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Abstract: This talk defends a contextualist theory of ‘knowledge’ ascriptions. I argue that in some sentences, the implicit argument of ‘knows’ is bound by a quantifier. The natural readings of these sentences can be generated by contextualist theories, but not by competing interest-relative theories of knowledge. In addition, I argue that the contextualist can explain…

Abstract: In this presentation I will discuss epistemic labour, which I characterise as labour one performs in their capacity as an epistemic agent. There is growing interest in a category of domestic labour frequently termed ‘emotional labour’. I show that this labour is, in fact, a primarily form of epistemic labour. I argue that domestic…

Abstract: In contemporary analytic epistemology, emotions are usually not considered to be a good justification for an agent’s belief, in the same way perception, memory, reasoning or testimony are, due to emotions facing issues when it comes to being reliable and sensitive to defeaters. In this talk, I argue that this problem can be overcome…

Abstract: Novelty—understood as the value of saying something new—appears to be a good-making feature of a philosophical contribution. Beyond this, however, novelty functions as a marker of philosophical success: contributions that say something new are considered successful, while contributions that do not say something new are considered unsuccessful. When novelty serves as a marker and metric…

Abstract: In supplementing the familiar ways that our interpersonal relationships are morally fraught, recent work in epistemology on doxastic wronging has highlighted how these relationships can be epistemically fraught as well. However, in focusing predominantly on beliefs— mental states that arguably constitute a small fraction of our mental lives—these theories have their own theoretical blindspots.…

Abstract: Discussions in a variety of contexts (including at least epistemic injustice, moral encroachment, epistemic obligations of friendship) sometimes assume that speakers have a right or moral entitlement to be believed when they assert or testify that p: that they are wronged if their audience fails to believe them. It is controversial whether rights of…

Abstract: When a person has evidence about their capacity to assess the evidence for or against a proposition, for example, when they have evidence that their assessment is subject to bias, they have higher-order evidence. A popular view in epistemology is that higher-order evidence can make a difference to whether it is rational for a…