Abstract: When a person has evidence about their capacity to assess the evidence for or against a proposition, for example, when they have evidence that their assessment is subject to bias, they have higher-order evidence. A popular view in epistemology is that higher-order evidence can make a difference to whether it is rational for a…
Joint work w/ Lorena Ram铆rez-Lude帽a (Pompeu Fabra University, Barcelona) ABSTRACT. 鈥斅燱e will discuss two different phenomena of language usage that we have characterized in past work as flexibility and tolerance. We will examine their relation, or lack thereof, to conceptual engineering and we will apply the distinctions discussed to the specific case of the legal…
TITLE: Artifacts and the Limits of Human Creative Intentions ABSTRACT: According to Amie Thomasson鈥檚 author-intention-based account of artifacts, an artifact of kind K is essentially a product of a largely successful intention to create something of kind K (see, e.g., Thomasson (2003), 鈥淩ealism and Human Kinds鈥�, Philosophy and聽Phenomenological Research, Vol. 67, No. 3, pp. 592-602).…
Abstract: Discussions in a variety of contexts (including at least epistemic injustice, moral encroachment, epistemic obligations of friendship) sometimes assume that speakers have a right or moral entitlement to be believed when they assert or testify that p: that they are wronged if their audience fails to believe them. It is controversial whether rights of…
ABSTRACT. 鈥斅營 propose to re-conceive the debate on natural kinds from the perspective of conceptual engineering. I take 鈥榥atural鈥� kinds in a broadly naturalist way, seeing a continuity between philosophical thinking and empirical inquiry in the natural sciences. This naturalist take on natural kinds recognizes that an important part of good scientific research is continual…
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