Abstract: What is the nature of ones justification to use a logical principle such as Modus Ponens in reasoning? It is widely agreed amongst epistemologists of logic that such justification cannot be internalist. One key reason offered for this view is that internalist accounts of justification are susceptible to Carroll-style regresses. In this talk, I…
Epistemology Seminar
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Abstract: In this talk I examine, and rebut, Goldbergs (2020) arguments in favour of a conversational norm that would defeasibly entitle linguistic agents to presume that silence indicates assent (NSR). Using evidence from conversational analysis I show that Goldberg is wrong to claim that our linguistic communities de facto conform to this norm in conversation.…
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Abstract: In this paper, I provide an account of the epistemic significance of the phenomenon of being known and the relationship it has to reparations that are distinctively epistemic. Drawing on a framework provided by the United Nations of the right to know, I argue that victims of gross violations and injustices not only have… |
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Abstract: This paper (which is very much a work in progress) will develop the concept ofextractivist epistemologyas a way to think through the effect of colonialism on knowing practices. Extractivist epistemologies work analogously to extractivist capitalism: seeking an epistemic resource of some sort—such as a piece of pharmacological knowledge held by an indigenous community or… |
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Abstract: Knowledge by sight is a standard paradigm of a posteriori knowledge. Knowledge by mathematical proof is a standard paradigm of a priori knowledge. However, I will argue that the two types of knowledge have so much in common that the a priori – a posteriori distinction cannot go very deep. |
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