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X-WR-CALDESC:Events for Philosophy events
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211011T093000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211011T110000
DTSTAMP:20260619T183857
CREATED:20210713T164207Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20211011T153811Z
UID:10001331-1633944600-1633950000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Medieval Logic Seminar: Walter Segrave\, Insolubles
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/medieval-logic-seminar-13/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ō¹Ļ\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Medieval Logic Research Group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211011T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211011T170000
DTSTAMP:20260619T183857
CREATED:20210713T164207Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20211011T153811Z
UID:10001332-1633964400-1633971600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics Seminar Jace Snodgrass (University of 58³Ō¹Ļ)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Properties and Their Parts \nAbstract: I will present some very early ideas on a hyperintensional theory of properties that I am attempting to work out. I will begin my presentation by considering an unlikely area of inquiry: the mereology of material objects. I will offer a framework for thinking about two distinct types of parthood for objects. One type leads to an unstructured conception of objects; the other leads to a structured conception of objects. I will then suggest that there is a roughly analogous framework for thinking about parthood for properties. Once this framework for properties is in place\, I will turn my attention to the theory of properties\, what I call ā€˜the theory of property embodimentā€™. \nThe theory of property embodiment draws its inspiration from a theory of objects that endorses a structured conception of objects. The theory of objects that I have in mind is Kit Fineā€™s theory of embodiment. For what Fine has to say about objects serves as a sort of blueprint to what I would like to say about properties.Ā Whether or not I can properly extend Fineā€™s theory in the way that I would like is something that I want to explore during our seminar. \nĀ 
URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-seminar-4/
LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58³Ō¹Ļ\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211012T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211012T140000
DTSTAMP:20260619T183857
CREATED:20210714T164459Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20211012T153852Z
UID:10001333-1634040000-1634047200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Language & Mind Seminar: Daniel Garibay Garcia (58³Ō¹Ļ)
DESCRIPTION:Authority and Group Assertion\n\nWe commonly attribute assertions to groups like companies and government institutions\, and we want to hold them accountable for their assertions. Intuitively\, we donā€™t attribute those assertions to the individuals performing them\, but to the groups. The question is: what kind of speech act is group assertion and how does it relate to individual assertion? Is it reducible to de second? In this work\, I defend an account based on having the authority to assert on behalf of the group. I take support from Lackeyā€™s (2018) account of group assertion. I argue that her account has some important problems and I try to give a more succinct account of group assertion.
URL:/philevents/event/language-and-mind-s1-6/
CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211012T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211012T170000
DTSTAMP:20260619T183857
CREATED:20210714T164459Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20211012T153852Z
UID:10001334-1634050800-1634058000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Conceptual Engineering Seminar ā€“ Luciano Floridi (University of Oxford) ā€“ On Design and the Logic of Information
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/conceptual-engineering-seminar-15/
CATEGORIES:Conceptual Engineering Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211013T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211013T160000
DTSTAMP:20260619T183857
CREATED:20210831T171155Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20211013T182726Z
UID:10001394-1634137200-1634140800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:Moral Philosophy Reading Group\nDescription: This group reads and discusses an article per week\, chosen by a different member each time. \nDay/time: Wednesdays 3pm to 4pm on Teams. \nOrganizer: Theron Pummer (tgp4).
URL:/philevents/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-65/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211013T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211013T180000
DTSTAMP:20260619T183857
CREATED:20210715T164608Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20211012T153852Z
UID:10001335-1634140800-1634148000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory Seminar
DESCRIPTION:For our next seminarĀ we will be having our second session on the theme of ā€˜Dangerous Speech\, Free Speech and Cancel Cultureā€. Derek Ball will be presenting a work in progress titled ā€˜A Limited\, Metasemantic Defense of Cancel Cultureā€˜. \nTitle:ā€œA Limited\, Metasemantic Defense of Cancel Cultureā€\nAbstract:Ā \nHume wrote\, ā€œWe cannot form to ourselves a just idea of the taste of a pine-apple\, without having actually tasted itā€.Ā  Putnam claimedĀ that brains in vats could not entertain thoughts about the external world\, since thinking such thoughts requires genuine contact with the world one is thinking about.Ā  These are claims about how oneā€™s circumstances constrain what one can think ā€” what contents one can entertain.Ā  This talk aims to develop the notion of a content constraint\, and to relate this notion to issues of free speech.Ā  A leading idea is that free speech requires adequate conceptual and linguistic resources\, and that this requirement can motivate actions designed to avoid content constraints (including constraints that might be caused by the actions of other speakers).Ā  On plausible metasemantic assumptions\, there could be cases in which deplatforming or cancelling are appropriate responses to speakers whose speech threatens to create constraints for others; but care is needed to determine exactly what kinds of cases might justify these responses.
URL:/philevents/event/philosophy-and-social-theory-seminar-4/
CATEGORIES:Philosophy & Social Theory ArchƩ Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211014T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211014T120000
DTSTAMP:20260619T183857
CREATED:20210716T165401Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20211014T153810Z
UID:10001336-1634205600-1634212800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Super Special Seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/super-special-seminar-11/
CATEGORIES:Super Special Seminar series
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211014T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211014T143000
DTSTAMP:20260619T183857
CREATED:20210716T165402Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20211014T153810Z
UID:10001337-1634216400-1634221800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar: Nick Kuespert (58³Ō¹Ļ) ā€œAims of Moral Inquiryā€
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: What should the interaction between non-experts and experts look like when it comes to moral inquiry? In this talk\, I discuss this interaction from both perspectives. In the first part\, I argue that whether non-experts should treat experts as authorities or advisors depends on the aim of moral inquiry which in turn varies with context. I propose a hybrid model: by default\, the aim of moral inquiry is moral understanding and non-experts should therefore treat moral experts as advisors. If\, however\, moral understanding is unavailable or only attainable at high risk\, moral knowledge becomes the aim of moral inquiry and non-experts should treat moral experts as authorities. In the second part\, I argue that we should be careful not to conceive of moral experts as completely analogous to non-moral experts. In particular\, we can expect that many moral experts will be those negatively affected by injustices. This creates special procedural obligations for non-experts in their pursuit of moral expertise.
URL:/philevents/event/epistemology-seminar-15/
CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar
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