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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260218T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260218T173000
DTSTAMP:20260611T204010
CREATED:20260126T190830Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260215T205210Z
UID:10002684-1771430400-1771435800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group (MPRG)
DESCRIPTION:Reading:tbc \nLocation: Edgecliffe 104
URL:/philevents/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-mprg-7/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:Reading Group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260218T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260218T173000
DTSTAMP:20260611T204010
CREATED:20260216T205313Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260218T210819Z
UID:10002701-1771430400-1771435800@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group (MPRG)
DESCRIPTION:Reading: Jason Kawall’s “Moral Realism and Arbitrariness”. \nLocation: Edgecliffe 104
URL:/philevents/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-mprg-18/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:Reading Group
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260219T110000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260219T123000
DTSTAMP:20260611T204010
CREATED:20251201T150823Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20251216T164004Z
UID:10002663-1771498800-1771504200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Cover-to-cover Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:This semester we are reading Finneron-Burns “What We Owe to Future People: A Contractualist Account of Intergenerational Ethics”. \nOrganiser: Ida Miczke (izm1)
URL:/philevents/event/cover-to-cover-reading-group-16/
LOCATION:CEPPA/Arché Seminar room\, 17 – 19 College Street\, 58�Թ�\, KY16 9AL\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Reading Group
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260219T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260219T173000
DTSTAMP:20260611T204010
CREATED:20260123T185310Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260219T210859Z
UID:10002674-1771516800-1771522200@www.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in-person) – Yoshinari Hattori and Ida Miczske (58�Թ� and Stirling)
DESCRIPTION:Yoshinari Hattori – Why We Must Believe in Free Will and Moral Responsibility: Reconsidering Their Foundations \nAbstract: This presentation argues that the practice of blaming wrongdoers—especially directing resentment or indignation towards them—is rationally indispensable for us. Pereboom contends that directing resentment or indignation at others is a form of harming them and is unjustified. As an alternative\, he proposes that when morally wrong actions are performed\, we should respond with disappointment or sadness. Against this proposal\, I argue that there are social functions that cannot be achieved by disappointment or sadness but are fulfilled only by directing resentment or indignation. The fact that we have strong reason to secure the fulfilment of these functions makes the practice of directing resentment or indignation rationally indispensable for us. In particular\, I argue that responding with disappointment or sadness fails\, first\, to treat others as moral agents and\, second\, to exercise the normative force required to compel them to stand in a space of answerability. \nIda Miczske – When love met morality: anonymity\, irreplaceability\, and partial self-effacement \nAbstract: Most of us value relationships such as friendship and love. Surprisingly\, it is not so easy to reconcile the demands they pose on us with living a moral life. In this presentation I want to identify one source of this tension and\, if time allows\, propose a solution based on partial self-effacement. \nI argue that the tension emerges because certain relationships require de re motivation grounded in the identity of an irreplaceable object\, while moral justification abstracts from particular identities. I propose to explicate the latter claim in terms of the requirement of justification anonymity\, and show that it conflicts with de re motivation.\nA common response to the conflict between relationships and morality has been to introduce self-effacement. However\, as full self-effacement is problematic\, I propose that moral theories should instead be partially self-effacing. Drawing on that\, I argue that partial self-effacement allows us to reconcile de re motivation with moral justification.\nLocation: Edgecliffe G03 and online on teams
URL:/philevents/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-yoshinari-hattori-and-ida-miczske-st-andrews-and-stirling/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03\, The Scores\, St Salvator's Quad\, KY16 9AL
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
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