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Abstract: An a priori lie is a lie that conflicts with an a priori truth. Rather sportingly, the liar leaves himself open to refutation by armchair methods such as calculation. My thesis is that Immanuel Kant precludes the existence of a priori lies. For asserting a proposition requires raising a rational expectation of its truth.… |
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In Defence of Individual Rationality: Common-sense (or folk) psychology holds that (generally) we do what we do for the reasons we have. This common-sense approach is embodied in claims like 鈥淚 went to the kitchen because I wanted a drink鈥� or 鈥淪he took a coat because she thought it might rain and hoped to… |
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Abstract:聽Value capture occurs when an agent enters a social environment which presents external expressions of value 鈥� which are often simplified, standardized, and quantified 鈥� and those external versions come to dominate our reasoning and motivations. Examples include becoming motivated by Twitter Likes and Retweets, citation rates, ranked lists of best schools, and Grade Point… |
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Authority and Group Assertion We commonly attribute assertions to groups like companies and government institutions, and we want to hold them accountable for their assertions. Intuitively, we don’t attribute those assertions to the individuals performing them, but to the groups. The question is: what kind of speech act is group assertion and how does it… |
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Abstract: What should the interaction between non-experts and experts look like when it comes to moral inquiry? In this talk, I discuss this interaction from both perspectives. In the first part, I argue that whether non-experts should treat experts as authorities or advisors depends on the aim of moral inquiry which in turn varies with… |
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Abstract: In this work-in-progress, I build from Iris Marion Young鈥檚 notions of inclusion and exclusion and Kristie Dotson鈥檚 framework of epistemic oppression, to show how some traditional views about what counts as a good source of justification can participate to internal epistemic exclusion, which contributes to second order epistemic oppression. Whilst theories of justification often… |
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Abstract:聽The aim of this paper is two-fold. First, it introduces the concept logical akrasia (by analogy to epistemic akrasia). Second, it discusses how logical akrasia relates to the standards of epistemic rationality, and in particular, how logical akrasia poses a challenge to the tenability of the controversial 铿亁ed point thesis. |
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