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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240701T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240701T110000
DTSTAMP:20260614T110849
CREATED:20231109T140825Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231109T140854Z
UID:10001800-1719824400-1719831600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Medieval Logic Seminar:
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/medieval-logic-seminar-54/
CATEGORIES:Medieval Logic Research Group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240702T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240702T140000
DTSTAMP:20260614T110849
CREATED:20240602T063851Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240627T093926Z
UID:10002096-1719921600-1719928800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Language and Mind seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:/philevents/event/language-and-mind-seminar-68/
CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240702T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240702T140000
DTSTAMP:20260614T110849
CREATED:20240628T094840Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240702T100941Z
UID:10002108-1719921600-1719928800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Language and Mind seminar: Derek Ball (University of 58łÔąĎ)
DESCRIPTION:Title: “Immanent Interpretation”\nBryan Pickel and Derek Ball\n\nAbstract: Famous arguments purport to show that all\, or a substantial fragment\, of language is indeterminate in meaning.  Quine and Davidson motivated indeterminacy arguments by attending to the possibility of different translations of a foreign language and to the possibility of differing uses of homophonic expressions among speakers of the same language; more contemporary versions focus on the interpretation of context-sensitive expressions such as quantifier domain restrictions (Heck\, Buchanan).  We show that these arguments fail because they ignore evidence that is available to interpreters – evidence that arises from the interpreters themselves as language users.  But our aim is not merely to rebut indeterminacy arguments.  We construct a research strategy for interpreters to meet the concerns of the proponents of indeterminacy arguments.  The strategy is available to interpreters in a wide range of cases\, but (time permitting) we will also discuss cases (such as the interpretation of AI\, or of non-human animals) in which it might fail.
URL:/philevents/event/language-and-mind-seminar-derek-ball-university-of-st-andrews/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 and via MS Teams
CATEGORIES:Language and Mind Seminar
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240702T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240702T170000
DTSTAMP:20260614T110849
CREATED:20240602T063851Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240702T100941Z
UID:10002097-1719932400-1719939600@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CANCELLED FPST Seminar – Clare Chambers (Cambridge)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Respect\, Religion\, and Feminism: Political Liberalism as Feminist Liberalism?\nAbstract: This chapter considers whether political liberalism\, specifically\, can be used for feminist ends. There is significant disagreement among feminists and liberals about the compatibility between their two doctrines. Political liberalism is vulnerable to particular criticism from feminists\, who argue that its restricted form of equality is insufficient. In contrast\, Lori Watson and Christie Hartley argue that political liberalism can and must be feminist. This chapter raises three areas of disagreement with Watson and Hartley’s incisive account of feminist political liberalism. First\, the chapter argues that an appeal to a comprehensive doctrine can be compatible with respecting others\, if that appeal is to the value of equality. Second\, the chapter takes issue with Watson and Hartley’s defence of religious exemptions to equality law. Third\, the chapter argues that political liberalism can be compatible with feminism\, but that it is not itself adequately feminist. The chapter concludes that political liberalism is not enough for feminists.
URL:/philevents/event/fpst-seminar-clare-chambers-cambridge/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03
CATEGORIES:Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240703T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240703T170000
DTSTAMP:20260614T110849
CREATED:20240603T065341Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240703T101302Z
UID:10002098-1720018800-1720026000@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Metaphysics and Logic Seminar: Greg Restall (58łÔąĎ)
DESCRIPTION:Title: What do we mean? Semantics\, Practices and Pluralism\n \nAbstract: In this informal talk\, I will revisit some longstanding issues in philosophical logic in the light of some contemporary developments. \n \nThe longstanding issues? (1) Michael Dummett’s challenge in The Logical Basis of Metaphysics to the effect that to get anywhere in fundamental issues of metaphysics we would do well to attend to the fundamental commitments of our theory of meaning—and that those concerns lead to the conclusion that we can find common ground in intuitionistic logic\, not classical logic. (2) The issue of pluralism (or monism) about logical consequence. Contemporary work in logic is filled with a range of different (and seemingly opposed) accounts of what follows from what. Many different kinds of logical pluralism have arisen to attempt to make sense of the diversity of logical analyses\, and just as many defences of logical monism have been offered.\n \nThe contemporary developments? The rise of dependent type theory in computer science and the consequent rise of proof assistants in the formalisation of mathematics. Different proof assistants (Agda\, Idris\, Lean\, Isabelle\, Coq) make different choices in the formal representation of mathematical reasoning\, but the predominant choice of these proof assistants is to represent proofs constructively\, in what amounts to intuitionistic logic and not classical logic. Proof assistants are steadily gaining ground in the mathematical community—mathematicians use these tools as conversation partners in the development of mathematical proofs\, and many of these conversation partners have intuitionistic scruples. \n \nI will reexamine Dummett’s appeal to revisit fundamental commitments in our theory of meaning\, and the challenge of logical pluralism\, given the example of the use of proof assistants in mathematical reasoning. We will see that paying attention to different aspects of our reasoning practices can clarify what is at stake in debates over the use of this or that logic\, or about the propriety of some semantic principle. In the end\, I hope to show that—as Dummett argued—it is worthwhile to spend some time attending to the concepts we use in our theorising\, just as the astronomer must take care of her telescopes if she wants to see clearly and see far\, and understand the power and limits of her tools. However\, I will also show that taking Dummett’s advice does not mean that we must accept his restrictive conclusion about the impropriety of classical reasoning. Classical reasoning can be vindicated\, but at some cost.
URL:/philevents/event/metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-tba-30/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03 and via MS Teams
CATEGORIES:Metaphysics and Logic group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240704T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240704T170000
DTSTAMP:20260614T110849
CREATED:20240604T065400Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240704T102837Z
UID:10002100-1720105200-1720112400@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Unity Pre-Reading: Quasi-Analysis II
DESCRIPTION:Mormann\, Thomas (2009). New Work for Carnap’s Quasi-Analysis. Journal of Philosophical Logic 38 (3):249-282.\nhttps://philpapers.org/rec/MORNWF-2 \nALT:\nDecock\, Lieven & Douven\, Igor (2011). Similarity After Goodman. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (1):61-75.\nhttps://philpapers.org/rec/DECSAG
URL:/philevents/event/unity-pre-reading-quasi-analysis-ii/
LOCATION:ArchĂ© Seminar Room\, 17-19 College Street\, 58łÔąĎ\, KY169AL
CATEGORIES:Unity Seminar
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