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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240429T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240429T110000
DTSTAMP:20260614T131122
CREATED:20231109T140613Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231109T140613Z
UID:10001790-1714381200-1714388400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Medieval Logic Seminar:
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/medieval-logic-seminar-45/
CATEGORIES:Medieval Logic Research Group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240430T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240430T140000
DTSTAMP:20260614T131122
CREATED:20240331T005403Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240426T040943Z
UID:10001999-1714478400-1714485600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Language and Mind seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/language-and-mind-seminar-59/
CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240430T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240430T140000
DTSTAMP:20260614T131122
CREATED:20240427T041427Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240430T043819Z
UID:10002046-1714478400-1714485600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Language and Mind seminar: Haoxu Wang (University of 58�Թ�)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Can a Russellian Monist Be a Genuine Physicalist?\n\nAbstract:\nCurrently\, Russellian Monism is a cutting-edge theory in the discussion of phenomenal consciousness. It has the potential to retain the advantages of both narrow physicalism and narrow dualism by locating phenomenal consciousness in a fundamentally unified universe\, having it play essential causal roles in the physical aspect\, and at the same time respecting its specific features.   Many see Russellian Monism as an opportunity to construct a new version of physicalism\, Russellian physicalism\, which has more advantages than narrow physicalism because it can avoid the difficulties faced by narrow physicalism\, especially those posed by the knowledge argument (Jackson\, 1982; 1986)\, the explanatory gap argument (Levine\, 1983; 2006)\, and the conceivability argument (Chalmers\, 2009). But the issue here is more complex. Some argue that a genuine or full-blooded physicalist must deny that there is anything specific to phenomenal consciousness at the fundamental level of the universe. Russellian Monism takes intrinsic natures (or quiddities) underlying structures and relations at the fundamental level in the universe as the keys to explaining the generation of high-level phenomenal consciousness\, which is itself the high-level intrinsic nature of high-level structural systems such as human brains. However\, it is argued that Russellian fundamental quiddities must be specific to consciousness\, and thus\, Russellian physicalism is itself an inconsistent theory. This is bad news for physicalists in general.\nIn this paper\, I will argue that it is compatible for a Russellian Monist to be a genuine physicalist or that the concept of “Russellian physicalism” is consistent. There have been some illuminating arguments for the compatibility on this issue\, but I will argue that they\, in some sense\, miss the core point of the challenge of incompatibility or inconsistency to Russellian physicalism. After setting out this core point\, I will offer my own responses.
URL:/philevents/event/language-and-mind-seminar-haoxu-wang-university-of-st-andrews/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 and via MS Teams
CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240430T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240430T170000
DTSTAMP:20260614T131122
CREATED:20240331T005403Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240429T042405Z
UID:10002000-1714489200-1714496400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:FPST Seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/fpst-seminar-10/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240430T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240430T170000
DTSTAMP:20260614T131122
CREATED:20240430T043819Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240430T043819Z
UID:10002051-1714489200-1714496400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:FPST Seminar – Sebastián Stuart (St. Andrews)
DESCRIPTION:Title: grounding metaphysics on Reddit posts\, a work in progress. \nAbstract: In this presentation I will be walking us through the methodological challenges I face in writing the second chapter of my thesis. Broadly\, my thesis is an attempt to ameliorate the concept of ‘gender dysphoria’. The first chapter argued that the current mainstream construals of gender dysphoria are ethically and descriptively inaccurate of the phenomenon in question. The aim of the second chapter is to provide an alternative definition of gender dysphoria that is able to meet the desiderata the previously considered construals failed to meet. In order to do this I have three steps planned: The first is identifying paradigmatic dysphoric/euphoric-like experiences in trans* testimony from Reddit. The second step is a stipulation of two new ‘dysphoria/euphoria’ concept pairs in light of the testimony. The third step reintegrates the ameliorated concepts within testimonial case studies in order to demonstrate two things: First\, that the concept pairs clearly track real features of the world. Second\, that the concept pairs can provide a full account of the nature of gender dysphoria.
URL:/philevents/event/fpst-seminar-sebastian-stuart-st-andrews/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240501T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240501T170000
DTSTAMP:20260614T131122
CREATED:20240401T011457Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240501T043926Z
UID:10002001-1714575600-1714582800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics and Logic Seminar: Roy Sorensen (UT Austin and University of 58�Թ�)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Seeing Holes-without seeing what they are holes in \nAbstract: Peering down into a tall box\, you see a ring. The ring is removed. To your surprise this uncovers a second duplicate ring. Did you see the hole of the bottom ring before you saw the bottom ring? Each answer is backed by good reasons. I resolve the antinomy by arguing yes: you saw the bottom hole without seeing what it was a hole in! Therefore\, a hole cannot be a part of what it is a hole in – its host. For a hole can be seen without seeing its host. Nor can a hole be an intrinsic property of its host\, such as its shape. Nor can it be a way of seeing its host. Seeing a hole is not a matter of seeing the matter in which it is a hole. The metaphysical dependence of a hole on its host does not make it perceptually dependent. Seeing a hole merely requires matter to serve as a visual aid. This loosened association between hosts and holes confirms other theories of holes such as the theory that holes are spacetime regions. \nThere will be a little magic show to illustrate the nature of holes and how they are seen.
URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-roy-sorensen-ut-austin-and-university-of-st-andrews/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 and via MS Teams
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240502T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240502T120000
DTSTAMP:20260614T131122
CREATED:20240402T012446Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240502T045502Z
UID:10002002-1714644000-1714651200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Plenary Seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/plenary-seminar-5/
CATEGORIES:Plenary session
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240502T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240502T143000
DTSTAMP:20260614T131122
CREATED:20240402T012446Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240502T045502Z
UID:10002003-1714654800-1714660200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar: Carlotta Pavese (Cornell University)
DESCRIPTION:Speaker: Carlotta Pavese (Cornell University) \nAre there essentially intentional actions? \nA long tradition in action theory holds that there are such things as essentially intentional actions—actions that are intentional whenever performed (Anscombe\, Davidson\, Bennett\, Turri\, etc). In my talk\, I argue that the existence of essentially intentional action is a philosophical myth and that this has interesting repercussions in action theory and in epistemology. In the first part of my talk\, I defend the claim that the doctrine of essentially intentional actions is incompatible with a desirable practical knowledge condition on intentional actions\, which I argue we have independent reasons to embrace. In the second part of my talk I argue that the doctrine of essentially intentional actions is incompatible with a plausible solution to a puzzle—the puzzle of novice learning—-that arises for certain kinds of theories of action and I contend that is an additional reason to reject the doctrine. Finally\, I explore some interesting conclusions that follow from rejecting the doctrine of essentially intentional actions.
URL:/philevents/event/epistemology-seminar-tba-29/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240502T143000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240502T153000
DTSTAMP:20260614T131122
CREATED:20240402T140839Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240414T142419Z
UID:10002006-1714660200-1714663800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:Location: Edgecliffe G03 and Teams \nContact: ceppadirector@st-andrews.ac.uk
URL:/philevents/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-141/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240502T143000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240502T153000
DTSTAMP:20260614T131122
CREATED:20240415T142326Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240426T154850Z
UID:10002025-1714660200-1714663800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:  \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03 and Teams \nContact: ceppadirector@st-andrews.ac.uk
URL:/philevents/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-144/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240502T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240502T170000
DTSTAMP:20260614T131122
CREATED:20240402T012446Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240502T045502Z
UID:10002004-1714662000-1714669200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Unity: No Seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/unity-no-seminar-2/
CATEGORIES:Unity Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240502T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240502T173000
DTSTAMP:20260614T131122
CREATED:20240402T140839Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240502T161437Z
UID:10002007-1714665600-1714671000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in person) – Bridget Bradley (58�Թ�)
DESCRIPTION:This talk is part of our series on Climate Ethics. \nTitle: Ethical births\, ethical deaths: Climate anxiety in Britain through the life course \nAbstract: This paper is based on anthropological research conducted with climate activists on the topic of climate anxiety in Britain. Drawing on themes of kinship and its relationship to mental health and activism\, the paper considers the ethical questions surrounding birth and death as significant moments in the life course. Through ethnographic and autoethnographic reflections\, this work reveals how climate anxiety re-frames expectations surrounding what counts as appropriate ways to enter and leave the world\, situated within the context of the cultural politics of contemporary Britain in a time of ecological crisis.\n \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03 \n 
URL:/philevents/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-bridget-bradley-st-andrews/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
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