Epistemology Seminar
Events
Calendar of Events
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Abstract: In contemporary analytic epistemology, emotions are usually not considered to be a good justification for an agent鈥檚 belief, in the same way perception, memory, reasoning or testimony are, due to emotions facing issues when it comes to being reliable and sensitive to defeaters. In this talk, I argue that this problem can be overcome… |
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Abstract:聽Novelty鈥攗nderstood as the value of saying something new鈥攁ppears to be a good-making feature of a philosophical contribution. Beyond this, however, novelty functions as a marker of philosophical success: contributions that say something new are considered successful, while contributions that do not say something new are considered unsuccessful. When novelty serves as a marker and metric… |
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Abstract: In supplementing the familiar ways that our interpersonal relationships are morally fraught, recent work in epistemology on doxastic wronging has highlighted how these relationships can be epistemically fraught as well. However, in focusing predominantly on beliefs鈥� mental states that arguably constitute a small fraction of our mental lives鈥攖hese theories have their own theoretical blindspots.… |
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Abstract: Discussions in a variety of contexts (including at least epistemic injustice, moral encroachment, epistemic obligations of friendship) sometimes assume that speakers have a right or moral entitlement to be believed when they assert or testify that p: that they are wronged if their audience fails to believe them. It is controversial whether rights of… |
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Abstract: When a person has evidence about their capacity to assess the evidence for or against a proposition, for example, when they have evidence that their assessment is subject to bias, they have higher-order evidence. A popular view in epistemology is that higher-order evidence can make a difference to whether it is rational for a… |
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