BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//Philosophy events - ECPv6.16.3//NONSGML v1.0//EN
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
X-WR-CALNAME:Philosophy events
X-ORIGINAL-URL:/philevents
X-WR-CALDESC:Events for Philosophy events
REFRESH-INTERVAL;VALUE=DURATION:PT1H
X-Robots-Tag:noindex
X-PUBLISHED-TTL:PT1H
BEGIN:VTIMEZONE
TZID:Europe/London
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZOFFSETFROM:+0000
TZOFFSETTO:+0100
TZNAME:BST
DTSTART:20250330T010000
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:+0100
TZOFFSETTO:+0000
TZNAME:GMT
DTSTART:20251026T010000
END:STANDARD
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZOFFSETFROM:+0000
TZOFFSETTO:+0100
TZNAME:BST
DTSTART:20260329T010000
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:+0100
TZOFFSETTO:+0000
TZNAME:GMT
DTSTART:20261025T010000
END:STANDARD
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZOFFSETFROM:+0000
TZOFFSETTO:+0100
TZNAME:BST
DTSTART:20270328T010000
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:+0100
TZOFFSETTO:+0000
TZNAME:GMT
DTSTART:20271031T010000
END:STANDARD
END:VTIMEZONE
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260204T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260204T173000
DTSTAMP:20260611T162839
CREATED:20260126T190830Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260204T202449Z
UID:10002682-1770220800-1770226200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group (MPRG)
DESCRIPTION:Reading: Wittgenstein – Lecture on Ethics (p.42-51 in this edition.) \nLocation: Edgecliffe 104
URL:/philevents/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-mprg-5/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:Reading Group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260205T110000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260205T123000
DTSTAMP:20260611T162839
CREATED:20251114T205337Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20251216T164004Z
UID:10002657-1770289200-1770294600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Cover-to-cover Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:This semester we are reading Finneron-Burns “What We Owe to Future People: A Contractualist Account of Intergenerational Ethics”. \nOrganiser: Ida Miczke (izm1)
URL:/philevents/event/cover-to-cover-reading-group-12/
LOCATION:CEPPA/Arché Seminar room\, 17 – 19 College Street\, 58�Թ�\, KY16 9AL\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Reading Group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260205T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260205T173000
DTSTAMP:20260611T162839
CREATED:20260123T185309Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260205T202351Z
UID:10002672-1770307200-1770312600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in-person) – Viviane Fairbank (58�Թ� and Stirling) & Jacob Librizzi (58�Թ�)
DESCRIPTION:Viviante Fairbank – The Responsible-Inquiry Model of Journalism \nAbstract: On the traditional\, so-called Informational Model of journalism\, the primary role of journalism in a functioning democracy is to provide people with true information about a certain range of important topics. Although this model is appealing\, I argue that it is unsatisfactory; importantly\, it does not allow us to properly criticize those journalists who publish true\, relevant\, and useful information without proper warrant or ethical backing. After discussing two recent case studies\, I argue that journalism is best understood as a distinctive kind of inquiry\, and that this understanding of journalism should lead us to reject any simple\, factive account of journalistic publication norms. I propose\, instead\, the Responsible-Inquiry Model of journalism\, according to which the primary role of journalism in a functioning democracy is to provide people with responsibly gathered information while\, in the process\, serving as zetetic models. Good journalists do not only provide useful information; they also conduct (ethically and epistemically) exemplary inquiries into the subject at hand. \nJacob Librizzi – Why Metanormative Constitutivists Should be Voluntarists About Reasons \nAbstract: For two decades\, constitutivist accounts of reasons (CR) have faced the “Shm” (or Shmagency) challenge. I argue that responses so far have misunderstood this challenge. However\, by interpreting CR as a form of voluntarism\, we can render the “Shm” challenge question-begging. In doing so\, we disarm the challenge once and for all. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03 and online on teams
URL:/philevents/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-viviane-fairbank-st-andrews-and-stirling-jacob-librizzi-st-andrews/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03\, The Scores\, St Salvator's Quad\, KY16 9AL
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260211T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260211T173000
DTSTAMP:20260611T162839
CREATED:20260126T190830Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260208T203028Z
UID:10002683-1770825600-1770831000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group (MPRG)
DESCRIPTION:Reading:tbc \nLocation: Edgecliffe 104
URL:/philevents/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-mprg-6/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:Reading Group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260211T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260211T173000
DTSTAMP:20260611T162839
CREATED:20260209T203857Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260211T203836Z
UID:10002697-1770825600-1770831000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group (MPRG)
DESCRIPTION:Reading: Ida Miczke will lead us in a discussion of Jessica Fischer’s recent paper\, “Consequentialism and the Separateness of Persons”. \nLocation: Edgecliffe 104
URL:/philevents/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-mprg-16/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:Reading Group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260212T110000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260212T123000
DTSTAMP:20260611T162839
CREATED:20251114T205337Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20251216T164004Z
UID:10002658-1770894000-1770899400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Cover-to-cover Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:This semester we are reading Finneron-Burns “What We Owe to Future People: A Contractualist Account of Intergenerational Ethics”. \nOrganiser: Ida Miczke (izm1)
URL:/philevents/event/cover-to-cover-reading-group-13/
LOCATION:CEPPA/Arché Seminar room\, 17 – 19 College Street\, 58�Թ�\, KY16 9AL\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Reading Group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260212T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260212T173000
DTSTAMP:20260611T162839
CREATED:20260123T185309Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260212T203849Z
UID:10002673-1770912000-1770917400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in-person) – Enrico Galvagni (University of Edinburgh)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Hume’s One and Only Definition of Virtue \nAbstract: Hume’s moral philosophy is seen by many as a form of virtue ethics that includes two different definitions of virtue. On the one hand\, Hume seems to define virtue as a mental quality generating utility and agreeableness to oneself or others. On the other hand\, he also says that it is a mental quality that receives moral approbation. Interpreters argue about which of these definitions is more fundamental and try to reconcile them into a unified account. Against such readings\, I argue that Hume has only one definition of virtue as a character trait that generates moral approbation. Utility and agreeableness play a fundamental role in his ethics\, but one that does not relate to his definition of virtue. In turn\, this provide reason to question the now mainstream interpretation of Hume as a virtue ethicist. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03 and online on teams
URL:/philevents/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-enrico-galvagni-university-of-edinburgh/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03\, The Scores\, St Salvator's Quad\, KY16 9AL
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260218T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260218T173000
DTSTAMP:20260611T162839
CREATED:20260126T190830Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260215T205210Z
UID:10002684-1771430400-1771435800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group (MPRG)
DESCRIPTION:Reading:tbc \nLocation: Edgecliffe 104
URL:/philevents/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-mprg-7/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:Reading Group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260218T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260218T173000
DTSTAMP:20260611T162839
CREATED:20260216T205313Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260218T210819Z
UID:10002701-1771430400-1771435800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group (MPRG)
DESCRIPTION:Reading: Jason Kawall’s “Moral Realism and Arbitrariness”. \nLocation: Edgecliffe 104
URL:/philevents/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-mprg-18/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:Reading Group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260219T110000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260219T123000
DTSTAMP:20260611T162839
CREATED:20251201T150823Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20251216T164004Z
UID:10002663-1771498800-1771504200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Cover-to-cover Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:This semester we are reading Finneron-Burns “What We Owe to Future People: A Contractualist Account of Intergenerational Ethics”. \nOrganiser: Ida Miczke (izm1)
URL:/philevents/event/cover-to-cover-reading-group-16/
LOCATION:CEPPA/Arché Seminar room\, 17 – 19 College Street\, 58�Թ�\, KY16 9AL\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Reading Group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260219T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260219T173000
DTSTAMP:20260611T162839
CREATED:20260123T185310Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260219T210859Z
UID:10002674-1771516800-1771522200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in-person) – Yoshinari Hattori and Ida Miczske (58�Թ� and Stirling)
DESCRIPTION:Yoshinari Hattori – Why We Must Believe in Free Will and Moral Responsibility: Reconsidering Their Foundations \nAbstract: This presentation argues that the practice of blaming wrongdoers—especially directing resentment or indignation towards them—is rationally indispensable for us. Pereboom contends that directing resentment or indignation at others is a form of harming them and is unjustified. As an alternative\, he proposes that when morally wrong actions are performed\, we should respond with disappointment or sadness. Against this proposal\, I argue that there are social functions that cannot be achieved by disappointment or sadness but are fulfilled only by directing resentment or indignation. The fact that we have strong reason to secure the fulfilment of these functions makes the practice of directing resentment or indignation rationally indispensable for us. In particular\, I argue that responding with disappointment or sadness fails\, first\, to treat others as moral agents and\, second\, to exercise the normative force required to compel them to stand in a space of answerability. \nIda Miczske – When love met morality: anonymity\, irreplaceability\, and partial self-effacement \nAbstract: Most of us value relationships such as friendship and love. Surprisingly\, it is not so easy to reconcile the demands they pose on us with living a moral life. In this presentation I want to identify one source of this tension and\, if time allows\, propose a solution based on partial self-effacement. \nI argue that the tension emerges because certain relationships require de re motivation grounded in the identity of an irreplaceable object\, while moral justification abstracts from particular identities. I propose to explicate the latter claim in terms of the requirement of justification anonymity\, and show that it conflicts with de re motivation.\nA common response to the conflict between relationships and morality has been to introduce self-effacement. However\, as full self-effacement is problematic\, I propose that moral theories should instead be partially self-effacing. Drawing on that\, I argue that partial self-effacement allows us to reconcile de re motivation with moral justification.\nLocation: Edgecliffe G03 and online on teams
URL:/philevents/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-yoshinari-hattori-and-ida-miczske-st-andrews-and-stirling/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03\, The Scores\, St Salvator's Quad\, KY16 9AL
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260225T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260225T173000
DTSTAMP:20260611T162839
CREATED:20260126T190831Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260222T213844Z
UID:10002685-1772035200-1772040600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group (MPRG)
DESCRIPTION:Reading:tbc \nLocation: Edgecliffe 104
URL:/philevents/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-mprg-8/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:Reading Group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260225T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260225T173000
DTSTAMP:20260611T162839
CREATED:20260223T213858Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260225T213922Z
UID:10002746-1772035200-1772040600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group (MPRG)
DESCRIPTION:Reading: Aliza Ashraf will lead us in discussing Eugene Marshall’s paper\, “Spinoza on the Problem of Akrasia”. \nLocation: Edgecliffe 104
URL:/philevents/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-mprg-20/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:Reading Group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260226T110000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260226T123000
DTSTAMP:20260611T162839
CREATED:20251201T150823Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20251214T163228Z
UID:10002664-1772103600-1772109000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Cover-to-cover Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:This semester we are reading Finneron-Burns “What We Owe to Future People: A Contractualist Account of Intergenerational Ethics”. \nOrganiser: Ida Miczke (izm1)
URL:/philevents/event/cover-to-cover-reading-group-17/
LOCATION:CEPPA/Arché Seminar room\, 17 – 19 College Street\, 58�Թ�\, KY16 9AL\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Reading Group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260226T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260226T173000
DTSTAMP:20260611T162839
CREATED:20260123T185310Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260226T214029Z
UID:10002675-1772121600-1772127000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in-person) – Omar Ruiz Rivera and Craig Ferrie (58�Թ� and Stirling)
DESCRIPTION:Omar Ruiz Rivera – Moral Skill \nAbstract: This talk is about moral skill—the capacity for morally excellent behaviour. In particular\, I engage with Shepherd’s (2022) view that moral skill is “limited in scope\, and precarious” (p. 713). To defend this view\, Shepherd relies on a distinction between global and local moral skill. The former involves the action domains that structure human life\, whereas the latter is restricted to specific areas of human life. His claim is that global moral skill is “practically impossible for human agents” (p. 725)\, while local moral skill is possible but precarious. I will argue that Shepherd’s own account of skill supports a more complex picture of moral skill than he allows. Drawing on Shepherd’s (2021) account of skill\, I propose a third model of moral skill—“mid-level moral skill”—which is less demanding than global moral skill but broader in scope than local moral skill. If this claim is correct\, it would entail that framing moral skill exclusively in terms of global or local moral skill risks overlooking alternative perspectives that might lead to a more nuanced conclusion than Shepherd’s (2022) characterisation of moral skill as limited and precarious. \nCraig Ferrie – Normative (Un)knowability and the Hybrid Theory of Normative Truth \nAbstract: There is some plausibility to the idea that if a normative claim\, p\, is true then it should be possible to know p. If correct\, this makes normative truth quite different from natural truth\, which seems capable of outrunning our knowability. This view\, however\, runs up against counterexamples. It seems\, for instance\, that the people of Pompeii had most reason to evacuate in order to escape the eruption of Mt Vesuvius\, but no one could have known that they did. I am interested in whether the truth pluralist is in a unique position to overcome such counterexamples\, provided they accept a hybrid theory\, which treats them as conjunctions\, one part normative and one part natural. To do so\, it needs to be explained why these cases are exempt from the knowability condition on normative truth (which I will try do to!). \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03 and online on teams
URL:/philevents/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-omar-ruiz-rivera-st-andrews-and-stirling/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03\, The Scores\, St Salvator's Quad\, KY16 9AL
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR