BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//Philosophy events - ECPv6.16.4.1//NONSGML v1.0//EN CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH X-ORIGINAL-URL:/philevents X-WR-CALDESC:Events for Philosophy events REFRESH-INTERVAL;VALUE=DURATION:PT1H X-Robots-Tag:noindex X-PUBLISHED-TTL:PT1H BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:Europe/London BEGIN:DAYLIGHT TZOFFSETFROM:+0000 TZOFFSETTO:+0100 TZNAME:BST DTSTART:20200329T010000 END:DAYLIGHT BEGIN:STANDARD TZOFFSETFROM:+0100 TZOFFSETTO:+0000 TZNAME:GMT DTSTART:20201025T010000 END:STANDARD BEGIN:DAYLIGHT TZOFFSETFROM:+0000 TZOFFSETTO:+0100 TZNAME:BST DTSTART:20210328T010000 END:DAYLIGHT BEGIN:STANDARD TZOFFSETFROM:+0100 TZOFFSETTO:+0000 TZNAME:GMT DTSTART:20211031T010000 END:STANDARD BEGIN:DAYLIGHT TZOFFSETFROM:+0000 TZOFFSETTO:+0100 TZNAME:BST DTSTART:20220327T010000 END:DAYLIGHT BEGIN:STANDARD TZOFFSETFROM:+0100 TZOFFSETTO:+0000 TZNAME:GMT DTSTART:20221030T010000 END:STANDARD END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210510T093000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210510T110000 DTSTAMP:20210510T104929Z CREATED:20210504T101230Z LAST-MODIFIED:20210510T104929Z UID:10001267-1620639000-1620644400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Medieval Logic Seminar: Dumbleton\, Summa Logicae DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/medieval-logic-seminar-dumbleton-summa-logicae/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58łÔčÏ\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210510T150000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210510T170000 DTSTAMP:20210510T104929Z CREATED:20200819T113135Z LAST-MODIFIED:20210510T104929Z UID:10001140-1620658800-1620666000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Metaphysics and Logic Seminar Helen Beebee (University of Manchester) DESCRIPTION:Title: The Genesis of Lewis’s Counterfactual Analysis of Causation\n\n\nAbstract: Lewis presented a prototype counterfactual analysis of causation back in 1958 — aged just 16 or 17 — in the very first undergraduate philosophy essay he ever wrote. I place this paper in its historical context\, relating it to the state of the debate at that time both about counterfactuals and\, in philosophy and law\, about causation. I also trace his view as it developed in two further versions of the paper written during the following two years\, and say something about the further development of his view between then and the publication of his seminal ‘Causation’ in 1973. URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-tba-20/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58łÔčÏ\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210511T120000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210511T140000 DTSTAMP:20210511T105324Z CREATED:20210504T101231Z LAST-MODIFIED:20210511T105324Z UID:10001268-1620734400-1620741600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Language and Mind Seminar DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/language-and-mind-seminar-30/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58łÔčÏ\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210511T150000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210511T170000 DTSTAMP:20210511T105324Z CREATED:20200819T113136Z LAST-MODIFIED:20210511T105324Z UID:10001141-1620745200-1620752400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Conceptual Engineering Seminar | Cristina Bicchieri (UPenn): “Measuring Norms” DESCRIPTION:ABSTRACT. — TBA \nZOOM INFO \n\nMeeting ID: 892 5895 0975\nPassword: ACEW21\nInvite link: here URL:/philevents/event/conceptual-engineering-seminar-tba-20/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58łÔčÏ\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210512T110000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210512T123000 DTSTAMP:20200819T154433Z CREATED:20200819T112814Z LAST-MODIFIED:20200819T154433Z UID:10001065-1620817200-1620822600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-25/ ORGANIZER;CN="Ben Sachs":MAILTO:bas7@st-andrews.ac.uk END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210512T150000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210512T163000 DTSTAMP:20210512T103602Z CREATED:20210504T101421Z LAST-MODIFIED:20210512T103602Z UID:10001298-1620831600-1620837000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk – Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Lok Chan (Duke University) DESCRIPTION:Title: ‘Should Responsibility Affect Who Gets a Kidney?’ \nAbstract: About 98\,000 people in the US are waiting for a kidney transplant\, but only around 20\,000 kidneys become available each year. As a result\, doctors sometimes have to decide who gets a kidney. Many people (though few medical providers) hold that\, when two patients need the only available kidney\, and one but not the other is responsible for their own kidney disease\, then the patient who is not responsible should get the kidney\, other things being equal. We report two experiments that reveal what people hold patients responsible for and how responsibility affects how people allocate fault and kidneys. We also discuss some theoretical and practical implications of these empirical studies. URL:/philevents/event/ceppa-talk-walter-sinnott-armstrong-duke-university/ ORGANIZER;CN="Ben Sachs":MAILTO:bas7@st-andrews.ac.uk END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210512T160000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210512T180000 DTSTAMP:20210512T110614Z CREATED:20210504T101232Z LAST-MODIFIED:20210512T110614Z UID:10001269-1620835200-1620842400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Philosophy & Social Theory ArchĂ© Seminar DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/philosophy-social-theory-arche-seminar-2/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58łÔčÏ\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Philosophy & Social Theory ArchĂ© Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20210513 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20210516 DTSTAMP:20210513T112005Z CREATED:20210504T101245Z LAST-MODIFIED:20210513T112005Z UID:10001270-1620864000-1621123199@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Breaking Down the Barriers: Applied Conceptual Engineering (ACE) DESCRIPTION:  \nDESCRIPTION\nConceptual engineering focuses on how best to assess and improve our conceptual apparatuses. In less than half a decade\, it has become a central topic of contemporary analytic philosophy. Current work in conceptual engineering goes in two main directions. Case study research\, on the one hand\, which focuses on specific concepts and then advocates for specific improvement. Metaphilosophical research\, on the other hand\, which focuses on conceptual engineering qua philosophical method and deals\, for instance\, with issues related to its theoretical foundations. The ACE Conference takes the next step: It bridges the gap between these two trends of research in conceptual engineering and concentrates on how conceptual engineering actually works. Thereby\, it aims to contribute to turning conceptual engineering into a form of applied philosophy that has a direct bearing on areas of practical concern. \n  \nSPEAKERS\nINVITED SPEAKERS\n\nHerman Cappelen (Hong Kong University)\nDownload ACE20 Poster\n\nNancy Cartwright (Durham University)\nCatarina Dutilh Novaes (VU Amsterdam/University of 58łÔčÏ)\nManuel Gustavo Isaac (Swiss NSF/University of 58łÔčÏ)\nÉdouard Machery (University of Pittsburgh)\nMichela Massimi (University of Edinburgh)\nKevin Scharp (University of 58łÔčÏ)\nNicholas Shea (University of London)\n\n  \nONLINE ACCESS\n\nZoom Meeting ID: 875 2607 3825\nZoom Password: ACE21 (Invite link)\nACE YouTube Channel: www.youtube.com/channel/UC2KmatAi964jqA6gTSm7wbQ\n\n  \nFORMAT\nThe ACE conference will run over two days\, divided into four sessions. Each session will include two one-hour talks\, an open space\, and a final round table. \n\nSession 1: Thursday 13th May | 09.00 – 12.00 (BST/GMT+1) [Chair: TBA]\nSession 2: Thursday 13th May | 14.00 – 17.00 (BST/GMT+1) [Chair: TBA]\nSession 3: Friday 14th May | 09.00 – 12.00 (BST/GMT+1) [Chair: TBA]\nSession 3: Friday 14th May | 14.00 – 17.00 (BST/GMT+1) [Chair: TBA]\n\n  \nPROVISIONAL SCHEDULE\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nUK Time\n13 MAY\n14 MAY\n\n\n  \nAM\n09.00 – 09.15\nOpening\nOpen space\n\n\n09.15 – 10.15\nNancy Cartwright\nMichela Massimi\n\n\n10.15 – 10.30\nBreak\nBreak\n\n\n10.30 – 11.30\nHerman Cappelen\nManuel Gustavo Isaac\n\n\n11.30 – 12.00\nRound table 1\nRound table 3\n\n\n\n\n\n  \nPM\n14.00 – 15.00\nÉdouard Machery\nNicholas Shea\n\n\n15.00 –15.15\nBreak\nBreak\n\n\n15.15 – 16.15\nKevin Scharp\nCatarina Dutilh Novaes\n\n\n16.15 – 16.45\nRound table 2\nRound table 4\n\n\n16.45 – 17.00\nOpen space\nClosing\n\n\n\n  \nABSTRACTS\n#01 | Nancy Cartwright (Durham University): “Engineering Objectivity – For Responsible Science Use” — This talk is about engineering the concept of scientific objectivity to fit it to serve the demand for responsible use of science’s practices\, products and endeavours. It is based on work from the forthcoming Tangle of Science\, with Jeremy Hardie\, Eleonora Montuschi\, Mat Soleiman and Ann Thresher. Rather than engineering the concept to make it more precise\, we urge leaving it as a loose ‘Ballung’ notion\, similar to ‘duty of care’\, where context sets what is demanded in any given case. In particular we argue for the importance of a concept that we label ‘objectivity to be found’: the duty to be objective involves the duty to find what is required in the case. This duty intertwines epistemic and moral considerations because it demands finding the right tools for the right purposes. \n#02 | Herman Cappelen (Hong Kong University): “Conceptual Engineering as Lexical and Conceptual Abandonment: “Democracy” as a Case Study” — Some of our terminology shouldn’t be improved\, but instead abandoned. Abandonment Theory is the study of the conditions under which lexical and conceptual abandonment is appropriate. The first part of this talk is an introduction to abandonment theory and its relationship to amelioration\, replacement and elimination. The second part applies abandonment theory to a core concept in political philosophy: ‘democracy’. I argue that ‘democracy’ is an ideal candidate for abandonment. \n#03 | Édouard Machery (University of Pittsburgh): “Should We Really Engineer Confused\, Unclear\, or Otherwise Deficient Concepts? The Case of Scientific Concepts” — Following Carnap\, conceptual engineers have long thought that confused\, unclear\, or vague concepts\, particularly scientific concepts\, are deficient\, and should be explicated (Carnap)\, prescriptively analyzed (Machery)\, or engineered (Cappelen). This talk will review several challenges to this view\, arguing in particular that confusion\, lack of clarity\, and vagueness are not necessarily deficiencies in science. \n#04 | Kevin Scharp (University of 58łÔčÏ): “Conceptual Engineering and the Omnicide Problem” \n#05 | Michela Massimi (University of Edinburgh): “Conceptually Re-Engineering ‘Phenomena’” — In this paper I will re-engineer one of the oldest concepts in philosophy of science: the concept of ‘phenomena’. For long time this concept has been a battleground for empiricist\, metaphysical realist and constructivist views about science. I will lay out the reasons why the concept of ‘phenomena’ requires to be re-engineered so as to address some outstanding problems facing the empiricist tradition and the metaphysical realist one too. The solution is not a de novo conceptual engineering but instead a ‘re-engineering’ that goes back to a Kantian insight and tries to make good of it for 21st century debates about realism and perspectivism in philosophy of science. \n#06 | Manuel Gustavo Isaac (Swiss NSF/University of 58łÔčÏ): “Applied Conceptual Engineering” — Applied conceptual engineering primarily concerns the application of conceptual engineering to real-world cases. It ranges from across academic disciplines to society at large. This talk aims to take the first step toward making conceptual engineering an effective tool to achieve real-world changes with measurable impact via the development of a multistakeholder participatory model for knowledge co-creation. \n#07 | Nicholas Shea (University of London): “How People Appraise Their Concepts”. — One way of addressing various social injustices is by changing the way we conceive of the relevant social categories. However\, to stop people using a familiar concept may take more than exhortation. We will need to find ways to act on the psychological factors that make people select some concepts\, and leave others aside\, when they engage in communication and reasoning. At the moment we have little idea what those factors are. They may be implicit as well as explicit. The findings reported here are a first step in the direction of gaining that insight. Our studies found that people have a unified sense of how well they understand a concept (a Sense of Understanding). They also appraise concepts along a number of other dimensions. These forms of appraisal are shown to affect which concepts are relied on for category-based induction. They also predict the hierarchical structure (superordinate-basic-subordinate) of taxonomic concepts. That gives us an indication of how aspects of the structure of a concept may affect whether or not it is selected for various uses\, including for communication with others. It thus points the way towards potential places to intervene if we want people to stop using certain commonplace but problematic concepts. \n#08 | Catarina Dutilh Novaes (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam): “The Role of History and Genealogy for Conceptual Engineering.” — What is the relevance of historical\, and in particular genealogical\, investigations for projects of conceptual engineering? This question has received some attention in the literature (in particular in (Plunkett 2016))\, but it deserves further attention. In this presentation\, I address this question by focusing on Carnapian explication\, in particular the preliminary step of clarification of the explicandum\, which remains an under-developed component of Carnap’s own presentation of explication. I argue that a genealogical perspective\, in particular inspired by Foucault\, is eminently suitable for the clarification of an explicandum: it provides the conditions for a successful conceptual intervention because it may provide a diagnosis of what is defective in the explicandum. I illustrate this approach by means of two examples: the concept of marriage and the concept of logical form. \n  \nFUNDING\nTHOUGHT Trust Conference Grant \n  \nORGANISER\nDr. Manuel Gustavo Isaac // SNSF-PM2018 Fellow @ ARCHÉ Philosophical Research Centre \nDr. Kevin Scharp // Reader in Philosophy\, Director of ARCHÉ @ University of 58łÔčÏ URL:/philevents/event/breaking-down-the-barriers-applied-conceptual-engineering-ace/ LOCATION:A virtual Conference – by Zoom CATEGORIES:Conference ORGANIZER;CN="Manuel Gustavo Isaac":MAILTO:mgi1@st-andrews.ac.uk END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210513T100000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210513T120000 DTSTAMP:20200819T113136Z CREATED:20200819T113136Z LAST-MODIFIED:20200819T113136Z UID:10001142-1620900000-1620907200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Super Special Seminar tba DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/super-special-seminar-tba-24/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58łÔčÏ\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Super Special Seminar series END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210513T160000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210513T173000 DTSTAMP:20210513T112006Z CREATED:20200819T113136Z LAST-MODIFIED:20210513T112006Z UID:10001143-1620921600-1620927000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar (joint with CEPPA and FPST): Emmalon Davis (UMich) “Challenging the Pursuit of Novelty” DESCRIPTION:Abstract: Novelty—understood as the value of saying something new—appears to be a good-making feature of a philosophical contribution. Beyond this\, however\, novelty functions as a marker of philosophical success: contributions that say something new are considered successful\, while contributions that do not say something new are considered unsuccessful. When novelty serves as a marker and metric of success\, the pursuit of novelty becomes an aspirational ideal. This paper challenges the presumption and expectation that a successful philosophical contribution will be a novel one.\n\nTo do so\, I distinguish two constituent components—novelty as ingenuity/originality and novelty as discovery/priority—which\, taken together\, comprise the aspirational ideal of novelty. I outline a series of traps or pitfalls associated with the practical pursuit of each component part and show that efforts to avoid traps associated with one render philosophers vulnerable to traps associated with the other. I argue that an aspirational ideal of novelty should be rejected\, as the pursuit of each component part is in tension with the other. Throughout my analysis\, I demonstrate that the greatest risks accompanying the pursuit of novelty are unevenly distributed and that an aspirational ideal of novelty disadvantages certain practitioners disproportionately. I conclude that an aspirational ideal of novelty is less desirable and less feasible than it appears. URL:/philevents/event/epistemology-seminar-tba-19/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58łÔčÏ\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210513T160000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210513T173000 DTSTAMP:20210512T103602Z CREATED:20210504T101422Z LAST-MODIFIED:20210512T103602Z UID:10001299-1620921600-1620927000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk – Emmalon Davis (Michigan) DESCRIPTION:Title: ‘Challenging the Pursuit of Novelty’ \nAbstract: Novelty—understood as the value of saying something new—appears to be a good-making feature of a philosophical contribution. Beyond this\, however\, novelty functions as a marker of philosophical success: contributions that say something new are considered successful\, while contributions that do not say something new are considered unsuccessful. When novelty serves as a marker and metric of success\, the pursuit of novelty becomes an aspirational ideal. This paper challenges the presumption and expectation that a successful philosophical contribution will be a novel one. \nTo do so\, I distinguish two constituent components—novelty as ingenuity/originality and novelty as discovery/priority—which\, taken together\, comprise the aspirational ideal of novelty. I outline a series of traps or pitfalls associated with the practical pursuit of each component part and show that efforts to avoid traps associated with one render philosophers vulnerable to traps associated with the other. I argue that an aspirational ideal of novelty should be rejected\, as the pursuit of each component part is in tension with the other. Throughout my analysis\, I demonstrate that the greatest risks accompanying the pursuit of novelty are unevenly distributed and that an aspirational ideal of novelty disadvantages certain practitioners disproportionately. I conclude that an aspirational ideal of novelty is less desirable and less feasible than it appears. \n*** \nThis event is co-hosted with the Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory Seminar. \n  URL:/philevents/event/ceppa-talk-emmalon-davis-the-new-school/ CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk ORGANIZER;CN="Emilia Wilson":MAILTO:ew58@st-andrews.ac.uk END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210514T101500 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210514T114500 DTSTAMP:20200819T113136Z CREATED:20200819T113136Z LAST-MODIFIED:20200819T113136Z UID:10001144-1620987300-1620992700@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Medieval Logic Seminar tba DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/medieval-logic-seminar-tba-31/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58łÔčÏ\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR