BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//Philosophy events - ECPv6.16.3//NONSGML v1.0//EN
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
X-WR-CALNAME:Philosophy events
X-ORIGINAL-URL:/philevents
X-WR-CALDESC:Events for Philosophy events
REFRESH-INTERVAL;VALUE=DURATION:PT1H
X-Robots-Tag:noindex
X-PUBLISHED-TTL:PT1H
BEGIN:VTIMEZONE
TZID:Europe/London
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZOFFSETFROM:+0000
TZOFFSETTO:+0100
TZNAME:BST
DTSTART:20220327T010000
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:+0100
TZOFFSETTO:+0000
TZNAME:GMT
DTSTART:20221030T010000
END:STANDARD
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZOFFSETFROM:+0000
TZOFFSETTO:+0100
TZNAME:BST
DTSTART:20230326T010000
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:+0100
TZOFFSETTO:+0000
TZNAME:GMT
DTSTART:20231029T010000
END:STANDARD
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZOFFSETFROM:+0000
TZOFFSETTO:+0100
TZNAME:BST
DTSTART:20240331T010000
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:+0100
TZOFFSETTO:+0000
TZNAME:GMT
DTSTART:20241027T010000
END:STANDARD
END:VTIMEZONE
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20231120T093000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20231120T110000
DTSTAMP:20260614T233302
CREATED:20231109T140052Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231120T150857Z
UID:10001759-1700472600-1700478000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Medieval Logic Seminar: Ralph Strode\, Treatise on Consequences
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/medieval-logic-seminar-ralph-strode-treatise-on-consequences-2/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20231121T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20231121T140000
DTSTAMP:20260614T233302
CREATED:20231109T140105Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231109T140105Z
UID:10001760-1700568000-1700575200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Language and Mind Seminar:
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/language-and-mind-seminar-52/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20231121T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20231121T170000
DTSTAMP:20260614T233302
CREATED:20231109T140105Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231114T142309Z
UID:10001761-1700578800-1700586000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:FPST Seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/fpst-seminar-2/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20231121T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20231121T170000
DTSTAMP:20260614T233302
CREATED:20231115T143933Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231121T152425Z
UID:10001804-1700578800-1700586000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:FPST Seminar – Edgar Phillips (St. Andrews)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Philosophical foundations for radical love \nAbstract: Much recent philosophical work on love seeks to understand it as a fitting response to the value of those we love\, with such accounts typically being articulated in terms of ‘reasons for love’. Debates in this area have been animated by a couple of challenges: first\, to explain the way in which the loved one is unique or irreplaceable to the lover; second\, to explain love’s ‘selectivity’\, that is the fact that people typically love only a relatively very few people\, specifically people to whom they are interpersonally connected in certain distinctive kinds of ways. These challenges are interconnected\, because the value that makes individuals irreplaceable is\, plausibly\, one that every human being possesses just as such; this makes it difficult to explain love’s selectivity in a way that vindicates it\, that is to say\, that reveals it as an aspect of love’s proper responsiveness to its reasons. In this talk\, I first bring out some (largely implicit) assumptions that frame this debate. I then sketch (and I mean sketch) a way in which we might resolve these tensions if we are prepared to question some of those assumptions. On the view I will outline\, the irreplaceability of individuals is intimately connected to their very individuality and hence their particularity. I suggest that this idea cannot readily be accommodated within a reasons framework without distortion. I also make a suggestion as to how the selectivity of love might be explained consistently with this idea. Significantly\, the explanation is not vindicatory\, and raises the possibility that we might try to be more loving than we ordinarily are\, as well as questions about what this might mean.
URL:/philevents/event/fpst-seminar-edgar-phillips-st-andrews/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20231121T170000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20231121T190000
DTSTAMP:20260614T233302
CREATED:20231110T140812Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231121T152425Z
UID:10001801-1700586000-1700593200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Language and Mind Seminar: Takashi Yagisawa (California State University\, Northridge)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Ontology of Some Philosophy \nAbstract: \nWhen philosophers discuss philosophical views\, theories\, or arguments\, their discussion is often not metaphysically innocent. Given certain substantial but widely accepted assumptions concerning relativization of truth\, the worlds framework\, and understanding ontological issues in terms of domains of discourse (see Three Insights below)\, it can be argued that the extent of ontological involvement of some philosophical discussion is considerable. In particular\, philosophical discussion concerning modal metaphysics frequently makes the discussants incur non-trivial ontological commitments. \nThree Insights: \n(1) It is useful to relativize the notion of truth for many philosophical purposes; a sentence is true or false at a truth-relativizer. \n(2) The framework of worlds\, including both possible worlds and impossible worlds\, gives us truth-relativizers for the purposes of explicating the truth conditions of many important kinds of sentences\, in particular\, counterfactual conditional sentences. \n(3) Ontological matters should be understood as matters pertaining to the domain of discourse associated with quantification. \nSupposition-Based Argument: \n“You assert P. Suppose you are right and P is true. Then Q follows. But Q is false. So\, P is false and you are not right”. \nClaim: \nThree Insights + Supposition-Based Argument ⇨ a potentially endless sequence of ever-expanding ontological commitments.
URL:/philevents/event/language-and-mind-seminar-takashi-yagisawa-california-state-university-northridge/
LOCATION:Online Meeting via Teams
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20231122T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20231122T180000
DTSTAMP:20260614T233302
CREATED:20231109T140105Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231122T153810Z
UID:10001762-1700668800-1700676000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics and Logic Seminar: Giulia Schirripa (University of 58�Թ� and University of Stirling)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Vague Mereology and Supervaluationism \nAbstract: What is the referent of ‘Mt Everest’\, ‘Edinburgh’\, and even of ‘Meta’ and ‘Mark Zuckerberg’? Like dust\, vagueness ‘gets into everything’ (Dummett\, 1995\, p. 207) but\, unlike dust\, it is often taken to be only a semantic phenomenon. Standard supervaluationist accounts explain failures of reference fixing by appealing to semantic indecision\, whereas friends of vague objects urge that vagueness is\, at least in some cases\, in the world. While the existence of vague objects might well be (and has been) defended on independent grounds\, the first aim of this talk is to show that ontological vagueness might arise out of semantic indecision in compositional matters. The second aim is to discuss a novel possible direction to look at when dealing with onto-mereological vagueness. While retaining a supervaluationist gist\, the proposal is to take precisifications to be ontological rather than semantic and investigate what Classical Extensional Mereology (CEM) looks like in a precisificational dimension.  \nPlease note that the Metaphysics and Logic Seminar is starting one hour later than usual this week.
URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-giulia-schirripa-university-of-st-andrews-and-university-of-stirling/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 and via MS Teams
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20231123T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20231123T143000
DTSTAMP:20260614T233302
CREATED:20231109T140105Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231117T150811Z
UID:10001764-1700744400-1700749800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar:
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/epistemology-seminar-21/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20231123T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20231123T143000
DTSTAMP:20260614T233302
CREATED:20231118T150812Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231123T153821Z
UID:10001808-1700744400-1700749800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar: Discussion group led by Katharina Bernhard
DESCRIPTION:We will be reading Z. Quanbeck & A. Worsnip’s “A Permissivist Alternative to Encroachment\,” Philosophers’ Imprint (forthcoming).
URL:/philevents/event/epistemology-seminar-discussion-group-led-by-katharina-bernhard/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 and via MS Teams
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20231123T143000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20231123T153000
DTSTAMP:20260614T233302
CREATED:20231017T152320Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231120T162443Z
UID:10001738-1700749800-1700753400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:Location: Edgecliffe G03 and Teams \nContact: ceppadirector@st-andrews.ac.uk
URL:/philevents/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-104/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20231123T143000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20231123T153000
DTSTAMP:20260614T233302
CREATED:20231121T162345Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231123T163824Z
UID:10001809-1700749800-1700753400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:This week we will discuss Guy Kahane‘s article ‘Our Cosmic Insignificance‘ \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03 and Teams \nContact: ceppadirector@st-andrews.ac.uk
URL:/philevents/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-113/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20231123T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20231123T173000
DTSTAMP:20260614T233302
CREATED:20230921T132329Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231123T163824Z
UID:10001729-1700755200-1700760600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in person) – Oskari Sivula (Turku)
DESCRIPTION:Location: Edgecliffe G03 \nTitle: Is the future a utility monster? \nAbstract: I will revisit Nozick’s utility monster thought experiment and draw an analogy between imagined utility monsters and the long-term future. I argue that the far future can be seen as a real-life utility monster. This is the case if the three premises that form the basis of long-termism are true: 1) the future is vast\, 2) morally speaking\, the future matters\, and 3) current people can (in expectation) positively impact the far future. Following that\, I consider a couple of apparent disanalogies between the original utility monster and the far future utility monster. Lastly\, I discuss some possible reactions to the argument made.
URL:/philevents/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-barry-maguire-edinburgh-2/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR