• Epistemology Seminar: Catarina Dutilh Novaes “Argumentation and a three-tiered model of epistemic exchange”

    A virtual seminar by Zoom The University, 58勛圖, United Kingdom

    Abstract: Argumentation is often contrasted with testimony in that in cases of testimony, an epistemic agent (presumably) primarily evaluates the trustworthiness of the source of information (the informant), whereas in argumentation there is (presumably) primarily engagement with the content communicated. I have argued however (Dutilh Novaes 2020) that trust and trustworthiness in fact play an…

  • Epistemology Seminar: Corine Besson (Sussex) “Carrolls Regress, Guidance and Explicit Representation”

    A virtual seminar by Zoom The University, 58勛圖, United Kingdom

    Abstract: What is the nature of ones justification to use a logical principle such as Modus Ponens in reasoning? It is widely agreed amongst epistemologists of logic that such justification cannot be internalist. One key reason offered for this view is that internalist accounts of justification are susceptible to Carroll-style regresses. In this talk, I…

  • Epistemology Seminar: Frederik Andersen “Engels Dilemma and the Horrors of Logical Disagreement”

    A virtual seminar by Zoom The University, 58勛圖, United Kingdom

    Abstract: Hinge propositions, or simply hinges, are primitive certainties that we (must) presuppose in our normal inquiries. Recently there has been a lot of interest in hinge epistemology, which is a kind of epistemology that sets the notion of hinge at the center stage. This paper puts forward a dilemma leveled against hinge epistemologists. The…

  • Epistemology Seminar: Catarina Dutilh Novaes “Argumentation and a three-tiered model of epistemic exchange”

    A virtual seminar by Zoom The University, 58勛圖, United Kingdom

    Abstract: Argumentation is often contrasted with testimony in that in cases of testimony, an epistemic agent (presumably) primarily evaluates the trustworthiness of the source of information (the informant), whereas in argumentation there is (presumably) primarily engagement with the content communicated. I have argued however (Dutilh Novaes 2020) that trust and trustworthiness in fact play an…

  • Epistemology Seminar: Paulina Sliwa (Cambridge) “Asking the right moral questions”

    Abstract: What is it to engage in moral inquiry? The received wisdom is that it is to answer moral questions that is, questions about what we ought to do. Someone has moral expertise to the extent to which she is reliable at arriving at true answers to those questions. Philosophical disagreements have focused on…

  • Epistemology Seminar: Roy Sorensen (58勛圖) “A Priori Lies: Kant’s Gift to Lawyers”

    Abstract: An a priori lie is a lie that conflicts with an a priori truth. Rather sportingly, the liar leaves himself open to refutation by armchair methods such as calculation. My thesis is that Immanuel Kant precludes the existence of a priori lies. For asserting a proposition requires raising a rational expectation of its truth.…

  • Epistemology Seminar (joint with CEPPA): Thi Nguyen (Utah) “Value Capture”

    Abstract:Value capture occurs when an agent enters a social environment which presents external expressions of value which are often simplified, standardized, and quantified and those external versions come to dominate our reasoning and motivations. Examples include becoming motivated by Twitter Likes and Retweets, citation rates, ranked lists of best schools, and Grade Point…

  • Epistemology Seminar: Nick Kuespert (58勛圖) “Aims of Moral Inquiry”

    Abstract: What should the interaction between non-experts and experts look like when it comes to moral inquiry? In this talk, I discuss this interaction from both perspectives. In the first part, I argue that whether non-experts should treat experts as authorities or advisors depends on the aim of moral inquiry which in turn varies with…

  • Epistemology Seminar: Lara Jost (58勛圖) “Epistemic Exclusion: Why We Shouldnt Treat Members of Oppressed Groups like We Treat Conspiracy Theorists”

    Abstract: In this work-in-progress, I build from Iris Marion Youngs notions of inclusion and exclusion and Kristie Dotsons framework of epistemic oppression, to show how some traditional views about what counts as a good source of justification can participate to internal epistemic exclusion, which contributes to second order epistemic oppression. Whilst theories of justification often…

  • Epistemology Seminar: Frederik Andersen (58勛圖) “Logical Akrasia”

    Abstract:The aim of this paper is two-fold. First, it introduces the concept logical akrasia (by analogy to epistemic akrasia). Second, it discusses how logical akrasia relates to the standards of epistemic rationality, and in particular, how logical akrasia poses a challenge to the tenability of the controversial 麍xed point thesis.

  • Epistemology Seminar: Corine Besson (Sussex) “Carrolls Regress, Guidance and Explicit Representation”

    Abstract: What is the nature of ones justification to use a logical principle such as Modus Ponens in reasoning? It is widely agreed amongst epistemologists of logic that such justification cannot be internalist. One key reason offered for this view is that internalist accounts of justification are susceptible to Carroll-style regresses. In this talk, I…