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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240312T173000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240312T190000
DTSTAMP:20260614T154151
CREATED:20231213T175523Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240312T125530Z
UID:10001816-1710264600-1710270000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:1st Sarah Broadie Memorial Lecture – Ursula Coope
DESCRIPTION:Title: Contingency and the Present \nLocation: School V
URL:/philevents/event/1st-sarah-broadie-memorial-lecture-ursula-coope/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240314T143000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240314T153000
DTSTAMP:20260614T154151
CREATED:20240108T201117Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240311T125357Z
UID:10001833-1710426600-1710430200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:Location: Edgecliffe G03 and Teams \nContact: ceppadirector@st-andrews.ac.uk
URL:/philevents/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-122/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240314T143000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240314T153000
DTSTAMP:20260614T154151
CREATED:20240312T125530Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240314T131144Z
UID:10001964-1710426600-1710430200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:Location: Edgecliffe G03 and Teams \nContact: ceppadirector@st-andrews.ac.uk \nWe will meet in a hybrid format (online and in Edgecliffe G03) to discuss Eric Marcus’s article ‘Wanting and willing’ \nEric Marcus\, ‘Wanting and Willing’\, abstract: \nHow homogenous are the sources of human motivation? Textbook Humeans hold that every human action is motivated by desire\, thus any heterogeneity derives from differing objects of desire. Textbook Kantians hold that although some human actions are motivated by desire\, others are motivated by reason. One question in this vicinity concerns whether there are states such that to be in one is at once take the world to be a certain way and to be motivated to act: the state question. My question here is different: whether passion and reason constitute distinct sources of human motivation: the source question. In this essay\, I defend an affirmative answer to the source question while remaining neutral on the state question. I distinguish between what I call orectic desires\, which are associated with the appetites\, and anorectic desires\, which are associated with judgments of the good. I argue that the two sorts of desires constitute distinct sources of motivation initially on the basis of their differing epistemological profiles. Specifically\, self-attributions of anorectic desires are governed by the transparency condition; self-attributions of orectic desires are not. It emerges from this discussion that the motivation for performing an action arises in very different ways from each sort of desire.
URL:/philevents/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-137/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240314T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240314T173000
DTSTAMP:20260614T154151
CREATED:20231215T180532Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240314T131144Z
UID:10001817-1710432000-1710437400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (online) – Sergio Tenenbaum (Toronto)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Practical Reason and the Satisfaction of Desire \nLocation: Teams (online only) \nAbstract: I have a desire for dulce de leche ice-cream (or that I myself eat ice-cream) but there’s no ice-cream nearby. A heavenly angel takes pity on me and decides she will help me out. She conjures the ice-cream and quickly shoves it through my mouth at a temperature that burns my taste buds just as I had finished eating a whole watermelon. She then tells me: “Smile away my dear mortal; your desire has been satisfied!”. This vignette illustrates a well-known issue in understanding the nature of desire: the problem of under-specification. This problem has been recently debated mostly in the context of philosophy of language as a problem for a standard theory of propositional attitudes. My interest here is not to settle the dispute in the philosophy of language\, but to understand better how the satisfaction of desire is determined in the context of practical reason. That is\, in the above vignette\, I certainly failed to procure what I wanted. But if not in the mismatch between the proposition (or the common noun\, or the infinitival) that I use to express my desire and the facts on the ground\, in virtue of what has my desire failed to find satisfaction? After all\, the world seems to have conformed to the content of my will. \nIn this paper\, I first investigate the different ways in which desire finds no satisfaction. I then argue that a certain understanding of how desire relates to the good explains\, better than any other alternative\, how what is represented in my desire can fail to find satisfaction in the world despite its content being made true. In fact\, I will argue that this phenomenon provides an important argument for the guise of the good; since “satisfaction” seems to be the major potential alternative as the formal object of desire and intentional action\, the fact that satisfaction is inseparable from at least the apparent good\, shows that these are not rival aims of agency but one and the same formal object of our practical attitudes. I will end with a potential difficulty for this argument; namely\, that some cases of failure of satisfaction seem to require a “guise of the pleasant” above and beyond the “guise of the good”. I briefly sketch how on a Kantian view of human agency the guise of the pleasant is incorporated into the guise of the good and even more briefly try to explain how a similar account might be available to those less sympathetic to the Kantian conception of agency.
URL:/philevents/event/ceppa-talk-online-sergio-tenenbaum-toronto/
LOCATION:Microsoft Teams
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
ORGANIZER;CN="Johannes Nickl":MAILTO:jmn20@st-andrews.ac.uk
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