BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//Philosophy events - ECPv6.16.4//NONSGML v1.0//EN CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH X-ORIGINAL-URL:/philevents X-WR-CALDESC:Events for Philosophy events REFRESH-INTERVAL;VALUE=DURATION:PT1H X-Robots-Tag:noindex X-PUBLISHED-TTL:PT1H BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:Europe/London BEGIN:DAYLIGHT TZOFFSETFROM:+0000 TZOFFSETTO:+0100 TZNAME:BST DTSTART:20200329T010000 END:DAYLIGHT BEGIN:STANDARD TZOFFSETFROM:+0100 TZOFFSETTO:+0000 TZNAME:GMT DTSTART:20201025T010000 END:STANDARD BEGIN:DAYLIGHT TZOFFSETFROM:+0000 TZOFFSETTO:+0100 TZNAME:BST DTSTART:20210328T010000 END:DAYLIGHT BEGIN:STANDARD TZOFFSETFROM:+0100 TZOFFSETTO:+0000 TZNAME:GMT DTSTART:20211031T010000 END:STANDARD BEGIN:DAYLIGHT TZOFFSETFROM:+0000 TZOFFSETTO:+0100 TZNAME:BST DTSTART:20220327T010000 END:DAYLIGHT BEGIN:STANDARD TZOFFSETFROM:+0100 TZOFFSETTO:+0000 TZNAME:GMT DTSTART:20221030T010000 END:STANDARD END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211004T093000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211004T110000 DTSTAMP:20260620T031222 CREATED:20210706T153828Z LAST-MODIFIED:20211003T235308Z UID:10001324-1633339800-1633345200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Medieval Logic Seminar: Walter Segrave\, Insolubles DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/medieval-logic-seminar-12/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58łÔčÏ\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Medieval Logic Research Group END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211004T150000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211004T170000 DTSTAMP:20260620T031222 CREATED:20210706T153829Z LAST-MODIFIED:20211003T235308Z UID:10001325-1633359600-1633366800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Metaphysics Seminar Greg Restall (University of 58łÔčÏ) DESCRIPTION:Title: Worlds: Possible and Impossible \nAbstract: In this talk\, I’ll reflect on the role of worlds—both possible worlds and impossible worlds—both in the semantics of various kinds of languages and logics\, and in broader issues in metaphysics. I will argue that\, given very modest assumptions concerning the role of worlds in semantics\, that any defender of possible worlds in such a role should be equally comfortable with impossible worlds.\n\n\nHowever\, this argument for impossible worlds does not transfer straightforwardly to logically impossible worlds. So\, in the second part of the talk I will consider what we might say\, for (or against) properly logically impossible worlds. URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-seminar-3/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58łÔčÏ\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211005T120000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211005T140000 DTSTAMP:20260620T031222 CREATED:20210707T153836Z LAST-MODIFIED:20211003T235308Z UID:10001326-1633435200-1633442400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Language & Mind Seminar: Emma Borg (Reading) DESCRIPTION:In Defence of Individual Rationality: \n  \nCommon-sense (or folk) psychology holds that (generally) we do what we do for the reasons we have. This common-sense approach is embodied in claims like “I went to the kitchen because I wanted a drink” or “She took a coat because she thought it might rain and hoped to stay dry”. However\, the veracity of these common-sense psychological explanations has been challenged by experimental evidence (primarily from behavioural economics and social psychology) which appears to show that individuals are systematically irrational – that often we do not do what we do because of the reasons we have. Recently\, some of the same experimental evidence has also been used to level a somewhat different challenge at the common-sense view\, arguing that the overarching aim of reasoning is not to deliver better or more logical decisions for individual reasoners\, but to improve group decision making or to protect an individual’s sense of self. This paper explores the range of challenges that experimental work has been taken to raise for the common-sense approach and suggests some potential responses. Overall\, I argue that the experimental evidence should not (currently) lead us to a rejection of individual rationality. URL:/philevents/event/language-and-mind-s1-5/ CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211005T150000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211005T170000 DTSTAMP:20260620T031222 CREATED:20210707T153836Z LAST-MODIFIED:20211003T235308Z UID:10001327-1633446000-1633453200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Conceptual Engineering Seminar DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/conceptual-engineering-seminar-14/ CATEGORIES:Conceptual Engineering Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211006T150000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211006T160000 DTSTAMP:20260620T031222 CREATED:20210831T171142Z LAST-MODIFIED:20211003T190851Z UID:10001393-1633532400-1633536000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group DESCRIPTION:Moral Philosophy Reading Group\nDescription: This group reads and discusses an article per week\, chosen by a different member each time. \nDay/time: Wednesdays 3pm to 4pm on Teams. \nOrganizer: Theron Pummer (tgp4). URL:/philevents/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-64/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211006T160000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211006T180000 DTSTAMP:20260620T031222 CREATED:20210708T154009Z LAST-MODIFIED:20211003T235308Z UID:10001328-1633536000-1633543200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory Seminar: Jonathan Flowers\, ‘The Affective Quality of Gender’ DESCRIPTION:The Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory Seminar is delighted to welcome Jonathan Flowers\, Professorial Lecturer in the Department of Philosophy & Religion at American University\, who will be delivering a talk titled ‘The Affective Quality of Gender’: \nTitle: The Affective Quality of Gender \nAbstract: \n     While Judith Butler recognizes that identity\, specifically gendered identities\, are established through a stylized repetition of acts\, and Shannon Sullivan connects this stylized repetition of acts to John Dewey’s concept of habit\, this talk will seek to advance upon these theories by presenting the gendered identity established by these habits as one that is affective and qualitative\, by placing both Butler and Sullivan in conversation with Richard Shusterman’s “somaesthetics” and the aesthetic philosophy of John Dewey.  \n     On this view\, the different gendered habits which are taken from or imposed upon us by culture serve to enable an affective perception of the body as not only gendered\, but gendered in a specific way in line with our cultural expectations. This affective perception serves the ground of our immediate judgments of the gender of a body and serves to enable the denotation of bodies as gendered in social space.  \n  URL:/philevents/event/philosophy-and-social-theory-seminar-3/ CATEGORIES:Philosophy & Social Theory ArchĂ© Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211007T100000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211007T120000 DTSTAMP:20260620T031222 CREATED:20210709T155325Z LAST-MODIFIED:20211007T151203Z UID:10001329-1633600800-1633608000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Super Special Seminar DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/super-special-seminar-10/ CATEGORIES:Super Special Seminar series END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211007T160000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211007T173000 DTSTAMP:20260620T031222 CREATED:20210709T155337Z LAST-MODIFIED:20211007T151204Z UID:10001330-1633622400-1633627800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar (joint with CEPPA): Thi Nguyen (Utah) “Value Capture” DESCRIPTION:Abstract: Value capture occurs when an agent enters a social environment which presents external expressions of value — which are often simplified\, standardized\, and quantified — and those external versions come to dominate our reasoning and motivations. Examples include becoming motivated by Twitter Likes and Retweets\, citation rates\, ranked lists of best schools\, and Grade Point Averages. We are vulnerable to value capture because of the competitive advantage that such pre-packaged value expressions have in our reasoning and our communications. But when we internalize such metrics\, we damage our own autonomy. In value capture\, we outsource the process of deliberating on our values. And that outsourcing cuts off one of the key benefits of personal deliberation. When we tailor our values to ourselves\, we can fine-tune them to fit our own particular psychology and place in the world. But in value capture\, we buy our values off the rack. URL:/philevents/event/epistemology-seminar-14/ CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211007T160000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211007T173000 DTSTAMP:20260620T031222 CREATED:20210830T171135Z LAST-MODIFIED:20211007T180806Z UID:10001384-1633622400-1633627800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk – Thi Nguyen (University of Utah) DESCRIPTION:Title: Value Capture \nAbstract: Value capture occurs when an agent enters a social environment which presents external expressions of value — which are often simplified\, standardized\, and quantified — and those external versions come to dominate our reasoning and motivations. Examples include becoming motivated by Twitter Likes and Retweets\, citation rates\, ranked lists of best schools\, and Grade Point Averages. We are vulnerable to value capture because of the competitive advantage that such pre-packaged value expressions have in our reasoning and our communications. But when we internalize such metrics\, we damage our own autonomy. In value capture\, we outsource the process of deliberating on our values. And that outsourcing cuts off one of the key benefits of personal deliberation. When we tailor our values to ourselves\, we can fine-tune them to fit our own particular psychology and place in the world. But in value capture\, we buy our values off the rack. URL:/philevents/event/ceppa-talk-thi-nguyen-university-of-utah/ CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR