BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//Philosophy events - ECPv6.16.4.1//NONSGML v1.0//EN CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH X-ORIGINAL-URL:/philevents X-WR-CALDESC:Events for Philosophy events REFRESH-INTERVAL;VALUE=DURATION:PT1H X-Robots-Tag:noindex X-PUBLISHED-TTL:PT1H BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:Europe/London BEGIN:DAYLIGHT TZOFFSETFROM:+0000 TZOFFSETTO:+0100 TZNAME:BST DTSTART:20200329T010000 END:DAYLIGHT BEGIN:STANDARD TZOFFSETFROM:+0100 TZOFFSETTO:+0000 TZNAME:GMT DTSTART:20201025T010000 END:STANDARD BEGIN:DAYLIGHT TZOFFSETFROM:+0000 TZOFFSETTO:+0100 TZNAME:BST DTSTART:20210328T010000 END:DAYLIGHT BEGIN:STANDARD TZOFFSETFROM:+0100 TZOFFSETTO:+0000 TZNAME:GMT DTSTART:20211031T010000 END:STANDARD BEGIN:DAYLIGHT TZOFFSETFROM:+0000 TZOFFSETTO:+0100 TZNAME:BST DTSTART:20220327T010000 END:DAYLIGHT BEGIN:STANDARD TZOFFSETFROM:+0100 TZOFFSETTO:+0000 TZNAME:GMT DTSTART:20221030T010000 END:STANDARD END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210614T093000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210614T110000 DTSTAMP:20210614T133418Z CREATED:20210504T101337Z LAST-MODIFIED:20210614T133418Z UID:10001284-1623663000-1623668400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Medieval Logic Seminar: Dumbleton\, Summa Logicae DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/medieval-logic-seminar-dumbleton-summa-logicae-6/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58łÔčÏ\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210614T150000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210614T170000 DTSTAMP:20210614T133418Z CREATED:20200819T113146Z LAST-MODIFIED:20210614T133418Z UID:10001165-1623682800-1623690000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Metaphysics and Logic Seminar Hitoshi Omori (Ruhr-UniversitĂ€t Bochum) DESCRIPTION:Title: On American and Australian plans for negation \nAbstract: Francesco Berto\, later joined by Greg Restall\, defends a modal account of negation\, or the Australian plan for negation. The aim of this talk is to carefully examine and compare Australian and American plans for negation. To this end\, I will consider four cases\, and draw some implications for both plans. The four cases include (i) FDE-family\, also with Shrieking and Shrugging idea deployed by Jc Beall\, (ii) intuitionistic logic\, (iii) treatment of Aristotle’s thesis\, and (iv) the system CLoN made use of by Diderik Batens. URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-tba-25/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58łÔčÏ\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210615T120000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210615T140000 DTSTAMP:20210615T134922Z CREATED:20210504T101338Z LAST-MODIFIED:20210615T134922Z UID:10001285-1623758400-1623765600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Language and Mind Seminar DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/language-and-mind-seminar-35/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58łÔčÏ\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210615T150000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210615T170000 DTSTAMP:20210615T134923Z CREATED:20200819T113147Z LAST-MODIFIED:20210615T134923Z UID:10001166-1623769200-1623776400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Conceptual Engineering Seminar | Elizabeth Barnes (Virginia): “What Is Health?” DESCRIPTION:ABSTRACT. — Philosophers have taken a wide range of approaches to defining health. I offer a pessimistic take on such definitional projects. I will argue\, not only that extant accounts are flawed\, but that no theory which seeks to give a single\, unified conceptual definition of health can succeed. \nZOOM INFO \n\nMeeting ID: 892 5895 0975\nPassword: ACEW21\nInvite link: here URL:/philevents/event/conceptual-engineering-seminar-tba-25/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58łÔčÏ\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20210616 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20210617 DTSTAMP:20210602T095820Z CREATED:20210504T101424Z LAST-MODIFIED:20210602T095820Z UID:10001301-1623801600-1623887999@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:JS Mill Cup DESCRIPTION:https://millcup.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/ \n  \n  URL:/philevents/event/js-mill-cup/ ORGANIZER;CN="Ben Sachs":MAILTO:bas7@st-andrews.ac.uk END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210616T110000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210616T123000 DTSTAMP:20200819T154437Z CREATED:20200819T112819Z LAST-MODIFIED:20200819T154437Z UID:10001070-1623841200-1623846600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-30/ ORGANIZER;CN="Ben Sachs":MAILTO:bas7@st-andrews.ac.uk END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210616T160000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210616T180000 DTSTAMP:20210616T134908Z CREATED:20210504T101338Z LAST-MODIFIED:20210616T134908Z UID:10001286-1623859200-1623866400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Philosophy & Social Theory ArchĂ© Seminar DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/philosophy-social-theory-arche-seminar-7/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58łÔčÏ\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Philosophy & Social Theory ArchĂ© Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20210617 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20210619 DTSTAMP:20210617T135307Z CREATED:20210504T101339Z LAST-MODIFIED:20210617T135307Z UID:10001287-1623888000-1624060799@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Workshop on Hyperintensional Metaphysics DESCRIPTION:The University of 58łÔčÏ ArchĂ© Philosophical Research Centre for Logic\, Language\, Metaphysics and Epistemology will be hosting a Workshop on Hyperintensional Metaphysics\, which will take place on the 17th of June 2021. \nThe aim of this Workshop is to bring together and promote research in the area of Hyperintensional Metaphysics\, and to draw connections with ongoing work in Metaphysics\, including (but not limited to): causation\, essence\, grounding\, explanation\, the individuation of propositions and properties\, intrinsic and extrinsic properties\, conditionality\, impossible worlds\, and truthmaking. Further\, other areas up for discussion also include: questions regarding the metaphysical status of hyperintensional phenomena\, objections against hyperintensional analyses\, or kinds of analyses\, as well as assessments of the relative merits of the different accounts of hyperintensional metaphysics on offer today. \nConference Venue: Online on Zoom (N.B. There is a 100 participant capacity.) \nProgramme (All times are British Summer Time) \n12:30-12:55 Registration and Coffee \n12:55-13:00 Introduction \n13:00-14:00 Timothy Williamson (University of Oxford) \n14:00-14:15 Break \n14:15-15:15 Maya Eddon (University of Massachusetts\, Amherst) \n15:15-15:30 Break \n15:30-16:30 Sara Bernstein (University of Notre Dame) \n16:30-16:45 Break \n16:45-17:45 Daniel Nolan (University of Notre Dame) \n17:45-18:00 Break \n18:00-19:00 Kit Fine (New York University) \n  \nTimothy Williamson (University of Oxford) \nTitle: Is Hyperintensionalism Good Science? \nAbstract: Theories in metaphysics can be compared abductively\, in a way similar to the abductive comparison of theories in natural science. By that standard\, how do hyperintensionalist theories when compared to their natural rivals\, intensionalist theories? (Here intensionalism about states of affairs\, properties\, relations\, etc. holds that they are identical if necessarily equivalent\, while hyperintensionalism is the denial of intensionalism.) \nSimplicity is one salient abductive virtue. In most cases\, hyperintensionalist theories are manifestly more complicated than their intensionalist rivals\, so the issue is whether the former can compensate on other dimensions for this initial disadvantage. Hyperintensionalism is sometimes held to have an advantage over intensionalism in being a less constraining framework than intensionalism\, but from an abductive perspective that is a mistake: extra degrees of freedom weaken a theory (i.e. make it less informative) and so in themselves are an abductive vice. Furthermore\, the intensionalist approach has been far more systematically and fully developed than hyperintensionalist accounts\, has proved its worth in applications outside philosophy (e.g. in computer science\, theoretical economics\, and linguistics)\, and is closely related to frameworks in very general use in science (e.g. probability spaces). Another disadvantage of hyperintensionalism is that its unrestricted versions are inconsistent (Russell-Myhill paradoxes)\, while its restricted versions involve further losses of simplicity and elegance; there is no analogous threat to intensionalism. \nIf hyperintensionalist theories are to survive abductive comparison with their intensionalist rivals\, they will have to do so by fitting the data better (for which the extra complications and loss of informativeness would be the price to be paid). However\, the data to which they appeal are shaky. The relevant judgments seem to project features of discourse onto the extra-linguistic world\, e.g. relevance\, aboutness\, contextual shifts\, perspicuousness of explanations\, and can be explained away by intensionalists without ad hoc auxiliary assumptions. By abductive standards\, intensionalism is way ahead of hyperintensionalism. \n  \nMaya Eddon (University of Massachusetts\, Amherst) \nTitle: On Not Having Mass \nAbstract: What does it mean for an object to lack some quantitative feature\, like mass?  Does such an object instantiate the property having no mass\, or does it instantiate the property having 0 units mass\, or is there even any distinction between the two?  I will show that no matter what we say we must deal with some counterintuitive results.  I lay out several views and their consequences\, and argue in favor of one of these views. \n  \nSara Bernstein (University of Notre Dame) \nTitle: Countersocial Counterfactuals \nAbstract: We often reason about what our lives would have been like if we had belonged to different social groups\, as in “If I had been born into a Victorian English family\, I wouldn’t have gotten married\,” or “If I hadn’t been a woman\, I would have had an easier time in that meeting.” This talk aims to make sense of such countersocial counterfactuals\, conditionals whose antecedents run contrary to social facts. I distinguish between several sorts of countersocials\, and suggest that some countersocials are non-vacuous counterpossibles. After arguing for the explanatory power of such countersocials\, I suggest that countersocial counterfactuals play an important role in social explanations. I discuss the benefits of adopting a hyperintensional framework (i.e.\, a framework for distinguishing between necessarily equivalent claims) for the evaluation of countersocials. I conclude by suggesting that a plausible similarity metric for countersocial counterfactuals must take into account the nature of unitary and intersectional social groups. \n  \nDaniel Nolan (University of Notre Dame) \nTitle: The Hyperintensional Mind \nAbstract: The case for hyperintensionally individuated mental contents is now hard to resist. That is\, it is clear that agents do not automatically believe all the necessary equivalents of the things they believe; and they do not always desire necessary equivalents to the same degree. Debate continues about the ontology of the contents of belief and desire. Issues include whether to characterise contents as propositions or properties; whether to think of the propositions or properties as structured or unstructured; and if contents are not individuated by necessary equivalence\, how fine-grained should we take them to be. \nWe would like an account of what it is about an agent that determines she has one set of mental contents rather than another. One influential picture of how content is determined\, associated with the kinds of functionalism defended by David Lewis\, Frank Jackson\, Robert Stalnaker and others\, outlines an account of the contents of an agent’s attitudes in terms of how the agent\, others like her\, and her internal states are disposed to behave across a range of possible circumstances. This kind of story can be developed to handle a rich range of impossible contents as well\, provided we equip ourselves with hyperintensional metaphysical resources. In particular\, if we endorse non-trivial counterpossible conditionals and non-trivial dispositions to respond in impossible circumstances\, we can characterise the “modal” profiles of agents\, states\, and populations in the way needed to deliver a foundational story about agents with fine grained attitudes. The resulting understanding of mental content is a useful guide to the metaphysics of those contents themselves. It suggests a picture of contents as sets of worlds rather than as structured contents\, and offers some guidance on the question of the fine-grainedness of belief and desire. \n  \nKit Fine (New York University) \nTitle: Why go Hyperintensional? \nAbstract: I will give some purely logical reasons why it might be helpful to adopt a hyperintensional approach to logics – such as those for the counterfactual and deontic operators – that are commonly taken to be intensionial. \n  \nOrganizers: \nJace Snodgrass \nMatteo Nizzardo URL:/philevents/event/workshop-on-hyperintentional-metaphysics/ LOCATION:A virtual workshop by Zoom\, The University\, 58łÔčÏ\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Workshops ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/png:/philevents/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/WHM-yOJlDZ.tmp_.png END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210617T100000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210617T120000 DTSTAMP:20210617T135307Z CREATED:20200819T113147Z LAST-MODIFIED:20210617T135307Z UID:10001167-1623924000-1623931200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Super Special Seminar tba DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/super-special-seminar-tba-29/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58łÔčÏ\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Super Special Seminar series END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210617T130000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210617T143000 DTSTAMP:20210617T135308Z CREATED:20200819T113147Z LAST-MODIFIED:20210617T135308Z UID:10001168-1623934800-1623940200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar: Corine Besson (Sussex) “Carroll’s Regress\, Guidance and Explicit Representation” DESCRIPTION:Abstract: What is the nature of one’s justification to use a logical principle such as Modus Ponens in reasoning? It is widely agreed amongst epistemologists of logic that such justification cannot be internalist. One key reason offered for this view is that internalist accounts of justification are susceptible to Carroll-style regresses. In this talk\, I examine this claim and argue that internalist accounts of justification are not open to such regresses. I further argue that the sorts of externalist accounts of the justification of logical principles typically put forward as alternatives are inadequate. URL:/philevents/event/epistemology-seminar-tba-24/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58łÔčÏ\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20210618 DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20210621 DTSTAMP:20210618T135330Z CREATED:20210508T103806Z LAST-MODIFIED:20210618T135330Z UID:10001302-1623974400-1624233599@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:How Could Truth be Plural? DESCRIPTION:It has been nearly thirty years since Crispin Wright’s Truth and Objectivity was published\, and in these thirty years alethic pluralism has established itself as a strong contender in the current debate on truth. Yet\, while various intricate versions of alethic pluralism have been developed over the years\, many philosophers are still hesitant to buy into the very idea that truth is plural.\nOur conference\, “How Could Truth Possibly Be Plural?”\, offers the alethic pluralist the opportunity to face their critics and defend their views. \nSchedule (all times are in UTC+1)\nDay 1 (18th of June):\n14:45 – 15:00 Crispin Wright (NYU/Stirling)  Introduction\n15:00 – 16:15 Mark Jago (Nottingham)  On Ways of Being True\n16:30 – 17:45 Cheryl Misak (Toronto)  Ramsey’s Unified Pragmatist Concept of Truth\n18:00 – 19:15 MarĂ­a JosĂ© FrĂĄpolli (Granada)  Semantic Pluralism and the Complex Meaning of Truth\n19.30 – 20:45 Chase Wrenn (Alabama) — Blindspots and Brightspots in Alethic Pluralism \nDay 2 (19th of June):\n15:00 – 16:15 William Gamester (Leeds) A Place and Purpose for Pluralism\n16:30 – 17:45 Douglas Edwards (Utica) & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen (Yonsei) Moderate Pluralism: Doubly Grounded?\n18:00 – 19:30 Douglas Edwards\, Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen\, Crispin Wright  Panel Discussion \nRegistration\nIf you would like to attend the conference\, please register by emailing Tom Kaspers (tk70@st-andrews.ac.uk) or NiccolĂČ Aimone Pisano (nap6@st-andrews.ac.uk). The conference is free and open to all. \nAbstracts\nJago — On Ways of Being True \nThere are many ways for truths to be true. How should we understand that idea? One is that there are different kinds of truth: the ways are different properties of truth. Another understanding is that a truth can be made true in different ways\, by different kinds of entities. The former understanding supports alethic pluralism. But the latter can be understood as a kind of monism: truth is the existential property of having some truthmaker or other. On this view\, the differences reside in how a truth is made true\, but not in its being true. I’ll discuss how these two understandings differ\, and what the potential advantages of each might be. \nMisak — Ramsey’s Unified Pragmatist Concept of Truth \nF.P. Ramsey is sometimes taken to be a proponent of the redundancy theory of truth. Sometimes he is taken to be on the same page as the Vienna Circle or Wittgenstein’s Tractatus\, where the truth predicate only applies to something like simple elementary perceptual propositions. I will argue that both these interpretations are wrong. Ramsey offered a promising account of truth on pragmatist lines\, where truth is the aim of belief\, and each domain of belief or inquiry must answer\, for its own subject matter\, the question What is true? His project was to offer a unified account of how various kinds of beliefs might aim at truth\, including logic\, ethics\, and perhaps even aesthetics. \nFrĂĄpolli — Semantic Pluralism and the Complex Meaning of Truth \nTruth ascriptions are sophisticated linguistic tools of endorsement and generalisation over propositions. Their complex meaning can only be unravelled in a pluralistic semantic framework that makes room for a distinction between an aspect of meaning that is stable\, i.e. linguistic meaning\, and an aspect that is contextually modulated\, i.e. the content that they help to assert. The focus on the use of truth ascriptions accommodates the intuition that different terms (different sentences) can act as truth predicates (truth ascriptions). This does not imply\, nevertheless\, that there are different truth conceptsthat apply to different kinds of contents. Ramsey is my main inspiration. Frege\, Kaplan\, Strawson\, C. F. J. Williams and Brandom have also had an essential impact on my proposal\, which combines philosophical aspects\, taken from pragmatics\, and technical aspects\, taken from the linguistic analysis of proforms. \nWrenn — Blindspots and Brightspots in Alethic Pluralism \nAlethic pluralists often stake their position on the claim that truth-attributions involve marking claims with a special normative status. We can understand that status as fitness to believe or fitness to assert. I argue that truth-attributions can’t necessarily involve attributing any such status. The problem comes from true-belief (or true-assertion) blindspots (Sorensen; Bykvist & Hattiangadi) and brightspots. The former are claims such as ‘It’s raining and no one believes it’\, which can be true but not truly believed. The latter are claims such as ‘2 is prime and no one believes it’\, which can be false but not falsely believed. The basic shape of the problem is this: If something is fit to believe\, then\, were you to believe it\, your belief would be alethically fitting (or correct or good or whatever). No state of believing a blindspot is alethically fitting\, even though blindspots can be true. So\, being true does not entail fitness to believe. For similar reasons\, falsehood doesn’t entail unfitness to believe. Consequently\, it can’t be part of the content of TRUE that what is true is fit to believe. After laying out the problem\, I explore some of the likeliest pluralist responses to it. \nGamester — A Place and Purpose for Pluralism \nThis talk takes up a suggestion made independently by Wright (“Comrades Against Quietism”\, 1998) and Lynch (“Expressivism and Plural Truth”\, 2013): that truth pluralism and metaethical expressivism are natural allies. I explore one way in which expressivists stand to benefit by endorsing a substantive\, but non-representational\, theory of truth for ethical judgements: with regards to the notorious Frege-Geach Problem. I argue that such a theory can play a critical role in earning the right to a truth-conditional semantics for ethical discourse\, by explaining that in virtue of which ethical sentences have truth-conditions (namely\, in virtue of expressing judgements that can be true or false). The expressivist can hereby silo her distinctive commitments to the metasemantics of ethical discourse and the nature of ethical judgement\, while endorsing an utterly orthodox\, truth-conditional semantic theory. While this does not\, by itself\, suffice to solve the Frege-Geach Problem – we still need a compositional story about what mental states are expressed by logically complex sentences – it constitutes a major step forwards. Moreover\, I suggest how we can complete the solution by appealing to a kind of logical expressivism – an independently motivated and well-developed theory that is already employed by some truth pluralists (Ferrari\, Moruzzi\, and Pedersen\, “Austere Truth Pluralism”\, 2021). \nEdwards & Pedersen — Moderate Pluralism: Doubly Grounded? \nModerate truth pluralists (such as Lynch 2009\, Edwards 2018) hold that truth itself is distinct from properties such as correspondence and superassertibility that nevertheless play a significant role in explaining the truth of sentences in different domains. A significant challenge for moderate pluralists is to explain the relationship between truth itself and these domain-specific properties. In this talk we explore the idea (due to Pedersen 2020\, MS) that grounding can be used to account for this relation. We do this in two ways. We first show how the truth of particular sentences can be explained through grounding\, before going on to explore whether grounding can also be used to account for the general relation between truth and the domain-specific properties. \n  \n  URL:/philevents/event/how-could-truth-be-plural/ LOCATION:A virtual Conference – by Zoom CATEGORIES:Conference ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/png:/philevents/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/Poster-Alethic-Pluralism-Conference_001-e1620399580532-1wKYWz.tmp_.png END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210618T101500 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210618T114500 DTSTAMP:20200819T113148Z CREATED:20200819T113148Z LAST-MODIFIED:20200819T113148Z UID:10001169-1624011300-1624016700@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Medieval Logic Seminar tba DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/medieval-logic-seminar-tba-36/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58łÔčÏ\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR