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X-WR-CALDESC:Events for Philosophy events
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240603T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240603T110000
DTSTAMP:20260614T063457
CREATED:20231109T140824Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231109T140824Z
UID:10001796-1717405200-1717412400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Medieval Logic Seminar:
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/medieval-logic-seminar-50/
CATEGORIES:Medieval Logic Research Group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240604T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240604T140000
DTSTAMP:20260614T063457
CREATED:20240505T050903Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240531T062312Z
UID:10002058-1717502400-1717509600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Language and Mind seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/language-and-mind-seminar-64/
CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240604T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240604T140000
DTSTAMP:20260614T063457
CREATED:20240601T063311Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240604T065317Z
UID:10002095-1717502400-1717509600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Language and Mind seminar: Simon Prosser (University of 58łÔšĎ)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Mental Hypertime \nAbstract: Hypertime\, if it exists\, is a second dimension of time. The hypothesis of mental hypertime says that the mind has a second representation of time. This enables the mind to represent the world as though there were a second time dimension\, even though both representations may in fact be of the same real time series. I shall discuss some reasons for accepting the hypothesis of mental hypertime\, and its possible role in explaining our sense of ourselves\, and perhaps other things\, ‘moving’ through time. I’ll start from a discussion of the psychology of time travel. Then I’ll discuss the connection between the hypothesis of mental hypertime and the notion\, suggested in recent years by several philosophers\, that our seeming to move through time is closely connected to our seeming to endure (rather than perdure) through time. I shall suggest a new way to understand this claim about endurance that avoids some possible objections. Finally I shall discuss a putative phenomenal contrast that suggests that the sense of moving through time is not just cognitive\, but is also phenomenological.
URL:/philevents/event/language-and-mind-seminar-simon-prosser-university-of-st-andrews/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 and via MS Teams
CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240604T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240604T170000
DTSTAMP:20260614T063457
CREATED:20240505T050903Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240604T065317Z
UID:10002059-1717513200-1717520400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:FPST Seminar – Rebecca Earle (Warwick) [online only]
DESCRIPTION:Title: A Very Large Peruvian Painting\nAbstract: This talk is in some ways about a missing object in search of a satisfying narrative frame. More concretely\, it’s about a painting. The painting was made in Lima in 1791\, and was intended to be sent to King Charles IV of Spain\, but\, as a result of a series of unfortunate occurrences\, ended up in Britain. Where it is now we have no idea. Perhaps it no longer exists at all. So in part this talk is about how to write the history of something that perhaps doesn’t exist anymore.
URL:/philevents/event/fpst-seminar-rebecca-earle-warwick-online-only/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240605T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240605T170000
DTSTAMP:20260614T063457
CREATED:20240506T050858Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240605T065737Z
UID:10002060-1717599600-1717606800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics and Logic Seminar: NO MEETING
DESCRIPTION:No meeting due to the concurrent CEPPA Fest.
URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-viviane-fairbank-university-of-st-andrews-and-university-of-stirling/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 and via MS Teams
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240606T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240606T120000
DTSTAMP:20260614T063457
CREATED:20240507T050849Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240606T070811Z
UID:10002064-1717668000-1717675200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Plenary Seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/plenary-seminar-10/
CATEGORIES:Plenary session
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240606T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240606T143000
DTSTAMP:20260614T063457
CREATED:20240507T050850Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240606T070812Z
UID:10002065-1717678800-1717684200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemology Seminar: CANCELLED
DESCRIPTION:CANCELLED
URL:/philevents/event/epistemology-seminar-petronella-randell-st-andrews-stirling/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Epistemology Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240606T143000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240606T153000
DTSTAMP:20260614T063457
CREATED:20240507T163952Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240514T165355Z
UID:10002067-1717684200-1717687800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:  \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03 and Teams \nContact: ceppadirector@st-andrews.ac.uk
URL:/philevents/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-151/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240606T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240606T170000
DTSTAMP:20260614T063457
CREATED:20240507T050850Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240606T070812Z
UID:10002066-1717686000-1717693200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Unity Talk: Javier Belastagui (In-Person)
DESCRIPTION:Title: ‘A Conceptual Space for Classical Concepts’\nAbstract: TBC
URL:/philevents/event/unity-talk-javier-belastagui-in-person/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:Unity Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240606T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240606T173000
DTSTAMP:20260614T063457
CREATED:20240604T065318Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240606T070812Z
UID:10002099-1717689600-1717695000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:FPST x CEPPA – Sophie Grace Chappell ‘Trans figured’ book launch.
DESCRIPTION:Sophie Grace Chappell will present her new book Trans Figured: On Being a Transgender Person in a Cisgender World – followed by bubbles to celebrate!
URL:/philevents/event/fpst-x-ceppa-sophie-grace-chappell-trans-figured-book-launch/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240606T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240606T173000
DTSTAMP:20260614T063457
CREATED:20240606T122307Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240606T122307Z
UID:10002101-1717689600-1717695000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Sophie Grace Chappell ‘Trans figured’ book launch.
DESCRIPTION:Sophie Grace Chappell will present her new book Trans Figured: On Being a Transgender Person in a Cisgender World – followed by bubbles to celebrate!
URL:/philevents/event/sophie-grace-chappell-trans-figured-book-launch/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:/philevents/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/9781509561506-fh05ge.tmp_.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20240607
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20240609
DTSTAMP:20260614T063457
CREATED:20240508T051610Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240607T070824Z
UID:10002069-1717718400-1717891199@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Workshop on Modality: With or Without Possible Worlds?
DESCRIPTION:The University of 58łÔšĎ ArchĂŠ Philosophical Research Centre for Logic\, Language\, Metaphysics and Epistemology will be hosting a workshop on Modality\, With or Without Possible Worlds?\n\n \nDESCRIPTION: The purpose of the workshop is to bring together and promote research in the area of metaphysics of modality\, with a specific focus on two broad themes: (i) the challenges associated with exclusively employing possible worlds to clarify our modal discourse about metaphysical necessity and possibility\, among other metaphysical concepts; and (ii) alternative approaches that shed light on such discourse without relying on the concept of a possible world.\n \nDATE AND VENUE: 7 June 2024\, Online on Teams\n \nSPEAKERS: Vera Hoffman-Kolss (University of Bern)\, Barbara Vetter (Freie Universität Berlin)\, Jennifer Wang (Simon Fraser University)\, Mark Jago (University of Nottingham)\, Takashi Tagisawa (California State University)\, and John Divers (Trinity College Dublin).\n\n \n\nREGISTER HERE: https://forms.gle/Cnh4zpbyFXPzhg7v8\n\n\n\n\n \n\n\n\n\nPROVISIONAL SCHEDULE (Note: All times are in British Summer Time):\nEvery time slot includes: the main talk (40 mins)\, and Q&A (20 mins).\n\n\n\n \n\n\n\n9:55 – 10:00 Preliminary Remarks \n10:00 – 11:00 Barbara Vetter (Freie Universität Berlin) \n11:00 – 11:15 Break \n11:15 – 12:15 Mark Jago (University of Nottingham) \n12:15 – 12:30 Break \n12:30 – 13:30 Jennifer Wang (Simon Fraser University) \n13:30 – 14:30 Break \n14:30 – 15:30 John Divers (Trinity College Dublin) \n15:30 – 15:45 Break \n15:45 – 16:45 Vera Hoffman-Kolss (University of Bern) \n16:45 – 17:00 Break \n\n17:00 – 18:00 Takashi Yagisawa (California State University) \n\n \n \nTITLES AND ABSTRACTS: \n \n\nTitle: Modal epistemology without worlds: the case of axiom T (Barbara Vetter)\n \nAbstract: Epistemologists of modality often assume that some knowledge of possibility is easy: knowledge by inference from actuality\, via axiom T of modal logic. What is true in this world must be true at some world\, after all; what could be easier? Inference by axiom T takes centre stage in similarity based modal epistemologies like that of Sonia Roca Royes\, but it is generally assumed to be a form of easy modal knowledge. In this talk\, I argue that the role of axiom T in a realistic modal epistemology has been overstated. The case of axiom T also serves as a case study for a general caveat not to project to much of our (modal) logic into a realistic (modal) epistemology.\n\n \n\nTitle: Knowing What it Is (Mark Jago) \nAbstract: Essentialists understand modal properties in terms of the essences of things. Given this view\, it is natural to think that our knowledge of modality ultimately derives from our knowledge of the essences of things. Is that view plausible? Do we genuinely have knowledge of the essences of things\, in a form substantial enough to ground our modal knowledge? The more we pack into the notion of essence to allow it to underpin modal properties\, the harder it is to claim genuine knowledge. I will argue that realists about essence of a certain kind can have the best of both worlds. They can co-opt a conventionalist explanation of our knowledge of essence\, but against the background of a fully realist notion of essence.\n\n\n \n\nTitle: The Explanatory Grounds of De Re Modal Truths (Jennifer Wang)\n\nAbstract: In Naming and Necessity\, Kripke makes a forceful case for the actualist against the so-called “problem of transworld identification”. If the goal is to be able to use possible worlds semantics\, then I think that his response is entirely correct. But if the goal is to provide an explanation of de re modal truths\, then the actualist should reject transworld identity. In this paper\, I argue that the actualist who wants to use possible worlds to explain facts such as “Oscar could have been a movie star” should adopt a purely qualitative conception of possible worlds. Perhaps more surprisingly\, they should combine this with a counterpart-theoretic treatment of de re modality. I will argue that this combination is consistent with actualist motivations\, and with Kripke’s views in particular.\n\n\n \n\nTitle: Modality\, With or Without Possible Worlds? A Quinean Perspective (John Divers)\nAbstract: We may proceed in the philosophy of modality with\, or without\, deploying the device of quantification over possible worlds. How we think of the advantages and disadvantages brought by the respective approaches will be determined for the most part on whether we are presupposing some form of modal realism. Here\, I will address the matter from a modal anti-realist and – more specifically – Quinean perspective\n\n\n \n\nTitle: Counterpossibles\, Causal Exclusion\, and Impossible Worlds (Vera Hoffman-Kolss)\nAbstract: In this paper\, I argue that counterpossible conditionals\, whose truth conditions are formulated in terms of impossible worlds\, can shed new light on the problem of causal exclusion. According to the interventionist version of this problem\, higher-level (e.g.\, mental) properties described by an interventionist causal model are causally pre-empted by the lower-level properties upon which they supervene\, because it is metaphysically impossible to intervene on the higher-level properties without changing at least some of the lower-level properties (which then do all the causal work). Recent debate has shown\, however\, that there are several reasons to allow for counterpossible interventions as well. But once counterpossible interventions are allowed in certain metaphysical contexts\, there is no good reason to ban them from causal exclusion contexts. I argue that this paves the way for a new approach to the causal exclusion problem. The autonomy of higher-level properties can be vindicated by showing that higher-level properties and lower-level properties enter into different counterpossible dependence relations. These counterpossible dependence relations can in turn be interpreted in terms of impossible worlds.\n \nTitle: Ontology of Some Philosophy (Takashi Yagisawa)\n\nAbstract: When philosophers discuss philosophical views\, theories\, or arguments\, their discussion is often not metaphysically innocent. Given certain substantial but widely accepted assumptions concerning relativization of truth\, the worlds framework\, and understanding ontological issues in terms of domains of discourse (see Three Insights below)\, it can be argued that the extent of ontological involvement of some philosophical discussion is considerable. In particular\, philosophical discussion concerning modal metaphysics frequently makes the discussants incur non-trivial ontological commitments.\n\nThree Insights:\n(1 )It is useful to relativize the notion of truth for many philosophical purposes; a sentence is true or false at a truth-relativizer.\n(2) The framework of worlds\, including both possible worlds and impossible worlds\, gives us truth-relativizers for the purposes of explicating the truth conditions of many important kinds of sentences\, in particular\, counterfactual conditional sentences.\n(3) Ontological matters should be understood as matters pertaining to the domain of discourse associated with quantification.\n\nSupposition-Based Argument: “You assert P. Suppose you are right and P is true. Then Q follows. But Q is false. So\, P is false and you are not right”.\n\nClaim: Three insights + Supposition-Based Argument ⇨ a potentially endless sequence of ever-expanding ontological commitments.
URL:/philevents/event/workshop-on-modality-with-or-without-possible-worlds/
CATEGORIES:Workshops
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