Events
Calendar of Events
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Location: Edgecliffe G03 Title: Ought and the Transmission of Reasons Abstract: According to the widely held Weightiest Reasons view about how reasons for action and the practical ought are related to one another, (WR) an agent ought to φ if, and only if, the reasons for φ are weightier than the reasons for every incompatible alternative to… |
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Title: Beyond the Now: Epistemic Oppression and the “Common†Sense of Incarceration Abstract: In this presentation, I narrate an encounter with 2 Black teenagers who attempted to steal my cellphone and the difficulty of insisting on accountability while avoiding the worst parts of the state-run criminal justice system. Ultimately, I demonstrate that, at times, when a situation calls for accountability for a serious wrongdoing…
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POSTPONED TO 7/4/2022 Abstract: In this presentation, I narrate an encounter with 2 Black teenagers who attempted to steal my cellphone and the difficulty of insisting on accountability while avoiding the worst parts of the state-run criminal justice system. Ultimately, I demonstrate that, at times, when a situation calls for accountability for a serious wrongdoing in the U.S. one can find oneself trapped… |
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Disagreement in Logic
Over the past fifteen years the epistemology of disagreement has been one of the most widely discussed research topics in epistemology. A special case of disagreement is logical disagreement, i.e. disputes regarding the validity of certain inferences, or the status of fundamental logical principles. This one-day Arché workshop is dedicated to the topic Disagreement in… |
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Title: Epistemic Akrasia: No Apology Required Abstract: It is natural to think that rationality imposes some relationship between what a person believes, and what she believes about what she’s rational to believe. Epistemic akrasia—for example, believing P while believing that P is not rational to believe in your situation—is often seen as intrinsically irrational. This… |
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Logic of Identity
Given a theory – e.g., in mathematics, theology, physics, sociology, political theory – what is it for the objects of that theory to be identical? Not all true theories give the same answer: it can depend on the objects of the theory. The logic of identity, as current research stands, is largely confined to the… |
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Title: Legislative Intent: A Rational Unity Account (co-authored with David Tan (Deakin University)) Abstract:Â Does the legislature have intentions concerning the effects of legislation? If so, how can that intent be known by outsiders? Existing theories of legislative intent can be divided into three camps: skepticism, constructivism, and realism. This paper begins by outlining problems for… |
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