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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240307T143000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240307T153000
DTSTAMP:20260614T195901
CREATED:20240108T201116Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240304T123943Z
UID:10001832-1709821800-1709825400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:Location: Edgecliffe G03 and Teams \nContact: ceppadirector@st-andrews.ac.uk
URL:/philevents/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-121/
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240307T143000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240307T153000
DTSTAMP:20260614T195901
CREATED:20240305T123811Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240307T124012Z
UID:10001960-1709821800-1709825400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:this week will have a Work in Progress session discussing Bradley Hillier-Smith’s draft paper\, ‘The Egalitarian Case for Open Borders: Moral Arbitrariness’. \nAbstract: This paper argues that recent debates on egalitarian objections to immigration restrictions overlook a crucial\, powerful normative principle that underpins objections to inequalities: any inequalities between morally equal persons – whether in goods\, resources\, welfare but also in powers\, statuses\, rights\, and freedoms – that arise from morally arbitrary factors are undeserved and thereby pro tanto unjust. This Principle of Moral Arbitrariness is fundamental to both luck and relational egalitarianism yet is often missing from debates that apply such theories to migration ethics. The result of this omission is that certain arguments that purportedly reject Luck Egalitarian Cases for Open Borders in fact fail since they fail to recognise the normative force of the Principle of Moral Arbitrariness; yet\, simultaneously\, Relational Egalitarian Cases for Open Borders are not fully successful since they fail to recognise that the Principle of Moral Arbitrariness is required to distinguish immigration restrictions as unjust where other (relational) inequalities may not be unjust. Hence\, the overall argument of this paper is that the recognition of the Principle of Moral Arbitrariness is essential for the success of both the luck and relational egalitarian cases for open borders\, and thus a proper recognition of (the full normative force and implications of) this principle entails the egalitarian case for open borders indeed succeeds. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03 and Teams \nContact: ceppadirector@st-andrews.ac.uk
URL:/philevents/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-136/
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240307T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240307T173000
DTSTAMP:20260614T195901
CREATED:20231208T172702Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240307T124012Z
UID:10001814-1709827200-1709832600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (online) – Renee Jorgensen (Michigan)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Encroachment and epistemic negligence \nAbstract: In this talk\, I argue that the moral duty of non-negligence is a fruitful way to understand and motivate the claim that moral reasons can ‘encroach’ on epistemic norms. More forcefully: we should readily affirm that on the epistemic norms governing agents like us—that is\, who have limited cognitive resources\, conduct inquiries with widely varying practical and moral stakes\, and who rely on belief to simplify and structure their practical deliberation—the strength of evidential warrant necessary to justify belief is responsive to the gravity of the costs of being mistaken. I suggest that a ‘purism’ about doxastic justification that denies this faces a dilemma: either a belief’s being justified suffices to license using it to structure inference and inquiry\, or it isn’t. If it is\, then being insensitive to non-truth-conducive factors leaves the standard for justified belief unresponsive to relevant risks. If it isn’t\, then it is unclear what theoretical value the notion justified belief has\, and we still need something to fill the role of licensing the relevant epistemic moves (which will be responsive to the risks.) \nLocation: Teams (online only)\, we will bee streaming it from Edgecliffe G03
URL:/philevents/event/ceppa-talk-online-renee-jorgensen-michigan/
LOCATION:Microsoft Teams
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
ORGANIZER;CN="Jessica Brown":MAILTO:jab30@st-andrews.ac.uk
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