BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//Philosophy events - ECPv6.16.4//NONSGML v1.0//EN CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH X-ORIGINAL-URL:/philevents X-WR-CALDESC:Events for Philosophy events REFRESH-INTERVAL;VALUE=DURATION:PT1H X-Robots-Tag:noindex X-PUBLISHED-TTL:PT1H BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:Europe/London BEGIN:DAYLIGHT TZOFFSETFROM:+0000 TZOFFSETTO:+0100 TZNAME:BST DTSTART:20200329T010000 END:DAYLIGHT BEGIN:STANDARD TZOFFSETFROM:+0100 TZOFFSETTO:+0000 TZNAME:GMT DTSTART:20201025T010000 END:STANDARD BEGIN:DAYLIGHT TZOFFSETFROM:+0000 TZOFFSETTO:+0100 TZNAME:BST DTSTART:20210328T010000 END:DAYLIGHT BEGIN:STANDARD TZOFFSETFROM:+0100 TZOFFSETTO:+0000 TZNAME:GMT DTSTART:20211031T010000 END:STANDARD BEGIN:DAYLIGHT TZOFFSETFROM:+0000 TZOFFSETTO:+0100 TZNAME:BST DTSTART:20220327T010000 END:DAYLIGHT BEGIN:STANDARD TZOFFSETFROM:+0100 TZOFFSETTO:+0000 TZNAME:GMT DTSTART:20221030T010000 END:STANDARD END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210607T150000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210607T170000 DTSTAMP:20260621T014213 CREATED:20200819T113144Z LAST-MODIFIED:20210607T131900Z UID:10001160-1623078000-1623085200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Metaphysics and Logic Seminar Thomas Randriamahazaka (University of St. Andrews) DESCRIPTION:Title: Truthmaker semantics for containment and nonsense\n\nAbstract: Conceptivism is the doctrine according to which a proposition cannot entail another proposition if the latter contains a concept which is not already contained in the former: entailment does not introduce any additional conceptual content. This doctrine motivates so-called containment logics\, namely logics where a formula B cannot be deduced from a formula A if B contains a propositional variable which is not already contained in A. Interestingly\, most containment logics can be described as the result of filtering another logic by this syntactic condition. For instance\, A follows from B in Parry’s logic PAI if and only if A classically follows from B and all the propositional variables of B occur in A. Routley uses this fact to discredit containment logics as syntactic artefacts lacking any semantic depth. In this talk\, I investigate the semantic properties of containment logics to rebut Routley’s critique. I look at two recent strategies to semantically characterise containment logics without syntactic filters: Berto (2019)’s two-component semantics\, where entailment contains a condition of topical inclusion\, and logics of nonsense (e.g.\, Ferguson (2015))\, which include a truth-value representing meaninglessness. Both are somewhat unsatisfactory and call for a more general approach. I argue that the framework of truthmaker semantics (e.g.\, Fine (2017)) can be used to that end. I develop sound and complete truthmaker semantics for logics of nonsense and adapt them to model containment logics. The truthmaker understanding of containment logics provides a purely semantic foundation for them\, thus refuting Routley’s claim that they are syntactic artefacts. URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-tba-24/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58Թ\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210608T100000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210608T120000 DTSTAMP:20260621T014213 CREATED:20200819T113144Z LAST-MODIFIED:20210608T131905Z UID:10001161-1623146400-1623153600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Conceptual Engineering Seminar* | Frank Jackson (ANU): “Conceptual Engineering in Context” DESCRIPTION:*Session jointly hosted with ARCHÉ’s “Mind & Language” Research Group \nABSTRACT. — We should all be supporters of conceptual engineering. I take that to be relatively uncontroversial. But why – exactly? That’s where the controversy starts. I give the answer I like\, drawing on a view in metaphysics which explains why we need conceptual analyses (of a more or less traditional nature). Perhaps surprisingly\, when we are clear about why we need conceptual analyses\, we can see why we should be supporters of conceptual engineering. \nZOOM INFO \n\nMeeting ID: 892 5895 0975\nPassword: ACEW21\nInvite link: here URL:/philevents/event/conceptual-engineering-seminar-tba-24/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58Թ\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210608T120000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210608T140000 DTSTAMP:20260621T014213 CREATED:20210504T101317Z LAST-MODIFIED:20210608T131906Z UID:10001281-1623153600-1623160800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Language and Mind Seminar DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/language-and-mind-seminar-34/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58Թ\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210609T093000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210609T110000 DTSTAMP:20260621T014213 CREATED:20210504T101316Z LAST-MODIFIED:20210609T131900Z UID:10001280-1623231000-1623236400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Medieval Logic Seminar: Dumbleton\, Summa Logicae DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/medieval-logic-seminar-dumbleton-summa-logicae-5/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58Թ\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210609T110000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210609T123000 DTSTAMP:20260621T014213 CREATED:20200819T112819Z LAST-MODIFIED:20200819T154437Z UID:10001069-1623236400-1623241800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-29/ ORGANIZER;CN="Ben Sachs":MAILTO:bas7@st-andrews.ac.uk END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210609T160000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210609T180000 DTSTAMP:20260621T014213 CREATED:20210504T101318Z LAST-MODIFIED:20210609T131901Z UID:10001282-1623254400-1623261600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Philosophy & Social Theory Arché Seminar DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/philosophy-social-theory-arche-seminar-6/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58Թ\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Philosophy & Social Theory Arché Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20210610 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20210612 DTSTAMP:20260621T014213 CREATED:20210504T101319Z LAST-MODIFIED:20210610T131900Z UID:10001283-1623283200-1623455999@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Workshop on Identity and Individuation of Particulars and Universals DESCRIPTION:The University of 58Թ’ Arché Philosophical Research Centre for Logic\, Language\, Metaphysics\, and Epistemology will host a one-day online workshop on Identity and Individuation\, which will take place on June 10th 2021\, 12:30PM-7PM (British Summer Time). \nThe aim of this workshop is to bring together and promote research in the metaphysics of identity and individuation\, and to draw connections with ongoing work in metaphysics\, including but not limited to: the logical form and function of criteria of identity\, identity and indiscernibility\, identity and essence\, identity and modality\, the individuation of particulars and properties\, intrinsic and extrinsic properties\, and qualitative and non-qualitative properties\, as well as assessments of the relative merits of the different criteria of identity for both particulars and properties on offer today. \n  \nProgramme\n(N.B. Details to access the workshop can be found at the bottom of this webpage) \n12:30-12:55 Registration and Coffee \n12:55-13:00 Introduction \n13:00-14:00 Tim Button (University College London) \n14:00-14:15 Break \n14:15-15:15 Sophie Allen (Keele University) \n15:15-15:30 Break \n15:30-16:30 Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (University of Oxford) \n16:30-16:45 Break \n16:45-17:45 Vera Hoffman-Kolss (University of Bern) \n17:45-18:00 Break \n18:00-19:00 Sam Cowling (Denison University) \n  \nTim Button (University College London) \nTitle: Getting precise on indiscernibility \nAbstract: “Are there indiscernible but distinct objects?” That question is imprecise\, in at least two regards: \nFirst: there are many notions of indiscernibility. For example: we say (roughly) that two objects are two-symmetricaliff you can swap the objects without affecting the overall structure. (More precisely: a and b are two-symmetrical iff there is an automorphism mapping a to b and b to a.) We say that two objects are Leibniz-indiscernible iff they stand in exactly the same relations to all entities. These are distinct notions. When asking questions about indiscernibility\, we need to know which notion we have in mind. \nSecond: every notion of indiscernibility makes reference to a background language\, with regard to which discernment occurs. When asking questions about indiscernibility\, we need to choose a particular language. Which language we choose might depend on our purposes. For example\, if we are interested in our ability to refer (determinately) to one entity rather than another\, we should presumably choose a language we can acquire and manifest. By contrast\, if we are interested in whether there are “metaphysically” indiscernible entities\, we will have to assume there is a metaphysically privileged language. \nTo see why this matters\, I will run through the question “Are there indiscernible but distinct mathematical objects?” It transpires there is a “cheap” to a version of the identity of indiscernibles (with the most demanding notion of indiscernibility); and it is not obviously too cheap. \n  \nSophie Allen (Keele University) \nTitle: Sortalism\, Token Identity\, and the Conception of a Particular \nAbstract: The conflict between sortalism and token identity between the mental and the physical is not unexpected: the former requires that the individuation of events or objects be based somehow on their type\, their essence or the properties which they have\, while the latter maintains that particulars can be identified across disparate domains regardless of type. In this paper\, I consider the prospects for resolving this dispute\, or for rejecting sortalism and characterising particulars in a way which is compatible with token identity. \n  \nGonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (University of Oxford) \nTitle: An Argument for the Identity of Indiscernibles \nAbstract: I shall argue that there is no trivial version of the Identity of Indiscernibles. I shall also identify the weakest version of the Identity of Indiscernibles (a fortiori the weakest non-trivial version of it) and give an argument for it based on considerations of grounding. \n  \nVera Hoffman-Kolss (University of Bern) \nTitle: Interventionism and the Individuation of Properties \nAbstract: Under what conditions is a property P identical with a property Q? Interventionist theories of causation and causal models provide a prima facie plausible answer to this question: P and Q are identical iff they (or the variables representing them) assume exactly the same position in all possible causal models. This criterion is problematic\, however\, if properties are individuated hyperintensionally\, that is\, if there are properties P and Q that are distinct\, but instantiated by the same individuals in all possible worlds. In this paper\, I argue that causal modeling frameworks can overcome this difficulty if the dependence relations occurring in them are characterized in terms of counterpossible conditionals. \n  \nSam Cowling (Denison University) \nTitle: Haecceitism by the Numbers \nAbstract: Haecceitism holds that things could be just as they are in all qualitative respects—e.g.\, with respect to properties like shape and mass—but differ non-qualitatively—e.g.\, with respect to which individuals exist or which qualitative roles they occupy. Although debate over the truth of haecceitism is commonplace\, investigation into the nature or variety of haecceitistic differences we ought to accept is far more limited. This essay explores the challenges that haecceitists face when specifying which haecceitistic differences are genuine. After considering competing proposals that deliver gruesome or natural species of haecceitism\, we turn to some empirical studies of haecceitistic intuitions. We conclude by considering what differ species of haecceitism might mean for the effectiveness of conceivability arguments for haecceitism. \nDetails to access the workshop: \nWhere: Zoom \nMeeting ID: 895 194 2082 \nMeeting Password: PHD2020 (Invite link) \nIf you have any questions\, please contact one of the organizers: Matteo Nizzardo (email- mn85@st-andrews.ac.uk) or Jace Snodgrass (email- js413@st-andrews.ac.uk). URL:/philevents/event/1st-workshop-on-identity-and-individuation/ LOCATION:A virtual workshop by Zoom\, The University\, 58Թ\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Workshops ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/png:/philevents/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/Poster_Identity-V9e5b4.tmp_.png END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210610T100000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210610T120000 DTSTAMP:20260621T014213 CREATED:20200819T113145Z LAST-MODIFIED:20210610T131900Z UID:10001162-1623319200-1623326400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Super Special Seminar tba DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/super-special-seminar-tba-28/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58Թ\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Super Special Seminar series END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210610T130000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210610T143000 DTSTAMP:20260621T014213 CREATED:20200819T113145Z LAST-MODIFIED:20210610T131901Z UID:10001163-1623330000-1623335400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar: Catarina Dutilh Novaes “Argumentation and a three-tiered model of epistemic exchange” DESCRIPTION:Abstract: Argumentation is often contrasted with testimony in that in cases of testimony\, an epistemic agent (presumably) primarily evaluates the trustworthiness of the source of information (the informant)\, whereas in argumentation there is (presumably) primarily engagement with the content communicated. I have argued however (Dutilh Novaes 2020) that trust and trustworthiness in fact play an important role in argumentation too. From this analysis emerged a three-tiered model of epistemic exchange\, inspired by the framework of social exchange theory (an influential framework in sociology and social psychology). According to this model\, there are three stages for an instance of epistemic exchange to take place: 1- a relation of attention is established between the parties; 2- a relation of sufficient trust is established between the parties; 3- the parties can finally engage in fruitful epistemic exchange. This model generalizes beyond argumentation\, and sheds new light on a number of phenomena that have attracted the interest of social epistemologists such as epistemic bubbles and epistemic injustice\, among others. In this talk\, I present the model in detail and discuss some of its applications. URL:/philevents/event/epistemology-seminar-tba-23/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58Թ\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210610T160000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210610T170000 DTSTAMP:20260621T014213 CREATED:20210528T111910Z LAST-MODIFIED:20210602T095819Z UID:10001303-1623340800-1623344400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Knox Seminar with Tim Scanlon (Harvard) DESCRIPTION:This will be a one-hour discussion of Scanlon’s Knox Lecture\, which can be viewed here: \nhttps://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/events/2021-knox-lecture-tim-scanlon-harvard-university/ URL:/philevents/event/knox-seminar-with-tim-scanlon-harvard/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210611T101500 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210611T114500 DTSTAMP:20260621T014213 CREATED:20200819T113145Z LAST-MODIFIED:20200819T113145Z UID:10001164-1623406500-1623411900@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Medieval Logic Seminar tba DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/medieval-logic-seminar-tba-35/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58Թ\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR