{"id":11862,"date":"2024-06-03T07:53:41","date_gmt":"2024-06-03T06:53:41","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.st-andrews.ac.uk\/philevents\/event\/metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-tba-30\/"},"modified":"2024-07-03T11:13:02","modified_gmt":"2024-07-03T10:13:02","slug":"metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-tba-30","status":"publish","type":"tribe_events","link":"https:\/\/www.st-andrews.ac.uk\/philevents\/event\/metaphysics-and-logic-seminar-tba-30\/","title":{"rendered":"Metaphysics and Logic Seminar: Greg Restall (58³Ô¹Ï)"},"content":{"rendered":"
Title:<\/strong>\u00a0What do we\u00a0mean<\/i>? Semantics, Practices and Pluralism<\/span><\/div>\n
\u00a0<\/span><\/div>\n
Abstract:<\/strong>\u00a0<\/b>In this informal talk, I will revisit some longstanding issues in philosophical logic in the light of some contemporary developments.\u00a0<\/span><\/div>\n
\u00a0<\/span><\/div>\n
The longstanding issues? (1) Michael Dummett\u2019s challenge in\u00a0The Logical Basis of Metaphysics<\/i>\u00a0to the effect that to get anywhere in fundamental issues of metaphysics we would do well to attend to the fundamental commitments of our theory of meaning\u2014and that those concerns lead to the conclusion that we can find common ground in intuitionistic logic, not classical logic. (2) The issue of\u00a0pluralism\u00a0<\/i>(or\u00a0monism<\/i>) about logical consequence. Contemporary work in logic is filled with a range of different (and seemingly opposed) accounts of what follows from what. Many different kinds of logical\u00a0pluralism\u00a0<\/i>have arisen to attempt to make sense of the diversity of logical analyses, and just as many defences of logical\u00a0monism<\/i>\u00a0have been offered.<\/span><\/div>\n
\u00a0<\/span><\/div>\n
The contemporary developments? The rise of\u00a0dependent type theory\u00a0<\/i>in computer science and the consequent rise of\u00a0proof assistants\u00a0<\/i>in the formalisation of mathematics. Different proof assistants (Agda, Idris, Lean, Isabelle, Coq) make different choices in the formal representation of mathematical reasoning, but the predominant\u00a0<\/i>choice of these proof assistants is to represent proofs\u00a0constructively<\/i>, in what amounts to\u00a0intuitionistic logic\u00a0<\/i>and not classical logic. Proof assistants are steadily gaining ground in the mathematical community\u2014mathematicians use these tools as conversation partners in the development of mathematical proofs, and many of these conversation partners have intuitionistic scruples.\u00a0<\/span><\/div>\n
\u00a0<\/span><\/div>\n
I will reexamine Dummett\u2019s appeal to revisit fundamental commitments in our theory of meaning, and the challenge of logical pluralism, given the example of the use of proof assistants in mathematical reasoning. We will see that paying attention to different aspects of our reasoning practices can clarify what is at stake in debates over the use of this or that logic, or about the propriety of some semantic principle. In the end, I hope to show that\u2014as Dummett argued\u2014it is worthwhile to spend\u00a0some<\/i>\u00a0time attending to the concepts we use in our theorising, just as the astronomer must take care of her telescopes if she wants to see clearly and see far, and understand the power and limits of her tools. However, I will also show that taking Dummett\u2019s advice does\u00a0not\u00a0<\/i>mean that we must accept his restrictive conclusion about the impropriety of classical reasoning. Classical reasoning can be vindicated, but at some cost.<\/span><\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Title:\u00a0What do we\u00a0mean? Semantics, Practices and Pluralism \u00a0 Abstract:\u00a0In this informal talk, I will revisit some longstanding issues in philosophical logic in the light of some contemporary developments.\u00a0 \u00a0 The…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"template":"","meta":{"_tribe_events_status":"","_tribe_events_status_reason":"","_tribe_events_is_hybrid":"","_tribe_events_is_virtual":"","_tribe_events_virtual_video_source":"","_tribe_events_virtual_embed_video":"","_tribe_events_virtual_linked_button_text":"","_tribe_events_virtual_linked_button":"","_tribe_events_virtual_show_embed_at":"","_tribe_events_virtual_show_embed_to":[],"_tribe_events_virtual_show_on_event":"","_tribe_events_virtual_show_on_views":"","_tribe_events_virtual_url":"","footnotes":""},"tags":[],"tribe_events_cat":[25],"class_list":["post-11862","tribe_events","type-tribe_events","status-publish","hentry","tribe_events_cat-metaphysics-and-logic-group","cat_metaphysics-and-logic-group"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.st-andrews.ac.uk\/philevents\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tribe_events\/11862","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.st-andrews.ac.uk\/philevents\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tribe_events"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.st-andrews.ac.uk\/philevents\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/tribe_events"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.st-andrews.ac.uk\/philevents\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/www.st-andrews.ac.uk\/philevents\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tribe_events\/11862\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":11954,"href":"https:\/\/www.st-andrews.ac.uk\/philevents\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tribe_events\/11862\/revisions\/11954"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.st-andrews.ac.uk\/philevents\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=11862"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.st-andrews.ac.uk\/philevents\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=11862"},{"taxonomy":"tribe_events_cat","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.st-andrews.ac.uk\/philevents\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tribe_events_cat?post=11862"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}