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Events
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*** SESSION RESTRICTED TO ARCH脡 MEMBERS *** Abstract. 鈥斅燭his paper advertises the importance of distinguishing three different foundational projects concerning the epistemic, which we call normative epistemic inquiry, metaepistemic inquiry, and the conceptual ethics of epistemology. We argue that these projects can be distinguished by their contrasting constitutive success conditions. We argue further that because… |
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Abstract. 鈥斅燭he DSM (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders) is a classification of mental disorders. It is published by the American Psychiatric Association and revised by committees of psychiatrists ever fifteen years or so. This talk considers the DSM as a 鈥榗onceptual building site鈥�. For successful conceptual engineering to be possible we would need… |
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Abstract: This paper investigates the norm of presupposition, as one pervasive type of indirect speech act. It argues against the view that sees presuppositions as an indirect counterpart of the direct speech act of assertion and proposes instead that they are much more similar to the direct speech act of assumption. More concretely, it suggests…
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Abstract. 鈥斅燩recisifications of certain informal concepts could be thought of as instances of conceptual engineering: the concept of a Turing machine (human effective computability), the notion of a Kripke structure (possibility), the Kolmogorov axioms (probability), Tarski’s definition of truth in formal languages, to name just a few. Should we聽regard聽the technical notions these formalisms define as… |
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Abstract. 鈥� Let ‘epistemic concepts’ refer to those concepts which express the standards employed in epistemic assessment.聽聽 Such concepts offer an interesting test case for conceptual engineering.聽 On the one hand, they seem like they are tailor-made to be constructed聽de novo, answering to whichever of the varying interests we might have in epistemic evaluation.聽 On… |
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Abstract. 鈥� This talk addresses methodological and political challenges of conceptual engineering in cross-cultural perspective. Based on four case studies of interdisciplinary (empirical and philosophical) research projects in Latin America and West Africa, the talk demonstrates the heterogeneity of epistemological and ontological perspectives of stakeholders and the often hidden politics of their inclusion/exclusion in the… |
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Abstract: The notion of risk plays a central role in economics, finance, health, psychology, law and elsewhere, and is prevalent in managing challenges and resources in day-to-day life. In recent work, Duncan Pritchard (2015, 2016) has argued against the orthodox probabilistic conception of risk on which the risk of a hypothetical scenario is determined by… |
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Abstract. 鈥� Talk of function often plays a central role in work on conceptual engineering. An appeal to functions can provide much needed standards for evaluating and constructing concepts, according to how well they fulfill their functions, and whether those functions are desirable. However, there has also been a great deal of skepticism about the… |
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There are various recent theories of what is the relationship between the mental and the physical (such as grounding theories and panpsychism). This workshop is an opportunity to explore new theories and arguments concerning the metaphysics of the mind. This could be about mental properties in general or a specific kind of mental properties (e.g.,… |
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Abstract: This talk defends a contextualist theory of 鈥榢nowledge鈥� ascriptions. I argue that in some sentences, the implicit argument of 鈥榢nows鈥� is bound by a quantifier. The natural readings of these sentences can be generated by contextualist theories, but not by competing interest-relative theories of knowledge. In addition, I argue that the contextualist can explain… |
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