project is a thesis that Muñoz calls the Self-Other Symmetry: we owe the same basic things to ourselves as to a relevantly similar other. In the past\, Symmetry has been criticized as being too restrictive\, since we clearly have extensive freedoms when it comes to our own bodies and things. For me to slap your arm would be morally wrong; for me to slap my own is merely foolish. But the right way to understand this issue\, Muñoz argues\, is not by invoking a mysterious moral asymmetry between self and other. There is a simpler explanation: when I harm others\, I might very well lack their consent\, but I am always a willing party to my own intentional choices. Rather than a moral anomaly\, our relation to ourselves is fundamentally like our relation to a consenting other. The limits of what I may do to myself can be derived from the limits of consent in general.\n \nWhat’s more\, the book is the first Self-Other Symmetric take on restrictions and prerogatives. The standard view is that prerogatives come from the special goodness of self-interest\, while restrictions come from the special nastiness of blood on one’s own hands. This makes the moral agent seem rather self-centered\, caring more about a good time and clean hands than about\, say\, reducing global poverty. Muñoz wants to turn this picture inside-out. You should care about everybody equally. But the choice of what happens to your body is still yours. This follows from the obligations that people owe you. I may not take your spare kidney (even if I need it more)\, since I am restricted by my obligations to you. You may keep the kidney if you wish\, since you owe this to yourself. But the optimal choice—the “supererogatory” deed beyond the call—is to waive the obligations that you are owed for the sake of someone else’s greater good. Equal concern for all beings is the ideal\, but when the sacrifice falls on you\, the choice belongs to no one else.\n \nFunding and Support\nFor supporting this workshop\, we are grateful to the Scots Philosophical Association\, the Society for Applied Philosophy\, the Department of Philosophy at the University of 58łÔčÏ\, and CEPPA.\n\n\n\nRegistration\nAgain\, to reserve a spot at the workshop\, please register by emailing Theron Pummer (tgp4).
URL:/philevents/event/book-workshop-in-person-daniel-munoz-unc-chapel-hill/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Workshop
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240515T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240515T170000
DTSTAMP:20260614T051202
CREATED:20240415T022501Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240515T052345Z
UID:10002023-1715785200-1715792400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics and Logic Seminar: Sabina DomĂ­nguez Parrado (University of 58łÔčÏ and University of Amsterdam)
DESCRIPTION:Title: A New Problem for Logical Contextualism \nAbstract: Logical contextualism is the view that ‘valid’ is a context-sensitive expression. One key reason to endorse logical contextualism is that\, unlike traditional forms of logical pluralism\, it can avoid the so-called collapse problem. Logical contextualism relies on the crucial assumption that each conversational context determines a uniquely appropriate logical consequence relation. In this talk\, I argue for two points. First\, I put pressure on this crucial assumption by focusing on the design of several card-selection tasks. Second\, I show that\, once this assumption is rejected\, logical contextualism does not solve the collapse problem. In light of these two points\, my conclusion will be that logical contextualism\, as currently developed\, is a less promising view than thus far appreciated.
URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-sabina-dominguez-parrado-university-of-st-andrews-and-university-of-amsterdam/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 and via MS Teams
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240516T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240516T120000
DTSTAMP:20260614T051202
CREATED:20240416T022649Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240516T052506Z
UID:10002029-1715853600-1715860800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Plenary Seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/plenary-seminar-7/
CATEGORIES:Plenary session
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240516T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240516T143000
DTSTAMP:20260614T051202
CREATED:20240416T022649Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240516T052506Z
UID:10002030-1715864400-1715869800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar: Roy Sorensen (UT Austin & 58łÔčÏ)
DESCRIPTION:Speaker: Roy Sorensen (UT Austin & 58łÔčÏ) \nModesty is a Contagious Blindspot \nI am modest about my spelling accuracy. Oops\, I cannot consistently believe that! Modesty about my spelling entails I underestimate my spelling. If I indeed underestimate my spelling accuracy\, then my ignorance about spelling accuracy is contagious. For if I believe you and I are equals at spelling\, then my modesty commits me to underestimating your spelling. Morally\, you may rightly resent my underestimate! You may also suffer intellectually. In addition to my ignorance of my merit spreading to my ignorance of your merit\, my ignorance can make you ignorant. For if you and I are epistemic peers\, then the limits of my knowledge become the limits of your knowledge. After all\, how do you know that I am modest rather than accurate? In general\, any modesty I possess robs my peers. Modesty is a vice rather than a virtue!
URL:/philevents/event/epistemology-seminar-roy-sorensen-ut-austin-st-andrews/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar
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END:VCALENDAR