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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201130T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201130T160000
DTSTAMP:20201104T154320Z
CREATED:20200925T203449Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20201104T154320Z
UID:10001249-1606748400-1606752000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Cover to Cover Reading Group (Kamm’s *Almost Over*)
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/cover-to-cover-reading-group-kamms-almost-over-11/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201130T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201130T170000
DTSTAMP:20201130T164714Z
CREATED:20200819T112948Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20201130T164714Z
UID:10001084-1606748400-1606755600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics and Logic Seminar Sean Walsh (University of California\, Los Angeles)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Modeling contingently existing propositions (and other intensions). \nAbstract: The traditional Montagovian framework for the analysis of intensional language uses constant domain models. However\, in other areas of philosophy which employ modal logic\, it is much more common to use variable domain models which permit various forms of contingent existence. Part of the difficulty in integrating the Montagovian framework with the variable domain setting is due to its higher-order nature. One facet of this is just the trivial issue that a function from actually existing individuals to actually existing individuals is not a function from possibly existing individuals to possibly existing individuals. Hence\, there is no obvious outer domain for the contingently existing higher-order entities to reside in\, in contrast to the case of standard first-order quantified modal logic. In this work we outline a semantics on which the outer higher-order domain is pieced together from the varying inner domains. We then test this framework out on the traditional Stalnakerian view about contingently existing propositions. This is joint work with Greg Lauro (UC Irvine\, LPS).
URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-tba-12/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58łÔšĎ\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201201T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201201T140000
DTSTAMP:20201201T165519Z
CREATED:20200819T112949Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20201201T165519Z
UID:10001085-1606824000-1606831200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Language and Mind Seminar | Savvas Ioannou
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/language-and-mind-seminar-26/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58łÔšĎ\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201201T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201201T170000
DTSTAMP:20201201T165519Z
CREATED:20200819T112949Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20201201T165519Z
UID:10001086-1606834800-1606842000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Conceptual Engineering Seminar | Amie Thomasson (Dartmouth): “How should we think about linguistic function?”
DESCRIPTION:Abstract. — Talk of function often plays a central role in work on conceptual engineering. An appeal to functions can provide much needed standards for evaluating and constructing concepts\, according to how well they fulfill their functions\, and whether those functions are desirable. However\, there has also been a great deal of skepticism about the idea that words or concepts have identifiable functions. Herman Cappelen has gone so far as to argue that the only functions one can identify are ‘disquotationally’ specified: that the function of the concept F is to pick out the Fs. We can\, however\, turn to work in empirical linguistics for help in understanding and identifying linguistic functions. I will argue that work in Systemic Functional Linguistics sheds new light on how we should think about function in language\, what the functions of certain philosophically interesting terms are\, and why the thought that linguistic functions can only be specified disquotationally would lead us badly astray. \n\nZoom meeting ID: 857 3025 53 80\nZoom password: ACEW20 (Invite link)
URL:/philevents/event/conceptual-engineering-seminar-tba-12/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58łÔšĎ\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Conceptual Engineering Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201202T093000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201202T170000
DTSTAMP:20201202T170026Z
CREATED:20200819T112949Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20201202T170026Z
UID:10001087-1606901400-1606928400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics of Mind Workshop
DESCRIPTION:There are various recent theories of what is the relationship between the mental and the physical (such as grounding theories and panpsychism). This workshop is an opportunity to explore new theories and arguments concerning the metaphysics of the mind. This could be about mental properties in general or a specific kind of mental properties (e.g.\, phenomenal properties or propositional attitudes). Some relevant questions are: Are mental properties and physical properties identical? If they are distinct\, what’s the relationship between them? What considerations can help us decide between different metaphysical theories about the mind? Is the explanatory gap a problem for physicalism? What are the advantages and disadvantages of each theory? \n  \nSchedule: \n9:45 – 10:00 Coffee \n10:00 – 11:00 Speaker 1 Daniel Stoljar (ANU): Structuralism and the Problem of Consciousness \n11:00 – 11:15 Break \n11:15 – 12:15 Speaker 2 Umut Baysan (Oxford): The Causal Argument for Russellian Panpsychism \n12:15 – 13:15 Lunch Break \n13:15 – 14:15 Speaker 3 Andreas Elpidorou (Louisville): Physicalism\, for the Scientifically Minded \n14:15 – 14:30 Break \n14:30 – 15:30 Speaker 4 Barbara Montero (CUNY): Goodbye Supervenience \n15:30 – 15:45 Break \n15:45 – 16:45 Speaker 5 Jessica Wilson (Toronto): Identity and Relative Fundamentality \n  \n40 minutes talk\, 20 minutes Q&A. \n  \nJoin Zoom Meeting\nhttps://us02web.zoom.us/j/84542362878?pwd=Um5wRVJRbVcyUzZRTUt0SDFCS004dz09 \nMeeting ID: 845 4236 2878\nPasscode: MOMW2020 \n  \nFor more info\, contact: si24@st-andrews.ac.uk \n  \nDavid Stoljar (ANU) \nTitle:  Structuralism and the Problem of Consciousness\nAbstract:  Structuralist approaches to physical properties have played a big role in philosophical discussions of consciousness in recent years\, mainly through the development of what has come to be called “Russellian monism”—an approach in philosophy of mind that is exciting because of its promise to move us beyond the dualist-physicalist standoff. In the first part of this talk\, I will set out Russellian monism\, explaining its differences and similarities to various nearby views. In the second part\, I will raise some questions about what a structuralist approach to physical properties could amount to in the context of debates about consciousness. \n  \nUmut Baysan (Oxford) \nTitle: The Causal Argument for Russellian Panpsychism \nAbstract: According to Russellian panpsychism\, the fundamental categorical properties that ground dispositional properties and conscious experiences of ordinary creatures like us are phenomenal properties. Its proponents admit that this claim is highly counterintuitive because it implies that phenomenal consciousness is a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of reality. However\, they argue that the counter-intuitiveness of Russellian panpsychism can be overcome because it is uniquely well-suited to integrate consciousness in the causal order and hence explain mental causation. If this argument is correct\, then Russellian panpsychism is more credible than its rivals\, in particular than traditional forms of dualism\, as dualist theories allegedly face insurmountable difficulties with regards to mental causation. In this paper\, I argue that in explaining mental causation\, the superiority of Russellian panpsychism over dualism is illusory. This is because\, first\, the problems that dualism faces regarding mental causation are not as serious as they appear to be. More specifically\, neither accepting epiphenomenalism nor denying the causal closure of the physical is as problematic as some implications of Russellian panpsychism. And\, second\, Russellian panpsychism’s explanation of mental causation leaves much to be desired. There may be other considerations in favour of Russellian panpsychism\, but explaining mental causation is not one. \n  \nAndreas Elpidorou (Louisville) \nTitle: Physicalism\, for the Scientifically Minded \nAbstract: Within recent philosophy of science\, something like a consensus has emerged: explanations in the life sciences\, and specifically those in neuroscience\, are such that describe mechanisms. Call this popular view of explanation “New Mechanism.” The talk will examine the ontological commitments of New Mechanism and will argue that it is compatible with both physicalist and anti-physicalist conceptions of our world. As such\, physicalists attracted to New Mechanism are faced with a choice. They can either make New Mechanism more metaphysically stringent by adding metaphysical requirements that ought to be met in order for a phenomenon to be mechanistically explained or they can adopt a new form of physicalism that is friendly to New Mechanism. The talk takes the latter option. It presents and defends a new physicalism that suits the needs of New Mechanists who are also physicalists. \n  \nBarbara Montero (CUNY) \nTitle: Goodbye Supervenience \nAbstract: According to Daniel Stoljar (2001)\, “physicalists may differ from one another in many ways\, but all of them must at least hold supervenience physicalism.” But why must a physicalist be a supervenience physicalist? Here\, I hope to free physicalism from its supervenience shackles\, arguing that physicalism need not imply that mental properties (or any other higher level properties\, for that matter) supervene either logically or metaphysically on fundamental physical properties. \n  \nJessica Wilson (Toronto) \nTitle: Identity and Relative Fundamentality \nAbstract: Reductive physicalists think that mental states are type- or token-identical to physical states\, and they moreover think that mental states are less fundamental than physical states. This combination of views poses a puzzle: given Leibniz’s Law\, how can there be a difference in relative fundamentality as among identical states or other goings-on? In this talk\, I canvas certain suggestions\, and offer my own account of how to make sense of reductive physicalism and other identity theories. \n  \nTalks\, but not the Q&A\, will be recorded.
URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-of-mind-workshop/
LOCATION:A virtual workshop by Zoom\, The University\, 58łÔšĎ\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Workshops
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:/philevents/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/LNM-scaled-e1603886915214-Wyau62.tmp_.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201202T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201202T140000
DTSTAMP:20201104T154457Z
CREATED:20200903T192614Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20201104T154457Z
UID:10001224-1606914000-1606917600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-52/
ORGANIZER;CN="Ben Sachs":MAILTO:bas7@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201202T140000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201202T160000
DTSTAMP:20201202T004637Z
CREATED:20200903T175404Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20201202T004637Z
UID:10001222-1606917600-1606924800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Feminist Philosophy & Social Theory Seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/feminist-philosophy-social-theory-seminar-11/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201202T170000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201202T190000
DTSTAMP:20201202T004637Z
CREATED:20200903T175404Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20201202T004637Z
UID:10001223-1606928400-1606935600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Breanne Fahs (Arizona State University)
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/breanne-fahs-arizona-state-university/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201203T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201203T120000
DTSTAMP:20201203T170533Z
CREATED:20200819T112949Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20201203T170533Z
UID:10001088-1606989600-1606996800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Super Special Seminar tba
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/super-special-seminar-tba-16/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58łÔšĎ\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Super Special Seminar series
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201203T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201203T173000
DTSTAMP:20201203T180037Z
CREATED:20200819T154331Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20201203T180037Z
UID:10001185-1607011200-1607016600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:ECT/CEPPA Talk – Sarah Moss (University of Michigan)
DESCRIPTION:Title: ‘How to Be a Clever Contextualist’ \nAbstract: This talk defends a contextualist theory of ‘knowledge’ ascriptions. I argue that in some sentences\, the implicit argument of ‘knows’ is bound by a quantifier. The natural readings of these sentences can be generated by contextualist theories\, but not by competing interest-relative theories of knowledge. In addition\, I argue that the contextualist can explain distinctive patterns in our judgments about sentences in which ‘knows’ is embedded under change-of-state verbs. Along the way\, I argue that the most common definitions of ‘encroachment’ and ‘interest relativity’ are seriously flawed. \nMoss – Handout
URL:/philevents/event/ceppa-talk-sarah-moss-university-of-michigan/
ORGANIZER;CN="Nick Kuespert":MAILTO:nk94@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201203T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201203T180000
DTSTAMP:20201203T170533Z
CREATED:20200819T112950Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20201203T170533Z
UID:10001089-1607011200-1607018400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar (joint with CEPPA!): Sarah Moss (UMich) “How to Be a Clever Contextualist”
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: This talk defends a contextualist theory of ‘knowledge’ ascriptions. I argue that in some sentences\, the implicit argument of ‘knows’ is bound by a quantifier. The natural readings of these sentences can be generated by contextualist theories\, but not by competing interest-relative theories of knowledge. In addition\, I argue that the contextualist can explain distinctive patterns in our judgments about sentences in which ‘knows’ is embedded under change-of-state verbs. Along the way\, I argue that the most common definitions of ‘encroachment’ and ‘interest relativity’ are seriously flawed.
URL:/philevents/event/epistemology-seminar-tba-11/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58łÔšĎ\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201204T091500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201204T104500
DTSTAMP:20201204T171715Z
CREATED:20200819T112951Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20201204T171715Z
UID:10001090-1607073300-1607078700@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Medieval Logic Seminar: John Dumbleton on Insolubles (NB meeting at earlier time because of Michael Beaney talk)
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/medieval-logic-seminar-tba-12/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58łÔšĎ\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Medieval Logic Research Group
END:VEVENT
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