{"id":6134,"date":"2020-08-19T12:31:43","date_gmt":"2020-08-19T11:31:43","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.st-andrews.ac.uk\/philevents\/event\/epistemology-seminar-tba-22\/"},"modified":"2021-06-03T13:59:12","modified_gmt":"2021-06-03T12:59:12","slug":"epistemology-seminar-tba-22","status":"publish","type":"tribe_events","link":"https:\/\/www.st-andrews.ac.uk\/philevents\/event\/epistemology-seminar-tba-22\/","title":{"rendered":"Epistemology Seminar: Daniel Whiting (Southampton) &#8220;Higher-Order Evidence, First-Order Beliefs&#8221;"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><b>Abstract:<\/b> When a person has evidence about their capacity to assess the evidence for or against a proposition, for example, when they have evidence that their assessment is subject to bias, they have higher-order evidence. A popular view in epistemology is that higher-order evidence can make a difference to whether it is rational for a person to believe a proposition. In particular, many think that there are cases in which it would be rational to believe a proposition in the absence of higher-order evidence but not rational to believe that same proposition in the presence of higher-order evidence. In this paper, I will ask, how? How might higher-order evidence have this effect? I will outline three answers to this question and show that they fail. In closing, I will query the motivation for thinking that higher-order evidence makes a rational difference.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Abstract: When a person has evidence about their capacity to assess the evidence for or against a proposition, for example, when they have evidence that their assessment is subject to&hellip;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"template":"","meta":{"_tribe_events_status":"","_tribe_events_status_reason":"","_tribe_events_is_hybrid":"","_tribe_events_is_virtual":"","_tribe_events_virtual_video_source":"","_tribe_events_virtual_embed_video":"","_tribe_events_virtual_linked_button_text":"","_tribe_events_virtual_linked_button":"","_tribe_events_virtual_show_embed_at":"","_tribe_events_virtual_show_embed_to":[],"_tribe_events_virtual_show_on_event":"","_tribe_events_virtual_show_on_views":"","_tribe_events_virtual_url":"","footnotes":""},"tags":[],"tribe_events_cat":[5],"class_list":["post-6134","tribe_events","type-tribe_events","status-publish","hentry","tribe_events_cat-epistemology-seminar","cat_epistemology-seminar"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.st-andrews.ac.uk\/philevents\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tribe_events\/6134","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.st-andrews.ac.uk\/philevents\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tribe_events"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.st-andrews.ac.uk\/philevents\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/tribe_events"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.st-andrews.ac.uk\/philevents\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/www.st-andrews.ac.uk\/philevents\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tribe_events\/6134\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":7408,"href":"https:\/\/www.st-andrews.ac.uk\/philevents\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tribe_events\/6134\/revisions\/7408"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.st-andrews.ac.uk\/philevents\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=6134"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.st-andrews.ac.uk\/philevents\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=6134"},{"taxonomy":"tribe_events_cat","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.st-andrews.ac.uk\/philevents\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tribe_events_cat?post=6134"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}