{"id":5730,"date":"2020-07-09T17:05:50","date_gmt":"2020-07-09T16:05:50","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.st-andrews.ac.uk\/philevents\/event\/conceptual-engineering-seminar-tba-4\/"},"modified":"2020-10-06T22:12:31","modified_gmt":"2020-10-06T21:12:31","slug":"conceptual-engineering-seminar-tba-4","status":"publish","type":"tribe_events","link":"https:\/\/www.st-andrews.ac.uk\/philevents\/event\/conceptual-engineering-seminar-tba-4\/","title":{"rendered":"Conceptual Engineering Seminar | Paul \u00c9gr\u00e9 (Paris) & Cathal O’Madagain (Ben Gu\u00e9rir): “Concept utility”"},"content":{"rendered":"

Abstract. \u2014<\/strong> Practices of concept-revision among scientists suggest that concepts can be improved. In 2006, the International Astronomical Union revised the concept PLANET so that it excluded Pluto, and insisting that the result was an improvement. But what could it mean for one concept or conceptual scheme to be better than another? Here we draw on the theory of epistemic utility to address this question. We show how the plausibility and informativeness of beliefs, two features that contribute to their utility, have direct correlates in our concepts. These are how inclusive a concept is, or how many objects in an environment it applies to, and how homogeneous it is, or how similar the objects that fall under the concept are. We provide ways of measuring these values, and argue that in combination they can provide us with a single principle of concept utility. We use this measure to account for concept constitution, and to rationalize cases of concept-revision.<\/p>\n