Metaphysics and Logic group
Events
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Edgecliffe G03
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Metaphysics & Logic Seminar: NO MEETING THIS WEEK
Edgecliffe 104 University of 58勛圖, 58勛圖, United Kingdom -
Metaphysics & Logic Seminar
Edgecliffe G03 -
Metaphysics & Logic Seminar: Greg Restall, “The Logic of Paradox as a Substructural Logic”
Edgecliffe G03Graham Priests simple three-valued logic LP has many curious properties. It has the same valid formulas as classical logic, but differs from classical logic when it comes to validsequents. The valid sequents do not uniquely characterise the logic: it is possible to have more than one different LP-negation, each of which satisfies all the LP-requirements,…
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Metaphysics & Logic Seminar
Edgecliffe G03 -
Metaphysics & Logic Seminar: Luna Guan: “Simplicity without Identity”
Edgecliffe G03The doctrine of divine simplicity serves two roles in Christian theologyit upholds the creator-creation distinction by saying that only the divine ontology is absolutely simple whereas every other created being is a composite, and it supports divine aseity by identifying the divine attributes with God. Traditional and contemporary versions of divine simplicity have filled these…
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Metaphysics & Logic Seminar
Edgecliffe G03 -
Metaphysics & Logic Seminar: Christopher Masterman: “Are abstraction principles all that explanatory?””
Edgecliffe G03An increasingly popular view is that abstracta are thintheir existence alone makes little or no demand on the world. The most sophisticated defence of this view to date is the version of abstractionism found in Linnebo’s recent book Thin Objects (2018). On this view, good abstraction principles should be understood as involving claims about asymmetric…
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Metaphysics & Logic Seminar
Edgecliffe G03 -
Metaphysics & Logic Seminar: Gill Russell: “Normativity, Neutrality, and Normativity and Neutrality”
Edgecliffe G03Neutrality and normativity have both attracted attention in the recent philosophy of logic. In this paper I ask: can we consistently hold that logic is both non-neutral and non-normative when it comes to logics for normative sentences? (e.g. deontic logics.) If these fail to be neutral wont they commit themselves on questions of substantive normative…
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Metaphysics & Logic Seminar
Edgecliffe G03 -
Metaphysics & Logic Seminar: Harry Vincent: “Must We Say What We May”
Edgecliffe G03Abstract: Normative inferentialist approaches to semantics in the tradition of Robert Brandom have traditionally focused on challenging as the appropriate response to an unentitled claim in an assertion-based autonomous discursive practice (ADP). In this paper I argue that purportedly unentitled claiming is likely to be far more prevalent than we might think in such…