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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260101T110000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260101T123000
DTSTAMP:20260611T162831
CREATED:20251114T205336Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20251216T164003Z
UID:10002652-1767265200-1767270600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Cover-to-cover Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:This semester we are reading Finneron-Burns “What We Owe to Future People: A Contractualist Account of Intergenerational Ethics”. \nOrganiser: Ida Miczke (izm1)
URL:/philevents/event/cover-to-cover-reading-group-7/
LOCATION:CEPPA/Arché Seminar room\, 17 – 19 College Street\, 58�Թ�\, KY16 9AL\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Reading Group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260108T110000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260108T123000
DTSTAMP:20260611T162831
CREATED:20251114T205337Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20251216T164004Z
UID:10002653-1767870000-1767875400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Cover-to-cover Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:This semester we are reading Finneron-Burns “What We Owe to Future People: A Contractualist Account of Intergenerational Ethics”. \nOrganiser: Ida Miczke (izm1)
URL:/philevents/event/cover-to-cover-reading-group-8/
LOCATION:CEPPA/Arché Seminar room\, 17 – 19 College Street\, 58�Թ�\, KY16 9AL\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Reading Group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260115T110000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260115T123000
DTSTAMP:20260611T162831
CREATED:20251114T205337Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20251216T164004Z
UID:10002654-1768474800-1768480200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Cover-to-cover Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:This semester we are reading Finneron-Burns “What We Owe to Future People: A Contractualist Account of Intergenerational Ethics”. \nOrganiser: Ida Miczke (izm1)
URL:/philevents/event/cover-to-cover-reading-group-9/
LOCATION:CEPPA/Arché Seminar room\, 17 – 19 College Street\, 58�Թ�\, KY16 9AL\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Reading Group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260116T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260117T180000
DTSTAMP:20260611T162831
CREATED:20251219T055348Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260116T062603Z
UID:10002669-1768575600-1768672800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Workshop on Metaphysical Building
DESCRIPTION:The University of Tennessee Southern’s School of Arts and Humanities and the University of St. Andrews’ Arché Philosophical Research Centre for Logic\, Language\, Metaphysics\, and Epistemology will be hosting a two-day online workshop on the Metaphysics of Building. \nThe aim of this workshop is to bring together scholars working on the metaphysics of building\, broadly construed\, to explore how building relations such as grounding\, composition\, constitution\, and realization connect the more fundamental to the less fundamental. Talk of “building”—of one thing being based in\, generated by\, or constructed out of another—runs throughout contemporary metaphysics. This workshop focuses on the family of building relations\, examining issues such as their nature\, their possible unity or disunity\, and their implications for how we conceive of what is fundamental and what is not. \nDATES AND VENUE: 16 and 17 January 2026\, online via Microsoft Teams \nSPEAKERS: Paul Audi (University of Rochester)\, Karen Bennett (Rutgers University)\, Sheiva Kleinschmidt (University of Southern California)\, Peter van Inwagen (University of Notre Dame & Duke University)\, and Nathan Wildman (Tilburg University) \nREGISTER HERE: https://forms.gle/hWmBG7h2JhVauTQ57 \nSCHEDULE (Note: All times are in GMT): \nEvery slot includes: The main talk (40 minutes)\, and Q&A (25 minutes). \nDay 1: Friday\, January 16 \n14:55–15:00 — Opening Remarks\n15:00–15:40 — Shieva Kleinschmidt\n15:40–16:05 — Audience Q&A\n16:05–16:20 — Break\n16:20–17:00 — Paul Audi\n17:00–17:25 — Audience Q&A \nDay 2: Saturday\, January 17 \n14:00–14:40 — Nathan Wildman\n14:40–15:05 — Audience Q&A\n15:05–15:20 — Break\n15:20–16:00 — Peter van Inwagen\n16:00–16:25 — Audience Q&A\n16:25–16:40 — Break\n16:40–17:20 — Karen Bennett\n17:20–17:45 — Audience Q&A\n17:45 — Closing Remarks \nThis workshop is supported by Aaron J. Cotnoir’s EPSRC Funded Project Instruments of Unity: the Many Ways of Being One. \nTITLES & ABSTRACTS: In Progress \nPaul Audi: Indeterministic Grounding Via Indeterministic Causation \nIt’s easy to think that grounding must be deterministic. Grounding relations derive from essences\, essences yield necessities\, and where there’s necessity\, there’s no indeterminism. But this is too quick. I will show how you could be led to grounding indeterminism by indeterminism about causation. The crucial links are the idea of causation as power-manifestation\, and an understanding of power-manifestation as a special case of grounding. I will present an argument that clarifies the route from indeterministic causation to indeterministic grounding\, and discuss some views that lend support to the premises. These include a novel account of dispositions\, which in turn gives us occasion to discuss the ideas of reduction and elimination—both of which I regard as alternatives to\, rather than cases of\, grounding or building. \nNathan Wildman: Necessary fundamentals? \nThis talk focuses on two distinct but inter-related questions at the intersection of modality and fundamentality: (1) Do the entities that are metaphysically fundamental necessarily or contingently exist?\, and (2) Is the property of being fundamental a necessary or contingent property? Here\, I argue for contingentist answers to both questions. Specifically\, after articulating and distinguishing the two questions\, I raise a general argument against the idea that fundamental entities are necessary existents\, derived from a traditional objection to the Principle of Sufficient Reason. I then present three cases designed to show that being fundamental is\, for some entities\, a contingent property. This leads to a brief aside where I discuss and ultimately dismiss a potential objection to this contingentism. Finally\, I conclude by discussing the general plausibility of the thorough-going contingentism on offer. \nShieva Kleinschmidt: Weak Supplementation of Pluralities and Constitution \nWeak Supplementation is commonly used to rule out two kinds of cases. (i) What I call “inadequate crowd” cases\, where some part is not enough to make up the whole object but there’s no disjoint supplementing part\, and (ii) constitution cases\, where one thing does seem to constitute the whole of something distinct\, and there’s no disjoint supplementing object. The impossibility of inadequate crowd cases is motivated by the intuition that\, if you have just some of something\, there must be some more of it beyond what you’ve already got. I’ve argued that this intuition also supports Weak Supplementation of Pluralities\, which says that if some xs are parts of y but y is not a fusion of the xs\, then there’s some z that is part of y and disjoint from the xs.  Interestingly\, one can accept WSP while rejecting WS. This allows for ruling out inadequate crowd cases\, while allowing for distinct 1-1 constitution. And it allows us to do this without taking proper parthood to be asymmetric parthood. \nPeter van Inwagen: Buildings \nThese are the building relations: composition\, constitution\, grounding\, and realization. Composition and constitution are mereological relations\, and pose no problems beyond those—if there are any—posed by parthood. (Proponents of constitution have generally supposed that constitution is not a mereological relation\, but there is a plausible definition of constitution in terms of parthood.) Grounding is of two sorts\, phenomenal grounding and ontological grounding. Phenomenal grounding is the grounding of phenomena in phenomena\, and ontological grounding is the grounding of objects of one sort in objects of another sort. If the mental is grounded in the physical\, that is a case of phenomenal grounding. If a unit set is grounded in its member\, that is a case of ontological grounding. Phenomenal grounding is very much like supervenience—if it is not simply identical with supervenience. It will be argued that whether ontological grounding in fact occurs depends on the answers to certain fundamental meta-ontological questions. And\, finally\, there is realization. Like phenomenal grounding\, realization may simply be supervenience\, but it is difficult to say what realization is\, owing to the use by its proponents of technical terms that\, to my mind\, have not got satisfactory definitions. I will explain why it seems to me that some of these terms—‘higher-level property’ and ‘property instance’\, for example—have not been adequately defined. \nKaren Bennett: Finding Dry Ground \nI articulate two mistakes in standard ways of thinking about the apparent need for grounding\, and restructure the discussion in a way that both reclassifies the teams and reveals new possible positions for those who prefer desert landscapes. While I will mostly be talking about grounding rather than building relations generally\, I will also clarify\, in big-picture ways\, how this project relates to what I was doing in Making Things Up. (Hint: pages 58-9.)
URL:/philevents/event/workshop-on-metaphysical-building/
LOCATION:A virtual workshop by Microsoft Teams
CATEGORIES:Conference,Workshops
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/png:/philevents/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/poster_banner_1-1f3Gxo.png
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260122T110000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260122T123000
DTSTAMP:20260611T162831
CREATED:20251114T205337Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20251216T164004Z
UID:10002655-1769079600-1769085000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Cover-to-cover Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:This semester we are reading Finneron-Burns “What We Owe to Future People: A Contractualist Account of Intergenerational Ethics”. \nOrganiser: Ida Miczke (izm1)
URL:/philevents/event/cover-to-cover-reading-group-10/
LOCATION:CEPPA/Arché Seminar room\, 17 – 19 College Street\, 58�Թ�\, KY16 9AL\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Reading Group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260129T110000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260129T123000
DTSTAMP:20260611T162831
CREATED:20251114T205337Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20251216T164004Z
UID:10002656-1769684400-1769689800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Cover-to-cover Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:This semester we are reading Finneron-Burns “What We Owe to Future People: A Contractualist Account of Intergenerational Ethics”. \nOrganiser: Ida Miczke (izm1)
URL:/philevents/event/cover-to-cover-reading-group-11/
LOCATION:CEPPA/Arché Seminar room\, 17 – 19 College Street\, 58�Թ�\, KY16 9AL\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Reading Group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260129T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260129T173000
DTSTAMP:20260611T162831
CREATED:20260123T185309Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260129T192501Z
UID:10002671-1769702400-1769707800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in-person) – Miguel de la Cal Moreno & Mario Bison (University of 58�Թ� and University of Stirling)
DESCRIPTION:4.05-4.45pm: Miguel de la Cal Moreno – Manufactured Disorientation and Climate Change \nAbstract: Many people experience Anthropogenic Climate Change (ACC) as overwhelming and intimidating\, recognising its seriousness and the need to act while feeling unable to determine what to do or how to decide what to do. This paper characterises this experience as moral disorientation. Drawing on Stephen Gardiner’s account of ACC as a “Perfect Moral Storm\,” I argue that its global\, intergenerational\, ecological\, and theoretical dimensions undermine moral clarity on both epistemic and psychological grounds. While Gardiner’s framework helpfully identifies structural difficulties and risks of moral corruption\, it treats these difficulties largely ahistorically.\nTo address this limitation\, I turn to historical work by Naomi Oreskes\, Erik Conway\, and Geoffrey Supran on the deliberate manipulation of climate science and public discourse by the Carbon Industrial Complex. I argue that practices such as doubt-mongering and manipulative framing—particularly those emphasising individual responsibility—have actively contributed to moral disorientation about ACC. Recognising the historically manufactured dimensions of this disorientation helps render it intelligible and identifies normative constraints on how we ought to reason and act. \n4.50-5.30pm: Mario Bison – How to think about empathy\, and why \nAbstract: Empathy is usually cited in connection with altruistic\, or otherwise other-oriented behaviours and attitudes. An empathic approach is usually cited in everyday moral talk as fostering virtues such as forgiveness\, understanding\, and openness. Nevertheless\, there has also been\, at a theoretical level\, an increasing scepticism toward empathy in general. Philosophers have claimed that empathy is neither necessary for making moral judgments nor indeed the best way to go about our moral lives. The matter is complicated by the fact that empathy is variously defined by psychologists\, and no universally agreed-upon definition exists. In this talk I want to look for a solution to these problems by setting aside the immediate debates\, and instead look at the role that this concept has played in the thought of perhaps its most illustrious and influential historical proponent (David Hume)\, who believes that our moral judgments are fundamentally influenced by ‘sympathy’. By critically analysing this concept in context\, and by setting it against modern critics\, I will try to understand what specific need Hume (and his followers) may have felt for invoking empathy\, or related concepts\, in trying to understand morality. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03 and online on teams
URL:/philevents/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-miguel-de-la-cal-moreno-mario-bison-university-of-st-andrews-and-university-of-stirling/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03\, The Scores\, St Salvator's Quad\, KY16 9AL
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
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