BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//Philosophy events - ECPv6.16.4//NONSGML v1.0//EN CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH X-ORIGINAL-URL:/philevents X-WR-CALDESC:Events for Philosophy events REFRESH-INTERVAL;VALUE=DURATION:PT1H X-Robots-Tag:noindex X-PUBLISHED-TTL:PT1H BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:Europe/London BEGIN:DAYLIGHT TZOFFSETFROM:+0000 TZOFFSETTO:+0100 TZNAME:BST DTSTART:20200329T010000 END:DAYLIGHT BEGIN:STANDARD TZOFFSETFROM:+0100 TZOFFSETTO:+0000 TZNAME:GMT DTSTART:20201025T010000 END:STANDARD BEGIN:DAYLIGHT TZOFFSETFROM:+0000 TZOFFSETTO:+0100 TZNAME:BST DTSTART:20210328T010000 END:DAYLIGHT BEGIN:STANDARD TZOFFSETFROM:+0100 TZOFFSETTO:+0000 TZNAME:GMT DTSTART:20211031T010000 END:STANDARD BEGIN:DAYLIGHT TZOFFSETFROM:+0000 TZOFFSETTO:+0100 TZNAME:BST DTSTART:20220327T010000 END:DAYLIGHT BEGIN:STANDARD TZOFFSETFROM:+0100 TZOFFSETTO:+0000 TZNAME:GMT DTSTART:20221030T010000 END:STANDARD END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211122T093000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211122T110000 DTSTAMP:20260619T115026 CREATED:20210824T200930Z LAST-MODIFIED:20211122T170828Z UID:10001373-1637573400-1637578800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Medieval Logic Seminar: Walter Segrave\, Insolubles DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/medieval-logic-seminar-19/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58łÔčÏ\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Medieval Logic Research Group END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211122T150000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211122T170000 DTSTAMP:20260619T115026 CREATED:20210824T200930Z LAST-MODIFIED:20211122T170828Z UID:10001374-1637593200-1637600400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Metaphysics Seminar Lorraine Keller (Saint Joseph’s University) DESCRIPTION:Title: The Access Problem for Act-type Theories of Propositions \nAbstract: Recent work on propositions has seen the rise of act-type theories\, according to which propositions are types of cognitive acts that derive their representational and truth-conditional properties from the token cognitive acts of agents. Act-type theories have been gaining traction as part of a rejection of what is called the ‘Fregean conception’\, a “traditional” conception of propositions according to which they are intrinsically representational\, mind- and language-independent abstracta\, while cognitive attitudes such as belief and doubt derive their representational properties from their relation to propositions. Act-type theorists present two main objections to the Fregean conception: \n\n(i) The Explanation Problem: by construing propositions as non-derivatively representational and deriving the representation of the cognitive attitudes from the representation of propositions\, Fregean theories turn truth-apt mental representation into an unsolvable mystery.\n(ii) The Access Problem: by construing propositions as mind- and language-independent abstracta\, Fregean theories make our cognitive access to them an additional unsolvable mystery.\n\nHowever\, in their attempt to evade the difficulties that plague the Fregean conception\, act-type theorists run into problems of their own—mainly centering around the crucial notion of predication. Peter Hanks has argued that the notion of predication at the heart of Scott Soames’ theory cannot explain representation and is incoherent (Hanks 2015: 36-39). And in a recent paper\, Indrek Reiland endorses Hanks’ criticism of Soames\, but argues that Hanks’ attempt to address objections to his own notion of predication is unsuccessful (Reiland 2019). Reiland offers a modified version of Hanks’ view that allegedly succeeds where Hanks’ proposed solution fails. I argue that the way Reiland modifies his view leads to a particularly acute version of the Access Problem. I then point out that this is a problem for Hanks and Soames as well\, and that\, by examining the way in which their theories face the Access Problem\, we can see that they are also unable to solve the Explanation Problem. URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-seminar-10/ LOCATION:A virtual seminar by Zoom\, The University\, 58łÔčÏ\, KY16 9L\, United Kingdom CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211123T120000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211123T140000 DTSTAMP:20260619T115026 CREATED:20210825T202427Z LAST-MODIFIED:20211123T172322Z UID:10001375-1637668800-1637676000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Language & Mind Seminar: Nick Allen (58łÔčÏ) DESCRIPTION:Pluralist Meta-ethical Constructivism and Feminist Social Construction: \n\nMeta-ethical Constructivism holds that ethics is grounded upon shared values between agents in a society. In this sense a Constructivist thinks there are correct moral procedures dictated from the ‘moral point of view’ (Street\, 2008/2010)\, the following of which both gives answers to moral questions and justifies the moral values we receive as answers (Darwall et.al.\, 1992). From this\, a moral semantics view can follow in which moral terms are ‘explained by identifying the kinds of inferences (for example\, about means and ends) one must be making in order to count as employing normative concepts at all.’ (Street\, 2010) \nDespite basing their accounts on moral practice\, the correct moral procedures and moral point of view which constructivism evinces are considered to be monological. That is\, there is one correct moral point of view and one set of correct moral procedures for justifying moral values. \nI will argue that this is a mistake\, and that an alternative\, pluralist version of meta-ethical constructivism is both available and preferable. This pluralist meta-ethical constructivism is built out of an altogether different understanding of construction: feminist social construction. \nThe resultant view has both independent support and is able to overcome some challenges which face traditional constructivism\, most notably what I call “the thick/thin dilemma”. URL:/philevents/event/language-and-mind-s1-12/ CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211123T150000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211123T170000 DTSTAMP:20260619T115026 CREATED:20210825T202427Z LAST-MODIFIED:20211123T172323Z UID:10001376-1637679600-1637686800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Conceptual Engineering Seminar – Ishani Maitra (University of Michigan) DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/conceptual-engineering-seminar-21/ CATEGORIES:Conceptual Engineering Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211124T150000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211124T160000 DTSTAMP:20260619T115026 CREATED:20210831T171211Z LAST-MODIFIED:20211124T170808Z UID:10001400-1637766000-1637769600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group DESCRIPTION:Moral Philosophy Reading Group\nDescription: This group reads and discusses an article per week\, chosen by a different member each time. \nDay/time: Wednesdays 3pm to 4pm on Teams. \nOrganizer: Theron Pummer (tgp4). URL:/philevents/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-71/ END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211124T160000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211124T180000 DTSTAMP:20260619T115026 CREATED:20210826T202429Z LAST-MODIFIED:20211124T172308Z UID:10001378-1637769600-1637776800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory Seminar: Jade Fletcher DESCRIPTION:Jade Fletcher will be giving a presentation titled ‘Social Structures\, Ideology and Bad Sex‘ at 4-6pm Wednesday. If you would like to attend please email Emilia Wilson (ew58@st-andrews.ac.uk) for the link.\n\n\n\nTitle: Social Structures\, Ideology\, and Bad Sex\n\nAbstract: This paper is concerned with providing an explanatory framework for thinking about a particular type of ethically bad sex. I argue that much of the current literature on bad sex\, which takes consent to be the lens through which bad sex should be viewed\, is unable to adequately capture an interesting set of cases of bad sex. I argue that we should make sense of what has gone wrong in these cases in terms of unjust social structures creating the conditions for bad events. URL:/philevents/event/philosophy-and-social-theory-seminar-10/ CATEGORIES:Philosophy & Social Theory ArchĂ© Seminar END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211125T100000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211125T120000 DTSTAMP:20260619T115026 CREATED:20210827T202430Z LAST-MODIFIED:20211125T172308Z UID:10001379-1637834400-1637841600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Super Special Seminar DESCRIPTION: URL:/philevents/event/super-special-seminar-17/ CATEGORIES:Super Special Seminar series END:VEVENT BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211125T130000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211125T143000 DTSTAMP:20260619T115026 CREATED:20210827T202442Z LAST-MODIFIED:20211125T172308Z UID:10001380-1637845200-1637850600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar: Timothy Williamson (Oxford) “Knowledge by sight and knowledge by proof” DESCRIPTION:Abstract: Knowledge by sight is a standard paradigm of a posteriori knowledge. Knowledge by mathematical proof is a standard paradigm of a priori knowledge. However\, I will argue that the two types of knowledge have so much in common that the a priori – a posteriori distinction cannot go very deep. URL:/philevents/event/epistemology-seminar-timothy-williamson-oxford/ CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR