Abstract. In this paper I argue thatconcepts fall into distinct kinds according to such things as their direction of determination, their modal range, and the nature of their referents. Such properties determine a given concept’s eligibility for genuine revision.As a result, different kinds of concepts require different treatment in the context of conceptual engineering. Understanding…
Conceptual Engineering Seminar
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Abstract. Practices of concept-revision among scientists suggest that concepts can be improved. In 2006, the International Astronomical Union revised the concept PLANET so that it excluded Pluto, and insisting that the result was an improvement. But what could it mean for one concept or conceptual scheme to be better than another? Here we draw… |
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Abstract. According to Mary Midgley (19192018), philosophy is like plumbing: “Each system supplies vital needs for those who live above it. Each is hard to repair when it does go wrong, because neither of them was ever consciously planned as a whole. In her view, philosophy responds to basic needs that are fundamental to… |
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Abstract. Historically, some feminists and Marxists aimed to introduce theoretically useful concepts to accurately describe, explain, and predict existing oppression and inequality. In fact, Haslanger (2000, 2006) had argued that we should analyse social kind concepts for discriminated groups (e.g., for race or gender) so as to lay down the conditions of oppression of the… |
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*** SESSION RESTRICTED TO ARCH MEMBERS *** Abstract. This paper advertises the importance of distinguishing three different foundational projects concerning the epistemic, which we call normative epistemic inquiry, metaepistemic inquiry, and the conceptual ethics of epistemology. We argue that these projects can be distinguished by their contrasting constitutive success conditions. We argue further that because… |
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