There are various recent theories of what is the relationship between the mental and the physical (such as grounding theories and panpsychism). This workshop is an opportunity to explore new theories and arguments concerning the metaphysics of the mind. This could be about mental properties in general or a specific kind of mental properties (e.g., phenomenal properties or propositional attitudes). Some relevant questions are: Are mental properties and physical properties identical? If they are distinct, what\u2019s the relationship between them? What considerations can help us decide between different metaphysical theories about the mind? Is the explanatory gap a problem for physicalism? What are the advantages and disadvantages of each theory?<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
Schedule:<\/p>\n
9:45 – 10:00 Coffee<\/p>\n
10:00 \u2013 11:00 Speaker 1 Daniel Stoljar (ANU): Structuralism and the Problem of Consciousness<\/p>\n
11:00 – 11:15 Break<\/p>\n
11:15 \u2013 12:15 Speaker 2 Umut Baysan (Oxford): The Causal Argument for Russellian Panpsychism<\/p>\n
12:15 – 13:15 Lunch Break<\/p>\n
13:15 – 14:15 Speaker 3 Andreas Elpidorou (Louisville): Physicalism, for the Scientifically Minded<\/p>\n
14:15 – 14:30 Break<\/p>\n
14:30 – 15:30 Speaker 4 Barbara Montero (CUNY): Goodbye Supervenience<\/p>\n
15:30 – 15:45 Break<\/p>\n
15:45 \u2013 16:45 Speaker 5 Jessica Wilson (Toronto): Identity and Relative Fundamentality<\/p>\n
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40 minutes talk, 20 minutes Q&A.<\/p>\n
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Join Zoom Meeting
\nhttps:\/\/us02web.zoom.us\/j\/84542362878?pwd=Um5wRVJRbVcyUzZRTUt0SDFCS004dz09<\/p>\n
Meeting ID: 845 4236 2878
\nPasscode: MOMW2020<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
For more info, contact: si24@st-andrews.ac.uk<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
David Stoljar (ANU)<\/p>\n
Title: \u00a0Structuralism and the Problem of Consciousness
\nAbstract: \u00a0Structuralist approaches to physical properties have played a big role in philosophical discussions\u00a0of consciousness in recent years, mainly through the development of what has come to be called\u00a0“Russellian monism”\u2014an approach in philosophy of mind that is exciting because of its promise to\u00a0move us beyond the dualist-physicalist standoff. In the first part of this talk, I will set out\u00a0Russellian monism, explaining its differences and similarities to various nearby views. In the\u00a0second part, I will raise some questions about what a structuralist approach to physical\u00a0properties could amount to in the context of debates about consciousness.<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
Umut Baysan (Oxford)<\/p>\n
Title: The Causal Argument for Russellian Panpsychism<\/p>\n
Abstract: According to Russellian panpsychism, the fundamental categorical properties that ground dispositional properties and conscious experiences of ordinary creatures like us are phenomenal properties. Its proponents admit that this claim is highly counterintuitive because it implies that phenomenal consciousness is a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of reality. However, they argue that the counter-intuitiveness of Russellian panpsychism can be overcome because it is uniquely well-suited to integrate consciousness in the causal order and hence explain mental causation. If this argument is correct, then Russellian panpsychism is more credible than its rivals, in particular than traditional forms of dualism, as dualist theories allegedly face insurmountable difficulties with regards to mental causation. In this paper, I argue that in explaining mental causation, the superiority of Russellian panpsychism over dualism is illusory. This is because, first, the problems that dualism faces regarding mental causation are not as serious as they appear to be. More specifically, neither accepting epiphenomenalism nor denying the causal closure of the physical is as problematic as some implications of Russellian panpsychism. And, second, Russellian panpsychism\u2019s explanation of mental causation leaves much to be desired. There may be other considerations in favour of Russellian panpsychism, but explaining mental causation is not one.<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
Andreas Elpidorou (Louisville)<\/p>\n
Title: Physicalism, for the Scientifically Minded<\/p>\n
Abstract: Within\u00a0recent philosophy of science, something like a consensus has emerged:\u00a0explanations in the life sciences, and specifically\u00a0those in neuroscience, are\u00a0such that describe mechanisms. Call this popular view of explanation \u201cNew\u00a0Mechanism.\u201d\u00a0The\u00a0talk will\u00a0examine the ontological commitments of New Mechanism and will argue\u00a0that it is compatible with both physicalist and anti-physicalist\u00a0conceptions of\u00a0our world. As such, physicalists attracted to New Mechanism are faced with a\u00a0choice. They can either make New\u00a0Mechanism more\u00a0metaphysically stringent\u00a0by adding metaphysical requirements\u00a0that ought to be met in order for a phenomenon to be\u00a0mechanistically explained\u00a0or they can adopt a new form of physicalism that is friendly to New Mechanism. The\u00a0talk takes the latter option.\u00a0It presents and defends a new physicalism that\u00a0suits the needs of New Mechanists who are also physicalists.<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
Barbara Montero (CUNY)<\/p>\n
Title: Goodbye Supervenience<\/p>\n
Abstract: According to Daniel Stoljar (2001), \u201cphysicalists may differ from one another in many ways, but all of them must at least hold supervenience physicalism.\u201d But why must a physicalist be a supervenience physicalist? Here, I hope to free physicalism from its supervenience shackles, arguing that physicalism need not imply that mental properties (or any other higher level properties, for that matter) supervene either logically or metaphysically on fundamental physical properties.<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
Jessica Wilson (Toronto)<\/p>\n
Title: Identity and Relative Fundamentality<\/p>\n
Abstract: Reductive physicalists think that mental states are type- or token-identical to physical states, and they moreover think that mental states are less fundamental than physical states. This combination of views poses a puzzle: given Leibniz’s Law, how can there be a difference in relative fundamentality as among identical states or other goings-on? In this talk, I canvas certain suggestions, and offer my own account of how to make sense of reductive physicalism and other identity theories.<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
Talks, but not the Q&A, will be recorded.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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